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INTRODUCTION
This book has a two-level structure. Its central part is a case study of a cogni-
tive approach to the representation of lexical “senses”, which is sometimes called 
“prototype semantics” (cf. Kleiber 2003 [1990]). This initial delimitation of the 
“object” of investigation merits some comment.
The label “prototype semantics” serves well as a sign of opposition to previ-
ous, more openly structuralist1 approaches to the representation of lexical senses. 
It is, however, potentially troublesome in respect of both its segments. While one 
may read the label’s meaning as “an application of the prototype theory of cate-
gorization to semantic issues”, it is not obvious that one can cogently talk about 
the prototype theory. What is beyond dispute is the existence of prototype ef-
fects, which may have relevance for psychological theories of concepts.2 More-
over, the notion of “prototype” as used in cognitive psychology (see section 0.2. 
below) need not play the central role in the linguistic study labelled “prototype 
semantics”. There are other features of “prototype phenomena” which may be as 
important in language study as the notion of “prototype” itself, i.e. graded and 
nondiscrete aspects of linguistic categories, or “family resemblances” between 
their members. In short, psychological “prototype effects” could be only a sug-
gestive analogy to some linguistically relevant phenomena.3 
The label can be also misleading as concerns the “semantics” segment. As un-
derstood traditionally, “semantics” is centrally opposed to syntax and pragmatics. 
However, in cognitive linguistics (CL, further used also as an adjective), which 
1 I am hinting here at complex relations between the descendants of Saussure’s structuralism 
(neostructuralists, generativists and cognitive linguists). This historical issue will be formulated be-
low and will constitute a signifi cant element in my conclusions (see 5.2.).
2 This is the position of Eleanor Rosch – the founder of the prototype approach in psychology. 
In Lehrer’s summary, Rosch “argues that the notion of prototype does not in itself constitute a theory. 
She claims only that any theory of concepts must be consistent with what is known about prototypes” 
(Lehrer 1990: 381, note 1). Lakoff traces an evolution in Rosch’s view on this matter – as pointed 
out by Vandeloise (1990: 409), refl ecting rather his own changes of view than hers – but faithfully 
reports her position that prototype effects do not constitute a theory of categorization. Nevertheless, 
he claims simultaneously that Rosch “launched a general challenge to the classical theory” (Lakoff 
1987: 42–45), thus giving substance to Vandeloise’s charge.
3 This general statement points to a complex of entangled issues central for “prototype seman-
tics”, concerning the relations between goals of psychologists and linguists (the role of linguistic 
evidence in ventures of different kind; the possibility of transferring – or “generalizing” – data from 
one research context to another; ultimately, the status of both disciplines or their mutual relation-
ship). It is enough to point out here a peculiar role of words in psychological experiments: “proto-
type effects” studied by Rosch and others are elicited when words are treated as lists to be ordered 
according to some abstract criterion (e.g. what is a better example of a type?) rather than as used in 
communication.
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developed the prototype approach, both syntactic and pragmatic phenomena tend 
to be explained in semantic terms (see 0.3.). Thus, the label “prototype semantics” 
can be used by a cognitive linguist to cover phenomena outside the range of tra-
ditionally conceived semantics.
This problem recurs in my description of the fi eld under investigation, i.e. “a 
new approach to the representation of lexical ‘senses’”. In traditional terms, I will 
explore the domain of “lexical semantics”, and more specifi cally, the category of 
“prepositions”. Since cognitive analyses and models cross standard morphosyn-
tactic boundaries, “prepositional” will actually refer not only to prepositions, but 
also to other categories, in which the lexical items chosen for discussion may be 
included.4
The crucial part of my agenda concerns the representation of lexical “senses” 
– a technical term for distinct meanings of words, ascribed to them out of the con-
text of use. It is assumed both in the new cognitive paradigm, as well as in the more 
traditional schools (neostructuralist and generativist ones), to which it is usually 
opposed, that words have senses which can be analysed in isolation. Without this 
assumption, arguably central for the very existence of lexical semantics, “the ra-
tionale for distinguishing lexical from sentence/utterance semantics would evapo-
rate” (Zlatev 2003: 454).5 The distinction reveals a gap between word senses, as 
represented out of context, and their meanings in use. Since the latter seem to be 
almost infi nitely fl exible,6 an analyst may feel an obligation to show how to get 
from postulated/attested senses to actual meanings. In lexical semantics, there are 
three general positions on this issue, which may be labelled with the terms: ho-
monymy, polysemy, monosemy. The gap between senses and meanings of a word 
is least acute for the homonymy position, which allows, in principle, as many 
separate senses as one detects in use (or posits), but this is bought – ultimately 
– at the price of incoherence, if senses in use, or actual meanings of a word, are 
potentially infi nite in number.7 The gap is most acute for the monosemy position, 
assuming a theorist would like to derive actual meanings from a single postulated 
sense. The polysemy position occupies the middle ground. It may be viewed as 
more realistic than the other two and refl ecting common-sense intuitions: words 
4 Terminological problems of this kind occur whenever a new approach offers its own theoreti-
cal grid to cover some “common ground” (terminology follows methodology). This issue primarily 
concerns future developments: whether a compromise is possible (an integration of perspectives or a 
“division of labour” of some kind) or not (which may mean that a particular perspective wins out as 
more encompassing or that both coexist as incommensurable).
5 It is not obvious to what extent Zlatev’s formulation covers some dynamic approaches to lexi-
cal meaning, which treat word meanings out of context as e.g. “pre-meanings” (Croft, Cruse 2004: 
97ff.) or “parameterised lexical concepts” (Dunbar 1991: 112ff.), since such theoretical constructs 
require actualization to have some specifi c content. In such cases the postulated distinction between 
“senses” and “meanings in use” is problematic (see 0.4.).
6 As pointed out by Croft and Cruse, the “possible readings of any word are nondenumerable” 
(2004: 111–112).
7 Since the homonymy position – represented by generativists – is focused on abstract “compe-
tence”, the issue of “performance” is not treated as problematic.
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have a number of related senses (see 0.4.).8 In a CL formulation, words constitute 
“natural categories of senses” (Lakoff 1987: 418).9
Thus, however, the polysemy position adds another dimension to the problem 
of representation. It is not only the number of senses of a single word form or 
lexeme10 which is at stake (one, several, many), but also their relatedness. On the 
level of representation, the proffered solution is a format containing “chains” or 
“networks” of senses. The problem to be solved is how to fi nd a principled way 
of distinguishing separate senses and how to locate the central sense(s), as mod-
els proposed by various theorists for a single lexeme turn out to be remarkably 
different in those respects. Those problems of representation refl ect, in turn, the 
more substantial issue of meaning extension: on what grounds particular relations 
between senses are established? Specifi cally, what kind of reality is revealed by 
such networks of related senses: is it historical (social process), psychological 
(semantic representations in the mind underlying actualizations in a context) or 
logical (relatedness of ideas)? Or a combination of those possibilities? So much 
for the central questions of the case study (as they, prima facie, appear; cf. 4.3.).
Prepositional network models – as stated in the subtitle – will be the “ob-
ject” of a hermeneutical exploration. This is the second layer, or the vantage point 
from which the case study is approached. There are several possible justifi cations 
for a “hermeneutical” approach to prepositional networks. At the historical level, 
one may argue that cognitive lexical models signal a return to the concerns of 
prestructuralist diachronic semantics, rooted in philological hermeneutics, within 
a new paradigm.11 This claim has been forcefully put forward by Geeraerts in a se-
ries of publications (1988b, 1992b, 2002) and by Tabakowska in the context of 
Polish linguistics (2004). From this perspective, network models could be treated 
as a chapter in the history of linguistic ideas – “the return of hermeneutics to lexi-
cal semantics”, as formulated by Geeraerts (the title of 1992b). At the methodo-
logical level, one could point out that linguistics is primarily a hermeneutical or 
interpretative science, opposed in its methods to natural sciences (as argued most 
persistently by Itkonen, e.g. 1977, 1981, 1997, 2008; cf. also Zlatev 2003: 459). 
8 Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk describes these positions and provides references. As she points 
out, the positions are related to the “granularity question”: “Which level of detail is most appropriate 
for semantic description?” (2007: 152).
9 See 1.3., note 28 for a discussion of Lakoff’s phrase. It is invoked here in an intuitively appeal-
ing “evolutionary” meaning which seems to underlie network modelling: with the passage of time, 
words develop a number of related senses.
10 “Word form” may be termed a “morpheme”, “lexeme” (cf. Szymanek 1993: 14–18 for some 
defi nitional problems), or a “lemma”, as in corpus linguistics (Glynn 2009). I will treat word forms as 
unproblematic for the purposes of this study; they will be marked with italics in the text (italics will 
also be used conventionally in quotations and to mark foreign words).
11 On the prestructuralist linguistics, see Jankowsky (1972) and chapters from more compre-
hensive treatments, e.g. Jespersen (1922: book I), Harris and Taylor (1989: chapters 11–13), Seuren 
(1998: chapter 2). On the cognitive paradigm in general, see Gardner (1987); Varela, Thompson, 
Rosch (1993); Baumgartner and Payr (1995), Bechtel and Graham (1998). On CL, see e.g. Ungerer 
and Schmid (1996), Croft and Cruse (2004), Evans and Green (2006).
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From this point of view, network models appear as intuitive reconstructions and 
interpretations of the structure of a given linguistic material rather than empiri-
cal models of actual processes and relations (whether historical, or psychologi-
cal). Finally, at the level of foundational assumptions about the nature of meaning 
and language, one could try to show that insights developed in hermeneutical 
phenomenology by some of the great philosophers of the 20th century (Husserl, 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Patočka, Ricoeur) throw light on the whole 
domain of linguistics and on specifi c problems recurring in the work of cognitive 
linguists (some of whom claim that CL mounts a challenge to philosophy at that 
very level of foundational assumptions about meaning and language).12
The hermeneutical exploration offered below may be related to all three moti-
vations. As concerns the historical development of the discipline, I believe – with-
out putting into question specifi c parallels between cognitive and prestructuralist 
work pointed out by Geeraerts and Tabakowska – that network models remain im-
portantly structuralist, and thus they cannot be properly opposed to this paradigm. 
Indeed, Geeraerts in the articles mentioned above places CL in the line of descent 
going down from structuralism, while Tabakowska opposes CL only to its im-
mediate predecessor – Chomsky’s transformational grammar (TG) – and presents 
it as a correction of “generativist excesses”. As she says about Langacker: his 
“theory of language is based on solid structuralist foundations” (1995: 6). I will 
show, however, that CL – following Chomsky – has signifi cantly weakened those 
foundations.13 Thus, a “hermeneutical” exploration could be a voice in the discus-
sion about the place of CL in the history of linguistics (see 5.2.).
That discussion is clearly linked to the methodological status of cognitive 
analyses. I have repeatedly argued against the “naturalistic” interpretation of CL, 
which was put forward most notoriously by Lakoff and Johnson in the whole 
series of their publications: Lakoff, Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; 
Johnson 1993a; Lakoff 1996; Lakoff, Johnson 1999 (to mention only book-length 
statements).14 In a slogan formulated by Turner, they (used to) claim that “the 
central fact of the humanities [in our context: linguistics] is the central nervous 
system” (1991: 48).15 Even though other towering fi gures within CL (notably, 
Langacker) assume a more cautious stance in relation to its place within cognitive 
12 E.g. “The problem [is] not one of extending or patching up some existing theory of meaning 
but of revising central assumptions in the Western philosophical tradition” (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 
ix–x).
13 This is not an original claim, as is evident in the debate between CL and its neostructuralist 
critics, see e.g. Coseriu’s criticism of prototype semantics as reported by Rúa (2003: 19, 30–31) and 
Taylor (1999: 26ff.); see also Taylor’s discussion of the “two-level model” (1995) and the relations 
between CL and structuralist semantics in general (1999). My position is opposed to Taylor’s.
14 I criticised that ideological project in detail in Pawelec (2005a, b, c, d; 2006a, b; 2007a, b).
15 Turner belonged at one time to what may be characterized as “Lakoff’s circle”. I argued (see 
Pawelec 2005a: 11–12) that this group of researchers from various domains collaborating with La-
koff on a common agenda includes also Kövecses, Núñez and – via Turner – Fauconnier. See e.g. 
Kövecses 1986, 1988, 1990; Lakoff, Turner 1989; Fauconnier 1997; Fauconnier, Turner 2003; La-
koff, Núñez 2001. A possible formulation of this agenda may be found in note 17 below.
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science,16 there looms a fundamental question about the status of linguistics as 
practised within the cognitive paradigm: is it a branch of psychology of some kind 
(neuropsychology?; social psychology?) or is it (relatively) autonomous, with its 
own agenda? Following several authors – apart from Itkonen and Zlatev, also, 
importantly, Sinha (1993, 1999, 2009) – one may argue that CL should be reinter-
preted: it is not primarily a branch of empirical (or even speculative) psychology 
but a hermeneutical or interpretative study of linguistic forms as developed, used 
and intuited within particular communities.
The last motivation (i.e. an assessment of CL from the perspective of herme-
neutical phenomenology) is the most far-reaching one and at the same time most 
diffi cult to substantiate. On the one hand, CL is heterogeneous, while I focus on a 
small (and arguably noncentral) aspect of this venture. On the other hand, it would 
be out of place to present here in a sketchy (or rather skeletal) form the views 
on meaning and language as developed by hermeneutical philosophers.17 Apart 
from the general reason that ideas of all great philosophers constitute takes on the 
whole of reality and, as such, require an all-out effort to be appropriated, herme-
neutical philosophy is perhaps unique in its dedication to both external dialogue 
with other currents of thought (not only in philosophy, but also in science and art) 
as well as internal dialogue among its practitioners.18 As such, it is less amenable 
to a summary presentation than most. Consequently, what I would like to offer is 
an introduction to the hermeneutical “view” (0.1.), occasional quotations and re-
marks bringing to light its divergence from the cognitive perspective, and, fi nally, 
a hermeneutical take on linguistic meaning and linguistics in general (see chapter 
5.), to make this position more transparent to linguists without a background in 
philosophy in the context of more specifi c aims of this study.
However, the problem goes deeper, as manifested by my hypothetical state-
ments about what the hermeneutical approach may involve in this case. No sane 
16 See Langacker’s modest statements: “Some portions of the present work can be regarded as an 
exercise in speculative psychology. I speak unabashedly about cognitive events, and sometimes go 
into considerable detail about their architecture and their relationships. All of this must be accepted 
in the proper spirit. Since I claim no privileged access to the operation of the human mind, there is 
obviously a substantial (some might say intolerable) element of speculation in any such proposals 
concerning the specifi cs of cognitive activity [...]. I have adhered rather strictly, in developing my 
proposals, to the dictates of both psychological plausibility and linguistic necessity; I have relied 
almost exclusively on seemingly indisputable cognitive abilities (e.g. the ability to compare two 
events and register a discrepancy between them), and I invoke them for linguistic constructs that must 
somehow be accommodated in any comprehensive and explicit analysis” (Langacker 1987: 6). If we 
go further down the line, the label “cognitive science” may be used to package loosely connected 
ventures, which look for prestige and, ultimately, better funding (cf. Turner 2001: 154).
17 I presented the gist of the positions taken on language by Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer and 
Ricoeur in Pawelec (2005a: ch. 7). My aim was to give substance to the claim that the ideological 
agenda of Lakoff’s circle, when confronted with genuine philosophical work, does not carry any 
conviction. That agenda is advertised by Lakoff and Johnson as follows: “more than two millenia of 
a priori philosophical speculation about [mind, meaning and language] are over” due to empirical 
discoveries in cognitive science (1999: 3).
18 As stated famously by Gadamer: “The ongoing dialogue permits no fi nal conclusion. It would 
be a poor hermeneuticist who thought he could have, or had to have, the last word” (1993: 579).
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person could believe that one can meaningfully prove anything on that scale 
(whether on the historical, methodological or philosophical level), particularly 
on the margins of a study focused on some problems of lexical representation in 
CL. My invocation of the hermeneutical perspective should be taken in the proper 
spirit: as an expression of my conviction that those problems of representation are 
rooted in the wider contexts invoked above, thus they can be made more transpar-
ent if one takes them into account. “Taking into account” means “showing that 
they are ultimately relevant” – that they should be invoked at some level of the 
discussion (see 0.5.).
I do believe that a step in this direction is justifi ed and hopefully welcome, 
for several reasons. First of all, CL enters into a dialogue with other approaches 
to language and meaning. Even though in the initial phase of development its 
stance towards alternative positions was sometimes unnecessarily combative, as 
evidenced by “revolutionary” slogans and occasionally a patronising attitude to 
critics,19 CL has now moved into a period of stabilisation and rapprochement with 
tradition, inviting open dialogue.20 Such developments seem propitious for a re-
newed hermeneutical assessment, since previous ones – most notably by McLure 
(1990, 1993) – met with incomprehension, as is evident from Johnson’s response 
(1993b) to the latter publication, which was in turn an answer to Johnson’s call 
(1992) for treating CL’s aspirations seriously.21 Second, from the start CL is 
openly “interdisciplinary” and in search of foundations. One could hope that a 
hermeneutical (read: more encompassing) view on some vexing issues in lexical 
representation may contribute (on a modest scale) to efforts aiming at a clarifi ca-
tion of CL’s identity. That general justifi cation, fi nally, is clearly linked with the 
hermeneutical aspects at the more specifi c historical and methodological levels, 
as mentioned before. Even though the questions raised in these contexts are dif-
ferent, they are all related to each other and also crucially to the basic issue of 
CL’s self-identity. Thus, I would like to offer the present study as a small contribu-
tion to the self-interpretation of the discipline.
In more substantial terms, this book aims to reveal a deep divergence of per-
spectives between the cognitive and the hermeneutical approaches to the meaning 
19 In this respect, the debate around a well-documented psychological critique of Lakoff and 
Johnson’s “philosophy of embodied realism” (Rakova 2002) is symptomatic. In their answer, John-
son and Lakoff tend not to notice substantive issues and prefer to ascribe to the author a “false men-
tality”, e.g. “She is seeing our work through idealized cognitive models of the mind and language 
– including metaphors – derived from traditional forms of philosophy” (Johnson, Lakoff 2002: 258). 
In his commentary, Krzeszowski points out that their position “must result in communication break-
downs” (2002: 268). In a more general context, see J. Taylor’s comments on “polemical aspects” of 
CL (2007: 567–569).
20 As clearly evident thanks to the presence and content of several articles in Janssen, Redeker 
1999 (e.g. Harder, Sinha), Geeraerts, Cuyckens 2007 (e.g. Harder, Nuyts, Sinha, Taylor) and Evans, 
Pourcel 2009 (e.g. Croft, Harder, Sinha).
21 I have offered a hermeneutical assessment of the ideological aspirations of CL (under the ban-
ner of “second generation cognitive science”) in Pawelec 2005a, as well as, more recently, of some 
linguistic aspects of CL’s paradigm (2006c; 2008; to appear: a, b).
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of words. My whole argument at this fundamental level could be summarised as 
follows: the issue of the representation of lexical senses (available out of context) 
presupposes the issue of distinct meanings of words in use, which in turn presup-
poses the question of the transformative power of words (in linguistics, articulated 
by Humboldt as energeia, cf. 5.0.). Anything I say below should be placed in the 
context of this sequence, which I hope to make more transparent. If a label could 
be helpful, I propose to complement an a posteriori static cognitive approach with 
a dynamic (or “genetic”) “expressive” one. Again, a venture of this kind cannot be 
convincingly argued for, exhaustive etc. Whenever a fundamental change of per-
spective is urged, one can only appeal (as shown by Merleau-Ponty and Charles 
Taylor22), starting with some problems inherent in an interlocutor’s position and 
trying to show that a more encompassing view may throw some light on them.
A possibly presumptuous undertaking of this kind will suffer from standard 
maladies affl icting such “fundamental” and “centrifugal” ventures (as my presen-
tation so far has perhaps already made abundantly clear). While pointing to more 
embracing perspectives on matters at hand (a “synoptic” view), I will invoke data 
and arguments from various quarters, whenever I fi nd them illuminating.23 Thus, 
I will often cross domain boundaries (I will try to signal, though, where I tread). 
Nor will I try to offer exhaustive expositions of available material, once I feel that 
enough to exemplify a position is presented (copious references may be viewed 
as a partial atonement – or further evidence of damnation). As a result (since 
particulars are there, waiting in the wings), I may also fi ght at places a losing 
battle with my parenthetical remarks and footnotes.24 Nevertheless (as a possible 
defence), what I am doing is intrinsically related to the character of the fi eld under 
investigation, which is openly interdisciplinary. Thus, I take seriously the call for 
an integration of perspectives on mind and language adopted in different ventures 
and disciplines placed under the umbrella term “cognitive science”. To be sure, 
I am not equally competent in all domains of inquiry: this study is primarily a 
review of a particular method of lexical representation in CL, while all additional 
matter serves as the background to make this assessment more meaningful. The 
22 For Merleau-Ponty, see note 8 in 5.1.; for C. Taylor, see e.g. (1989: 87) in the moral context.
23 Even though this strategy may superfi cially resemble a search for “converging evidence”, 
treated by Lakoff and Johnson as a sign of success in interdisciplinary ventures (e.g. Johnson 1992: 
345), I believe it is almost directly opposed to it. Lakoff and Johnson apparently assume that “data” 
exist independently of theories and may be picked at will, whenever they seem to confi rm one’s 
point. They do not pay much attention to the problem of integration of knowledge coming from 
different research domains (as opposed to e.g. Donald 2004). As Lakoff admits in his only “meth-
odological” statement I know: “I generally prefer not to engage in methodological discussions and 
would rather just get on with my work” (1990: 39). The hermeneutical approach, however, does not 
aim at the integration of data at the “objective” level but rather treats problems arising at that level as 
symptomatic of assumptions and limitations of particular research methods. Cf. remarks in the next 
paragraphs on my aims in the present study.
24 I paraphrase here (and exemplify) Beardsmore’s remark on Kripke’s book on Wittgenstein, 
as quoted by Pateman (1987: 113). My apology may sound fl ippant but the peculiarities mentioned 
above may be also taken as evidence that I have striven at clarity as far as my approach allows (and 
within my limitations). I would be glad if I had found a more direct way to say what I meant.
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present work – as noted in the subtitle – is a “case study” of a cognitive style of 
theorizing about lexical representation.
To limit the centrifugal tendencies inherent in my approach, I chose to focus 
on a highly specifi c “objective” domain, i.e. network models of two prepositions 
(particles, adverbs, prefi xes etc.): English over and Polish za(-). I present this 
material in, perhaps, tedious detail (even though the actual material covered is by 
far richer) to document the way in which researchers grapple with problems posed 
by the phenomena, when inspected from their vantage point. It is important to 
underline that I do not propose any solutions to particular problems, nor do I look 
for a more successful way of dealing with the phenomena in question. Rather, 
what appears as problematic at the “objective” level is treated as a symptom of 
the vantage point adopted by researchers. I aim to make better visible some of 
their deeper assumptions (rooted in the paradigm they work within), which may 
go beyond (and sometimes even against) their self-declared positions. This is one 
cause of the presumptuousness mentioned above and also of the possibly irritating 
habit to place “object” and “objective” in inverted commas (see 0.1.).
Such an approach may seem reminiscent of the patronising attitude I charged 
Lakoff and Johnson with (as exemplifi ed in note 19 above). However, I am far 
from mounting the charge of false consciousness against the authors of the mod-
els analysed below, nor do I think that hermeneutics (as opposed to “scientism”) 
has an emancipatory mission, because it “knows better”. As for the former point, 
scientists develop a given position – they try to capture as many recalcitrant phe-
nomena as they can within a chosen paradigm. Their work is normally viewed as 
hypothetical,25 i.e. not as something to believe in, but rather as a possible explana-
tion of a range of phenomena (when one takes for granted a set of assumptions), 
to be compared with alternative approaches, which apply other methods to an 
overlapping, or a complementary, range of phenomena. The charge of false con-
sciousness makes no sense in this context. One may only point out limitations of a 
particular position but this is true in all such cases: science is perspectival. While 
science (or a given discipline) as a whole aims at a more comprehensive perspec-
tive, embracing all relevant phenomena (a “synoptic” view), fragmentation and a 
competition of paradigms is the norm. A wider perspective may be achieved only 
thanks to a laborious integration of more partial approaches (transforming the 
signifi cance of their respective “data” in the process). As for the latter point, since 
hermeneutics is not situated at the “objective” level (it is not a method), it cannot 
directly participate in the task of integration. Hence, it has no right (or intention) 
to admonish or emancipate scientists. Hermeneutics rather reveals the conditions 
of “objectiveness” in general, as well as in particular “objective” domains, thus 
25 In theory rather than in practice, though, as shown by sociology of science. Cf. the pioneer-
ing study by Fleck (1986 [1935]) – an insider’s account of how Wasserman’s test shapes biological 
“data” – and the classic work by Mannheim (1955). The standard work on “paradigms” in science is 
Kuhn (1996). On “paradigms” in society at large, see Foucault (1994).
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aiming at a better self-understanding.26 I will try to make the relation between 
science and hermeneutics – central for the second layer of this work – somewhat 
clearer in 0.1. Naturally, this is a broad subject, debated on both sides, and one 
cannot go into details. The present study as a whole may be taken as an exempli-
fi cation of that dialogue.27
As for the method, primarily I report research found relevant in CL to throw 
light on the notion of “linguistic categorization”, as it has been theoretically dis-
cussed and developed in particular examples of network modelling of preposi-
tional polysemy. My contribution is to place that research in the wider perspec-
tive on language offered by hermeneutics, in order to reveal some of its inherent 
limitations. Importantly, this should not be viewed as a negative task, but in the 
context of Ricoeur’s remark: “An awareness of the validity of a given method is 
essentially linked to an awareness of its limits” (1985: 150).28
As for the order of presentation, the fi rst layer of the book – the “case study” 
– consists of four chapters. In Chapter 1, I present and discuss the “foundational” 
accounts of network modelling by Langacker and Lakoff. Chapter 2 contains sev-
eral attempts to improve Lakoff’s model of over. In Chapter 3, I present and dis-
cuss (mostly from the diachronic perspective) a Langackerian model of the Polish 
lexeme za(-). Chapter 4 investigates the issue of the cognitive “diachrony within 
synchrony”. The second “hermeneutical” layer of the book, which provides the 
framework for the case study, consists of two parts. In the preliminary Chapter 0, 
I try to characterize “the hermeneutical situation”, or the, prima facie, nontrans-
parent background of the issues taken up in the case study. In Chapter 5, I oppose 
the hermeneutical view of language to the position adopted by CL (and linguistics 
in general).
26 Let me add that I view myself as a member of the CL community in a rather uncomfort-
able role of a doubting Thomas, who questions on the hermeneutical grounds the “objectiveness” of 
constructs often taken for granted, e.g. the cognitive unconscious, conceptual metaphors or image 
schemas. The role is uncomfortable because it is one thing to claim in general that some constructs 
do not make sense as explanatory devices of a specifi ed kind – e.g. the unconscious as conceived by 
Lakoff and Johnson was criticised long before by Ricoeur in reference to “naive interpretations” of 
Freud (1985: 212–213) – while it is quite a different thing to be able to show it in the terms accepted 
within the CL community. The latter task was undertaken e.g. by Zlatev (2007b) in his criticism of 
the cognitive unconscious, and (2007c) in his criticism of image schemas. Some problems with the 
conceptual metaphors paradigm are pointed out by Croft, Cruse (2004: 198–204); see also Ortony 
(1988).
27 Which took place mostly in the natural and social sciences, e.g. C. Taylor (1985, 1995). As 
for cognitive science, the hermeneutical position was presented by e.g. Dreyfus (1992) and Dreyfus, 
Dreyfus (1986). First generation CL (Chomsky’s TG) was defended against a hermeneutical (Witt-
gensteinian) challenge by Pateman (1987).
28 Ricoeur’s comment concerns structuralism and the issue of its “initial truth”, often hardly visi-
ble in later phases of its development and in some far-reaching applications. Thus, the task of fi nding 
defensible limits of a method is linked to this initial stage of divergence and the process of growth, 
when a particular perspective establishes itself against available positions and is found more gener-
ally attractive. As is normal in history, it may be found attractive for various (also wrong) reasons.
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To some extent, this book is a hybrid. It is a continuation of a study writ-
ten in Polish (Pawelec 2005a), covering (with a substantially different focus) 
a similar range of material, i.e. CL research available primarily in English. Writ-
ing the present book in English was thus easier in some respects, but the Polish 
background remains present (several of my references and some examples are in 
Polish, one case study concerns a Polish lexeme and, when writing, I often had 
my Polish interlocutors in mind and sometimes employed Polish stylistic conven-
tions). Still, I hope that the book will not prove impenetrable to the English-speak-
ing audience. All translations from other languages (if not noted otherwise) are 
mine. Sometimes, I had to rely on Polish translations of classics from various do-
mains or Polish editions of books in English, when I had no access to the original. 
In such cases I tried to add in the bibliography references to an English edition. 
Several items in the bibliography – along a standard identifi cation, usually in a 
full version, but sometimes without pagination or all conventional details when 
those were not available – are marked as internet sources in one way or another. 
This may mean that I consulted a given work on the Internet as a reprint of an 
actual edition or in an author’s format or as pre-publication material or (as a last 
resort) in the chopped versions offered for free by “Google Books”. It may also 
be the case that I had access to a printed edition (at some stage of writing) but I 
wanted to make the reader aware that a text is available on the Internet. In all such 
cases I did not provide long and largely meaningless web addresses with dates of 
access, as is usually done, since the texts are also provided with standard refer-
ences and may be more easily googled. In this context, I feel obliged to express 
my deep gratitude to several authors who place their current (and in some cases, 
past) work on the Internet. Without this aid, the present study could not even be 
conceived. This does not in any way diminish my indebtedness to the Library 
of my Institute of English Philology (and the late Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn, who 
bequeathed her unique CL book collection to the Jagiellonian University) as well 
as to the Library of the UNESCO Chair for Translation Studies and Intercultural 
Communication in Kraków.
This study would have never been completed without a generous support of-
fered by Elżbieta Tabakowska, who has been an invaluable mentor and partner in 
an ongoing dialogue about language (and life), spanning now more than a quarter 
of a century. Henryk Kardela expressed faith in this project at a critical juncture. 
While both of them have read and commented on the manuscript, full responsibil-
ity for all remaining quirks and errors is mine. The book has been fi nanced by the 
Institute of English Philology at the Jagiellonian University. I owe deep gratitude 
to its director, Elżbieta Chrzanowska-Kluczewska, who has been invariably sup-
portive of this venture.
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CHAPTER 0. THE HERMENEUTICAL SITUATION
0.0. Introductory remarks
In this preliminary part of the book, I will discuss several topics which are rele-
vant as the background for an assessment of the material presented in chapters 
1–4. Only the fi rst section is truly introductory, i.e. it is intended to make tangible 
for a novice the hermeneutical viewpoint, which I adopt in my approach to net-
work modelling and CL in general. The subsequent sections are intended for read-
ers who are well-acquainted with relevant CL literature. Their goal is to “prob-
lematize” issues usually taken for granted or passed over in standard presentations 
of the domains in question. In other words, I attempt to show that some of the 
assumptions underlying particular treatments are arbitrary or of limited adequacy 
or beside the point, when one focuses on the issues from a wider perspective. 
Consequently, I do not offer “introductions” to particular fi elds of inquiry, but 
rather critical comments on some of the basic claims put forward in those fi elds. 
By its nature, an approach focusing on gaps and questionable assumptions cannot 
be systematic. I will try to retrace my steps and introduce some order in the fi nal 
section (0.5.). Let me point out that the possibly irritating approach adopted here 
is my way to deal with the “hermeneutical situation”, i.e. one which is not trans-
parent at fi rst sight, in terms offered by CL theorists.
0.1. The hermeneutical perspective
In this section, I will try to present “the hermeneutical perspective”. I will focus 
on two issues: the “manifestation” of things and the scientifi c approach to phe-
nomena (both in the natural and human sciences). In section 0.5. and chapter 5, I 
will return to some questions mentioned below.
In a well-known Oriental parable, a group of blind men, asked to identify an 
object, touched various parts of an elephant (“it’s like a rope!”, “it’s like a pillar!” 
and so on). Consequently, they could not agree on what they dealt with. Origi-
nally, the story justifi ed a call for harmony and co-operation. Rhetorically, the call 
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was probably effective, since the elephant was a common sight and such grave 
(but entirely predictable) “misrepresentations” of it must have seemed ludicrous. 
Nowadays, the story is sometimes used to illustrate the “perspectivism” of sci-
ence: particular “takes” on reality are limited, we can only see what is revealed 
from our partial perspective.
Even though it seems true that our cognitive predicament is best described as 
groping in the dark – a good reason for the lasting attraction of the elephant story 
– the parable does not go to the heart of the matter. Namely, how can we reveal 
the true shape of reality (or cut nature at its joints)? That is so, fi rst, because the 
elephant is an example of “middle-size dry goods” (John Austin’s expression). 
As such, it can be directly apprehended (unless one is blind – then it turns out 
to be oversized for an apprehension at one go). More importantly, second, the 
story presents an unsuccessful identifi cation of something already known. It does 
not get in focus the more fundamental problems: how can we reveal anything at 
all?; how can we identify something we do not know? Both questions are on the 
hermeneutical agenda.
I will return to the latter one in the next section (0.2.), when presenting the 
issue of categorization. As for the former one, it is clearly related to the function-
ing of the senses. The elephant story is not very helpful in this respect, since it 
merely plays the limitations of one sense (touch) against a greater recognitory 
potential (in the context of the activity) of another one (sight). A different exam-
ple (provided by psychologists) could be more relevant. Let us imagine a blind 
person using a stick for the fi rst time to fi nd her way around. Such an activity will 
be initially experienced as tapping. But after a while, the stick will become “part 
of the body”, an extension of the hand “meeting” things within reach. As such, 
the stick is integrated into the “body schema”1 and increases the power of one 
sensory channel (touch) to such an extent that it can serve as a replacement of 
the sense we chiefl y rely on when moving around (sight). This example shows at 
least two conditions of the process of “revealing” things. First, it is possible only 
as active exploration: primarily, as a movement directed at a goal. Tapping could 
be integrated into any number of activities. It is transformed into “sight” of a kind 
only when employed in this role. This transformation involves a miracle of sorts: 
one gets access to reality in a new way,2 something “appears” as a result of one’s 
special involvement (this miracle is at the centre not only of perception, but also 
linguistic expression). Second, the miracle is possible because the stick (and the 
very activity of tapping) “conceals itself”, leading “directly” to phenomena. We 
can become aware of things because we normally stop being aware of our revela-
tory engagements with reality. As a result, all perception (and symbolic expres-
sion) leads to a kind of “self-forgetting”: one’s role in the process of revelation is 
1 Merleau-Ponty’s notion. See the discussion in Morris 2004.
2 Of course, not entirely new: in this case the stick extends the potential of touch. The more foun-
dational question concerns the genesis of a new sense (a new channel of revealing reality).
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backgrounded and the reality revealed seems available “as it is” (rather than “as it 
is for us” due to our involvements3).
In this context, we can try to see the difference between Husserl’s original 
project of phenomenology and Heidegger’s hermeneutical transformation of it. 
Phenomenology raises the question I posed above: “How things make themselves 
manifest?”. It is important to appreciate what it achieves at the point of departure, 
when this basic question is asked. The question is an attempt to tackle the problem 
of the “bridge” between “consciousness” and “objects” (or mind – body dualism): 
when we start from consciousness, we get only “correlates” of consciousness (as 
in philosophical “idealism”); when we start from objects, consciousness must ap-
pear as an object of sorts (as in philosophical “materialism”).4 Phenomenology 
tries to overcome the “subject” – “object” dualism by thinking them together – by 
making “appearance” (“that something appears”) basic, and the “subject” – “ob-
ject” dichotomy as a subsequent step. It is enough to make two points here about 
Husserl’s project of doing philosophy. First, his is the last attempt to provide 
a necessary account (i.e. without any arbitrary assumptions) of phenomena. Sec-
ond, his account takes the form: “the subject (consciousness) meets an object”, 
which is not true to the original intent of phenomenology as an inquiry without 
arbitrary assumptions (cf. Michalski 1998: 26ff.). As we have seen above, it is not 
necessary that things appear as objects of consciousness, because primarily5 they 
are correlates of our engagements with reality.
That point was made by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit (1994 [1927]). He showed 
the essential primacy of practice as the source of phenomena. Husserl’s attempt 
to achieve certainty was thus doomed to failure, because it was not originary – it 
was based on seeing (“the subject perceives an object”), while the primary way of 
manifestation is through movement, action. As Patočka puts it: “At the very pro-
tofoundation of consciousness, of thought, of the subject, there is acting, not mere 
seeing. That explains why so much is opaque, obscure, in our clarity” (Patočka 
1998: 96–97).
We can see now how Heidegger’s position ties in with the example of tapping. 
If, at the very source (originarily), things appear as correlates of involvement, of 
a primordial interestedness, then their appearance is opaque: they manifest them-
selves not as they are,6 but primarily as useful, as pragmata – not objects we see 
but “something handy” (the tapping serves the aim of fi nding one’s way, i.e. de-
3 Individual processes of “revelation” in the animal realm are taken over by biological popula-
tions, while in human communities they “sediment” into a culture, see Merleau-Ponty (2002) for the 
notion of “sedimentation”. Importantly, individual revelations are transformed by “sedimentation” 
into social “horizons”, see Gadamer (1993) for the notion of “horizon”.
4 Cf. Kołakowski (1975: 66ff.) for a critical account of Husserl’s attempt.
5 Phenomenologists look for the “originary” access to phenomena, i.e. necessary conditions of 
encountering them.
6 The expression “things as they are” looks dubious to our relativistic mindset, since we know 
they appear differently to different people (the lesson of the elephant story). Philosophy, however, 
seeks certainty. Philosophers, as opposed to scientists, try to make sense of phenomena in such a way 
that they make no arbitrary assumptions. Husserl (in Kołakowski’s account) was the last philosopher 
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tecting potential obstacles rather than revealing things as they are). Additionally, 
their appearance involves self-concealment (whatever infrastructure is necessary 
for a manifestation of phenomena, it is necessarily backgrounded). Heidegger 
shows that this is true not only of perception, as in the example, but generally. 
Thus, the world as a correlate of our involvement cannot be made transparent 
directly through “seeing” (as in Husserl’s phenomenology), for it is based on self-
concealment.7
We should try to keep in mind this hermeneutical point of departure: “the 
world” is not the universe of things (out there without anyone watching), but “the 
meaningful whole” as revealed in the history of engagements, which are normally 
lost from view (there is no intention to deny reality here, and no subjectivism). We 
can see now that the problem of interpretation, of making things more transparent 
– in our context, the issue of theorizing – is rooted in the foundational process of 
manifestation, of revealing “the world” in “the natural attitude”, with its accom-
panying forms of self-concealment. The world of common sense – the world “as 
we live it”,8 with its own ways of understanding: prejudices, stereotypes, myths, 
folk etymologies etc. – is the actual point of departure for all theoretical efforts 
to understand reality (and it is, to a large extent, shaped by those “objectifi ca-
tions”9). 
Let us now ask about the distinction between natural and human sciences, 
which is relevant in our context, since CL is often treated as belonging to natural 
sciences (as opposed to linguistics sans phrase, which is normally classifi ed as 
belonging to human studies). Natural science goes beyond the natural attitude and 
assumes the “hypothetical” stance. It provides an interpretation, a clearer vision 
of some parts of the commonsensical world (than e.g. myths), employing em-
pirical, objectifying methods. The hypothetical attitude is based on the assump-
tion that phenomena refl ect various functional wholes of causally linked entities 
– “objects” of study – which we may (ultimately) capture. One may adopt that 
assumption for “manipulative” reasons (thus, it becomes a driving force of tech-
nology) or for “contemplative” reasons (one wants to understand reality as such 
a whole). As a result, we live (mostly) in a “disenchanted universe”.10 However, 
the natural science vision is “trumps” not mainly because it removes some self-
illusions (something that remains unclear and bothers us in our practical dealings 
with things), but primarily because it offers more powerful tools for our com-
to believe that a direct non-arbitrary path to “things as they are” is available. Since Heidegger, “foun-
dationalism” is rejected and more roundabout ways are explored.
7 See a commentary to Heidegger’s Being and Time (Dreyfus 1991).
8 Husserl’s Lebenswelt, cf. Patočka (1986).
9 This leads to a paradox from the objectivist point of view: in social studies, as Plamenatz no-
ticed, the “object” of theory may change under its infl uence; specifi cally, false theories of democracy 
sometimes shape democratic practices (Plamenatz 1973: 27–33). The paradox dissolves when we 
see man as a “self-interpreting animal”, falling prey to illusions while seeking clarity. The term is 
explained by Charles Taylor (1985, II: 26).
10 The term is Weber’s. The process (with serious reservations concerning Weber’s diagnosis) 
has been described in a ground-breaking way by C. Taylor (1989, 1991, 2004, 2007).
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merce with the natural world.11 Only when that objectifying stance toward reality 
is perceived as distorting, as it was perceived by Heidegger – cf. C. Taylor (1995: 
100–126) – or harmful, as in the ecological movement, can we begin to seek a 
clearer vision of our relations with the material world.
The problem of self-illusion and self-interpretation is much starker for the 
sciences of man, for they try to explain what people do. Thus, they should offer 
accounts which are clearer than self-interpretations in the natural attitude. To be 
sure, the objectifying stance can produce a lot of empirical data and reveal new 
phenomena in the human sciences, but it constantly runs the risk of “changing the 
subject”12 – of providing accounts which to a smaller or greater extent disregard 
the way people experience and articulate phenomena. That seems an inevitable 
result of reducing (or rather hoping to reduce) the phenomenon under study to 
the theoretical grid one adopts. As Plamenatz noticed, deriving defi nitions of phe-
nomena from one’s theoretical assumptions is the most widespread sin in political 
philosophy, leading to theories divorced from reality (1950: 81–82). A related er-
ror was called by William James the “psychologist’s fallacy”: “the mistaking of a 
doctrine, which may be good as far as it goes, for the very processes it is about”.13 
More generally, one could talk in this context not only of hypostatizing, but of 
hysteron proteron methodology: what is a result of the process of revealing reality 
or expression (concepts) is invoked to explain this very process (as in linguistic 
mentalism14). These are all signs of “self-concealment”, which may be remedied 
by a hermeneutical investigation.
The hermeneutical approach, true to its phenomenological roots, tries to be 
faithful to phenomena, rather than to one’s theoretical assumptions (to repeat, it is 
not a method). It is practised in various ways. Of particular relevance in our con-
text is Ricouer’s “detour” – a “long route” to a more originary view of phenomena, 
through a dialogue with various objectifying methods. In other words, since one 
cannot fathom reality from a chosen perspective, a hermeneuticist should choose 
a “detour” through encounters with all available sources of evidence and types of 
investigation to reveal what is valid in them, how they help us “uncover” phenom-
11 To be sure, many scientists (qua ideologists) attempt to shatter some self-interpretations, e.g. 
about the exalted status of humanity. In that role, they have no advantage over other participants in 
the debate: they must provide better self-interpretations (reducing self-obscurity). As such, scientifi c 
facts – e.g. that we are “naked apes” in evolutionary terms – are no “trumps”. To accept that we are 
just naked apes (rather than, e.g., God’s children), we must fi nd that description a better one than 
available alternatives as our self-interpretation.
12 Donald Davidson’s expression, quoted in C. Taylor (1989: 56).
13 Richards (1965: 116). Another version is called the “linguist’s fallacy”: attributing theoretical 
knowledge of language to ordinary speakers (McLure 1993: 42).
14 “Linguistic mentalism” treats language primarily as a mental entity. In Chomsky’s TG, lan-
guage is identifi ed with syntactic “deep structures”; in Langacker’s CL, with semantic conceptuali-
zations. I will oppose CL’s mentalism to hermeneutical “expressivism” (the primacy of expressive 
behaviour in relation to conceptual structures) in 5.1.
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ena.15 And as already pointed out, we cannot know what is valid in a given method 
unless we specify the limits of its application (Ricoeur 1985: 150).16 The analysis 
undertaken below may be viewed as an attempt to specify some limits of applica-
tion of network representations of lexical senses, or their claims to validity.
Finally, as is perhaps clear by now, I place “object” and “objective” in inverted 
commas to emphasize (when it seems relevant) the necessary involvement of ob-
servers in the process of revealing reality (my aim is to counter the assumption 
that reality is directly accessible). That convention is not meant to deny that ob-
jectifying methods – both in the natural sciences and in human studies – are fully 
legitimate (within their limits).
0.2. Prototype effects and categorization
In this section I want to raise three issues, which are interrelated: what are pro-
totype effects?; how are they related to the question of categorization?; what is 
linguistic categorization in relation to both previous issues? The hermeneutical 
question posed above: “how can we identify something we do not know?” is cen-
tral for the issue of categorization. I will mostly follow the standard CL account, 
adding comments and trying to widen the perspective. 
The notion of “linguistic categorization” is of primary importance in this study. 
John Taylor, who used the phrase as the title of his book – the fi rst monograph pre-
senting prototype approach in CL – pointed out its ambiguity. Whenever we use 
the same word to refer to various specimens of something, we categorize, or name 
“sameness in difference” (Taylor 1989: vii). Since words can refer to linguistic 
entities, “linguistic categorization” may not only involve categories pointed out 
verbally in the world, like DOG,17 but also linguistic categories, like WORD or 
LEXEME.
In this way one may enter the long-standing philosophical debate about the 
relations between language, thought and reality (cf. 5.1. for some empirical evi-
dence). Taylor mentions traditional philosophical positions concerning “sameness 
in difference”. Nominalism claims that “sameness is merely a matter of linguis-
tic convention; the range of entities which may be called dogs [...] have in real-
ity nothing in common but their name”. Realism asserts, on the other hand, that 
15 Thus, there is no hermeneutical perspective, properly speaking. I use this word to refer to the 
hermeneutical approach, based on the insights presented above. On the hermeneutical “detour”, see 
Ricoeur (1985, 1986, 1989).
16 Ricoeur’s own attempts of this kind (e.g. 1977, 2003, 2004) and Gadamer’s opinion quoted in 
the Introduction (note 18) show clearly that this is an unending task.
17 Categories, like concepts, will be typed in capitals.
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“categories like DOG [...] exist independently of language and its users”, while 
the words “merely name these pre-existing categories”. The third position, called 
conceptualism, proposes that “a word and the range of entities to which it may 
refer are mediated by a mental entity, i.e. a concept”. Conceptualism may be given 
a nominalist or a realist interpretation: according to the former, concepts are taken 
to be formed by convention; according to the latter, they are supposed to mirror 
existing categories (i.e. cut nature at its joints). In Taylor’s view, CL adopts the 
conceptualist position which is intermediate between its nominalist and realist 
interpretations. As he puts it: “To the extent that a language is a conventionalized 
symbolic system, it is indeed the case that a language imposes a set of categories 
on its users. Conventionalized, however, does not necessarily imply arbitrary. The 
categories encoded in a language are motivated to varying degrees, by a number 
of factors – by actually existing discontinuities in the world, by the manner in 
which human beings interact, in a given culture, with the world, and by general 
cognitive processes of concept formation” (Taylor 1989: vii–viii).
Taylor’s resume plunges us in deep philosophical waters concerning the rela-
tions between language, mind and reality. However, the position of CL against 
that background is hardly transparent. At this early stage, let us try to see better 
what is involved in Taylor’s fi nal claim that linguistic categories (in either sense) 
are non-arbitrary or motivated. Let us notice that “motivation” conceived in this 
way (as the opposite of arbitrariness) is very unspecifi c: it may cover any factors 
which infl uence categorization.
As an example, let us consider the categorization of colour (the point of de-
parture in Taylor’s account). In their pioneering study, Berlin and Kay (1969) 
put forward the following claims. First, all human beings (with the exception of 
individuals with vision defects, e.g. daltonists) possess the ability to recognize 
eleven basic colour categories mentioned below, even though not all linguistic 
communities verbalize each category. Signifi cantly, there is an order of verbaliza-
tion summarised as follows:
1) All languages contain terms for white and black.
2) If a language contains three terms, then it contains a term for red.
3) If a language contains four terms, then it contains a term for either green or yellow (but 
not both).
4) If a language contains fi ve terms, then it contains terms for both green and yellow.
5) If a language contains six terms, then it contains a term for blue.
6) If a language contains seven terms, it contains a term for brown.
7) If a language contains eight or more terms, then it contains a term for purple, pink, 
orange, grey, or some combination of these. (Berlin, Kay 1969: 2–3)
These fi ndings leave much room for speculation, e.g. why is the order of ver-
balization partly fi xed and why does it take this particular form?18 Provisionally, 
18 Berlin and Kay note: “Our essentially linguistic investigations have led, seemingly inescap-
ably, to the conclusion that the eleven basic color categories are pan-human perceptual universals. 
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we can conclude that there is a non-trivial correlation between perceptual and lin-
guistic categories. It is important to note in this context that Berlin and Kay chose 
to study colour categorization because colour perception can be investigated in-
dependently of linguistic expression, thus allowing a more objective correlation 
of data.19 By using colour samples, they were able to show that even though the 
colour spectrum may be divided in incommensurate ways by different languages, 
there is a cross-linguistic agreement concerning what constitutes a good example 
of a particular colour (“focal” colours).
Taylor20 (1989: 10–12) reports several experiments conducted by Rosch which 
confi rmed and extended that fi nding of Berlin and Kay. When speakers of eleven 
different languages were asked to choose good examples of colour terms in their 
vocabulary, they picked out focal colours. When speakers of twenty three lan-
guages were asked to name samples of focal and non-focal colours, the names for 
focal colours were produced faster and they were shorter. In another experiment 
on short-term memory, speakers of English were compared with speakers of Dani, 
who have only two colour terms at their disposal. In the test, which concerned the 
recognition of focal and non-focal colours, the English subjects performed better 
overall (this may suggest that having relevant terms aids memory). Still, the Dani 
were as good as the English speakers in choosing the focal samples over the non-
focal ones. In a long-term memory task, Dani speakers learned names for focal 
colours faster than for non-focal ones. Finally, English three- and four-year-olds 
paid more attention to focal colours and could match them better than non-focal 
ones.
According to Taylor, Rosch’s experiments show that colour categories have 
a centre and a periphery. A colour term will denote “fi rst and foremost” a fo-
cal colour, even if its range is subsequently extended to cover a large portion of 
the colour space (in languages with few such terms). When a neighbouring term 
appears in a language, the periphery will contract, while the centre will remain 
intact. Consequently, not all members of a colour category have equal status. As 
concerns motivation, Taylor does not fully endorse Rosch’s view that the forma-
tion and reference of linguistic colour categories is shaped by perceptual-cogni-
tive factors. Following Wierzbicka (for instance: 1990a), he adds that also “en-
vironmental” factors – the stability of colour features of important entities in the 
world, e.g. blood, vegetation or the sky – should be taken into account (Taylor 
1989: 14–15). 
But we can offer no physical or physiological explanation for the apparently greater perceptual sali-
ence of these particular eleven color stimuli, nor can we explain in any satisfying way the relative 
ordering among them. Existing theories of color perception, both classical and recent, offer several 
plausible suggestions for parts of the observed pattern, but none will serve as the basis of an adequate 
explanation” (1969: 109). 
19 Lucy (2000: xi–xii) comments on the problem of circularity when only linguistic data are used 
for the study of relations between thought and language.
20 More or less the same experimental material is covered in other books on this subject, e.g. 
Lakoff (1987: 24–57); Ungerer, Schmid (1996: 1–20); Rúa (2003: 104–121).
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To recapitulate, focal colours are apparently grounded in human physiology: 
we perceive and recall better some segments of the colour spectrum, which serve 
as natural perceptual reference points. Linguistic labels are supposed to refer pri-
marily to such points. Since not all eleven focal colours have labels in languages 
under study – and there seems to be a structural regularity in the development of 
such terms – additional factors must be invoked, e.g. environmental salience of 
some colours.
Subsequent studies concerned other categories (it is clear that the categoriza-
tion of colour is untypical, being so closely tied with sensory mechanisms). As 
reported by Taylor (1989: 40–42), Labov asked subjects to name the drawings of 
household objects (cups, mugs, bowls, vases) which “morphed” into one another. 
Apart from variable shapes, he also included functional elements. For instance, 
he asked subjects to imagine that the receptacles are fi lled with contents of differ-
ent kind, e.g. coffee or mashed potatoes. Labov’s experiments show that labelling 
does not refl ect primarily inherent properties of such objects, but their functional 
roles, to some extent shaped by particular cultures.
Rosch investigated several “natural” categories, that is “concepts desig-
natable by words in natural languages” (quoted by Taylor 1989: 43), e.g. FURNI-
TURE, FRUIT, VEHICLE, BIRD.21 She focused on their “goodness of rating”. 
For instance, American college students were asked to rate sixty household items 
on the scale from 1 to 7 as “good examples” of the category FURNITURE. In 
the experiment, CHAIR, SOFA, COUCH and TABLE were ranked the highest, 
while VASE, ASHTRAY, FAN and TELEPHONE – the lowest. Such “prototype 
effects” (interpreted by Taylor as “degrees of membership” in a category) were 
confi rmed in other experimental paradigms (e.g. reaction time, frequency and or-
der of naming).
Rosch found out not only that some items are “better members” of a category, 
but also that one level of categorization is more cognitively and linguistically 
salient that others.22 The so-called “basic level”, as exemplifi ed by the middle 
term in the sequence: KITCHEN CHAIR (subordinate level), CHAIR, FURNI-
TURE (superordinate level), contains perceptual and functional gestalts (entities 
we perceive as functional wholes, which can be represented by schematic draw-
ings) and is expressed by terms which are generally short, structurally simple and 
used more frequently. Thus, “it is the basic level categories that most fully exploit 
21 As explained by Taylor, in psychology natural categories are opposed to artifi cial ones, e.g. 
sequences of letters or numbers, which are used in studies of concept formation (1989: 43, footnote). 
He also points out that natural kind terms may be opposed to nominal kind terms: the former refer to 
entities with “natural” boundaries (e.g. BIRD), while the latter to categories of artefacts (like TOY or 
VEHICLE), whose boundaries are a matter of defi nition (1989: 43–44) We may notice that “natural 
language” categories are also opposed to categories in artifi cial languages of logic. As concerns 
typing conventions, let me repeat that both categories and concepts are marked by capitals – these 
notions will be distinguished in 0.3.
22 In Geeraerts’s description (1992a: 221), “horizontal” prototypicality within one category as 
opposed to “vertical” prototypicality between hierarchically related categories.
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the real-world correlation of attributes [and] cut up reality into maximally in-
formative attributes”. More specifi cally, they: “maximize the number of attributes 
shared by members of the category and minimize the number of attributes shared 
with members of other categories” (Taylor 1989: 50–51).
What kind of motivation is revealed by the existence of “prototype effects” 
and “basic level” categories? Taylor (1989: 52–53) presents several possibilities 
mentioned by Rosch and other authors: frequency of occurrence, order of learn-
ing, average properties of better members or (alternatively) their salient proper-
ties. Most satisfactory in his view is a “more general explanation” offered by 
Geeraerts, who argues that prototype categories are more effi cient than “Aristo-
telian” ones (based on necessary and suffi cient properties), since they are able to 
accommodate new data without necessitating a restructuring of the category sys-
tem. Let us notice, however, that overall higher effi ciency of a system is a result 
of some factors at play which still need to be explained. Moreover, if one wants 
to compare the performance of X and Y, they should compete at the same task 
(tertium comparationis). Aristotelian categories – as noticed by many participants 
in the debate – are more effi cient in some areas, e.g. mathematics.
Harnad shows that Rosch’s fi ndings concerning “prototype effects” and “basic 
level” entities do not explain categorization – they have nothing to do with the 
generation of this capacity. As a cognitive scientist (dealing with “sensorimotor 
robotics”), he aims at describing mechanisms, asking “how” things work. From 
this point of view, Taylor’s initial characterization of the phenomenon in question 
– “the seeing of sameness in difference” (1989: vii) – is a description of the result. 
We need to widen our horizon to see the process which underlies it.
Harnad defi nes categorization as “any systematic differential interaction be-
tween an autonomous, adaptive, sensorimotor system and its world” (2005: 3). 
Thus, we talk about organisms and not objects, which also “systematically and 
differentially interact” with their environment in some sense, like the sand in the 
desert building up dunes under the infl uence of the wind. The difference is this: 
while the sand produces the same output (a confi guration) when there is the same 
input (wind conditions), an organism reacts in the same way when there is the 
same kind of input. A description of systematic and differential interaction of the 
sand and the wind is a description of “brute facts”,23 while a description of an 
organism’s reactions – a description of “meanings”.
Categorization is a sensorimotor skill which must be learned (like all skills). 
This is so even if a particular differential capacity (like colour perception) is in-
born, since such abilities must have developed through evolution.24 The “seeing 
of sameness in difference” is thus an inborn or acquired ability to recognize some 
sensory input as a kind of thing, requiring the capacity to abstract. In the context 
of linguistic categorization, it is important to gauge the extent of abstraction in-
23 “Brute facts” as captured by physics (to repeat, all “facts” are revealed in involvement).
24 The process of individual sensorimotor learning involves real-time trial-and-error, while the 
process of evolutionary adaptation involves genetic trial-and-error. See Harnad (2005: 10).
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volved. Our sensorimotor systems with their skills acquired through evolution 
detect only some physical stimuli (e.g. the “visible” part of the light spectrum) 
and they do not give equal weight to them. For instance, a (relative) continuum 
of shades in black-and-white vision is transformed in colour vision into eleven 
clearly differentiated ranges of “focal” colours (in Berlin and Kay’s account). 
Abstraction – understood in negative terms: as eliminating some features from a 
given whole – is thus only a superfi cial description of the process of categoriza-
tion, which is intimately tied with differential weighting of input. When focal col-
ours are extracted as invariants, the frequencies belonging to their range become 
“compressed” (we see them as shades of “the same” colour – as more “similar” 
than they would be in black-and-white vision), while there is “expansion” at the 
boundaries (equal-sized frequency differences look much smaller within a cate-
gory than over the boundary).
This process of “articulation” of phenomena in perception was described by 
Ernst Cassirer in the twenties of the last century in the following terms:
The building of the world of perception requires an articulation of the sensory phenomena 
– that is to say, certain centers must be created, to which these phenomena as a whole are 
referred and toward which they are oriented and directed. [This requires that] the even fl ow 
of appearances be interrupted in some way and that certain favored points be singled out. 
What was previously an unremitting fl ow of events now coalesces, as it were, about these 
favored points: in the very midst of the stream there form separate vortices, whose parts 
seem to be linked in a common movement. It is the creation of such dynamic rather than 
static totalities, this formation of functional rather than substantial unities, that gives rise 
to the inner relationships between phenomena. For now there is no longer any absolutely 
isolated thing; every element that is engaged with others in such a common movement 
bears in itself the general law and form of that movement and is able to represent it for 
consciousness. And now, wherever we penetrate the stream of consciousness, we fi nd defi -
nite living centers, toward which the individual movements strive. Every single perception 
is a directed perception; aside from its mere content, it possesses a vector which makes it 
signifi cant for a defi nite direction or meaning.25 (Cassirer 1957: 221–222; emphasis in the 
original)
We can see from this quote that the term “abstraction” is a static, after the 
fact description of a deep reconfi guration of experience. Categories, or vortices 
around favoured points in the stream of experience, are formed as functional uni-
ties. Thus, they must be viewed in the context of activities which give them their 
meaning (le sens).
Let us consider, as an example, Harnad’s distinction between relative and ab-
solute discrimination (2005: 20). The former takes place in the context of succes-
sive pairwise presentation of two very similar shapes. Subjects, who are asked 
whether the shapes are the same or different, can normally spot tiny differences. 
25 Merleau-Ponty (2002: 223) quotes Cassirer as an important forerunner of hermeneutic phe-
nomenology. Let me add in this context that the “directional” character, or the meaning of an act of 
perception is best expressed by the ambiguous French word sens: see the translators’ notes to the 
English (2002: 499) and Polish (2001: 431) editions.
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But when they are shown one of the shapes in isolation, and asked which of the 
two it is, they are unable to do so. The latter task requires identifi cation or abso-
lute discrimination. In order to identify something, one must know what to look 
for. If we extrapolate Harnad’s example, we can begin to see better the difference 
between experiential categorization of animals and linguistic categorization of 
human beings. Animal categorization takes place in the context of their biological 
needs. The categories have more or less direct survival value: is “this” food or 
non-food?; friend or foe?; home or foreign territory? In other words, animals have 
no need to recognize “objects” (which have some identity in isolation) but only 
correlates of their drives, as activated in a particular environment.26 Linguistic cate-
gorization, on the other hand, is more like identifi cation in isolation: what is an 
X in absolute terms, i.e. in reference to other related entities (linguistic categories) 
at one’s disposal?27
Against that background, we can appreciate better, perhaps, Harnad’s claim 
(2005: Appendix 1) that “the Roschian legacy” of prototypes, family resem-
blances28 and the basic level of categorization is a “non-starter” as an explanation for 
our ability to categorize. Specifi cally, if prototypes are “templates” for categories, 
then “everything is a member of every category, to different degrees” (this re-
ductio ad absurdum follows directly from the observation that one can compare 
X and Y along any number of dimensions29). Moreover, many things we catego-
rize have no templates (or “gestalts” – cf. Rosch’s presentation of the basic level 
above). And fi nally, template-matching does not work in machine-learning mod-
els. Harnad concludes: prototype effects concern typicality judgements, which 
presuppose the ability to categorize, and not the other way round.
Models based on family resemblances – or polycentric categories – are clus-
ters of either / or features: this is an X, if it corresponds to the description A, B or 
C. As based on “disjunctive invariants”, such models are “perfectly classical”.30 
What is more, we are not told how the ability to categorize in this way may de-
26 This point is well illustrated by Köhler’s often discussed experiments with chimpanzees: they 
used a stick to reach a banana only if the stick was placed in sight – when it formed part of the situa-
tion; otherwise, they did not look actively for it, which indicates it was not an independent “object” 
in their memory store, see e.g. Vygotsky (1962: 36).
27 Linguistic identifi cation is also driven by some needs but of a different kind than in the animal 
world. The point of the example was to highlight the difference.
28 The notion is based on Wittgenstein’s discussion of the meaning of the word “game” [Spiel], 
see Wittgenstein (1978: 31–33). It is used to distinguish “monocentric” categories (which refer to one 
kind of thing) from “polycentric” ones (which include several kinds of things, or subcategories).
29 This idea is well captured in Watanabe’s “Ugly Duckling Theorem” (see Harnad 2005: 19): 
the “ugly duckling” is no less similar to any of the white swans than they are to one another, as long 
as one does not treat whiteness as a privileged feature.
30 Basically the same point is made by Geeraerts, in a more understated manner: “while the revo-
lutionary nature of prototype theory is often said to reside in the fact that it rejects the classical view 
that lexical categories can be defi ned by means of a suffi cient set of necessary conditions for category 
membership, the possibility that some lexical items cannot receive a defi nition in terms of necessary-
and-suffi cient attributes is not exactly absent from the classical tradition. Rather, it is traditionally 
taken as an indication of the polysemy of the item in question” (1993: 223–224).
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velop. Let me add at this point that “linguistic categories” analysed in the present 
case study are such polycentric categories based on family resemblances.
The “basic object level” – as opposed to the superordinate and subordinate 
level – merely corresponds to “the default context” of everyday communication. 
To quote Harnad:
If you point to an object, say, a table, and ask me what it is, chances are that I will say it’s a 
table, rather than a Biedermeyer, or furniture, or “Charlie”. So what? As mentioned earlier, 
there are many ways to categorize the same objects, depending on context. A context is sim-
ply a set of alternatives among which the object’s name is meant to resolve the uncertainty 
(in perfectly classical information-theoretic terms). So when you point to a table and ask me 
what it is, I pick “table” as the uncertainty-resolver in the default context. [...] If [the room] 
contains four tables, I might have to identify this one as the Biedermeyer; and if there are 
four Biedermeyers, I may have to hope you know I’ve dubbed this one “Charlie”. (Harnad 
2005: Appendix 1)
To conclude: prototype effects are real enough. It is true that in “monocentric” 
categories some elements are perceived as more central, that in “polycentric cate-
gories” some subcategories stand out as more easily recognizable, and that labels 
for “basic level” entities are used more readily in the default context. The signifi -
cance of such effects for the theory of categorization is much less clear.
In the context of linguistics, some light on the signifi cance of prototype effects 
is shed by a discussion between Bolinger and Wierzbicka. Bolinger reacted to 
Wierzbicka’s attack (1990b) on the abuse of prototype analyses: they are offered 
unnecessarily in the cases when a more rigorous feature-type analysis is possible. 
As an example, she points out the difference between the concepts BIRD and 
FURNITURE. In the former case (a natural kind term), one is never in doubt 
whether a particular creature belongs to the category, while the latter concept (a 
nominal kind term) is indeed vague: “one cannot draw a line between kinds of 
things which are included in this supercategory and things which are not – be-
cause by virtue of its meaning, the word furniture doesn’t aim at identifying any 
particular kind of thing” (Wierzbicka 1990b: 355; emphasis in the original). In 
Wierzbicka’s terminology, this is the difference between a “taxonomic” concept 
and a “collective” concept (or, in my paraphrase, a superordinate concept, com-
prising heterogeneous “basic level” objects).
In Bolinger’s view there is no essential difference between taxonomic and 
collective concepts (and consequently, between natural kind terms and nominal 
kind terms). The discreteness of taxonomy is largely an illusion. For one thing, 
we see only the results of a long process of natural selection, which eliminated 
intermediate stages of evolution (e.g. birds with teeth); moreover, we are taught to 
perceive the natural order through the traditional classifi catory lenses provided by 
Linnaeus and Darwin (1992: 114).31 Thus, both the concept FURNITURE and the 
31 Bolinger does not mention this but there is a lively discussion in biology between proponents 
of partly inconsistent taxonomic criteria: morphological vs. genetic ones (the latter are proposed by 
“cladists”; see Gould (1983); cf. Lakoff (1987: 119–121)). In philosophy of biology, there is a debate 
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concept BIRD have fuzzy boundaries. If they differ, it is not because the latter is 
rooted in the natural order of entities or the former cannot be represented by one 
schematic object. The difference lies in the defi nitional criteria. FURNITURE, as 
an artifactual category, is identifi ed relative to its function (things used to furnish 
rooms). Functional features – as opposed to morphological or genetic ones, as 
in the case of BIRD – are much more fuzzy. For instance, the feature “a piece 
of furniture is thought of as movable” on the one hand does not exclude “rugs” 
(1992: 115), while, on the other hand, seems to exclude kitchen furniture, which 
is fi xed to the walls.
In her rejoinder, Wierzbicka points out that there is an important difference 
for defi nitional purposes between “a kind of thing”, which has a stable position 
in some taxonomy, and “things of different kinds kept in one place, for the same 
purpose”. Only in the former case should the taxonomic position be included in 
the defi nition, e.g. it is right to defi ne PARROT as “a kind of bird” and it would 
be wrong to defi ne BED as “a kind of furniture”. This is based on the assump-
tion that “there are no higher levels of taxonomy in the realm of artifacts” (1992: 
120–122).32
In the present context, it is important to underline that Bolinger and Wierz-
bicka agree that both prototypes and features have a place in semantic description 
(their debate concerns a relatively minor issue: when should the information about 
the place of an item in a taxonomy be included?). This common assumption is in 
agreement with the results of a prima facie paradoxical result of an experiment by 
Armstrong et al., as reported e.g. by Lakoff (1987: 148–151) or Taylor (1989: 68–
69). The study revealed that classically defi ned categories – ODD NUMBER and 
EVEN NUMBER – also exhibit prototype effects, that is subjects assign higher 
values to some members. Taylor places this result in the context of the distinction 
between “folk” and “expert” categories: even though some (or most) categories 
can be defi ned in a (relatively) discrete way by experts, in everyday communi-
cation people need only “cognitive reference points” for successful orientation. 
Thus, there is a “division of linguistic labour” within a speech community. As de-
scribed by Putnam (1975), experts look for necessary and suffi cient criteria of cate-
gorization, while ordinary speakers rely on “stereotypes” (Taylor 1989: 68–74). 
We may conclude that “prototype effects” refl ect the ordinary cognitive strategy 
of relating new specimens to established “templates” or “gestalts” in a continuous 
effort to “domesticate” reality, as opposed to the expert task of “categorizing the 
world” as a taxonomic system of units defi ned in a discrete way.
whether to treat the species as a “natural kind” (a class of entities) or as an “individual”; see Bird, 
Tobin (2008) on “natural kinds” and Ereshefsky (2007) on “species” .
32 Consequently, Wierzbicka would probably reject my characterization of FURNITURE as a 
“superordinate concept, comprising heterogeneous ‘basic level’ objects”.
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* * *
Let us return to the questions guiding this presentation. How can we identify 
(categorize) something we do not know? Within CL (and psychology) this ques-
tion is normally understood as the problem of applying schemas (concepts) to 
objects which do not obviously fi t them. This issue (is something still a cup or a 
mug?) is clearly secondary – it is the question of referential application. Geneti-
cally, the problem concerns the constitution of categories: how is it possible that 
reality appears as types of entities? What is the source of this “typicality” (proto-
ideality)? As Harnad shows, types arise in sorting actions, when an organism looks 
actively for entities which could satisfy its needs. Primarily, types result from 
distinctions introduced by the goal of a given activity. In a more hermeneutical 
formulation, activities are “projective” stances: an animal treats its environment 
as if it were good for something. When it looks for food, shelter or a sexual part-
ner, its reality polarizes into entities which apparently satisfy the need or not.
This “projective” – hypothetical – style of exploration is revealed by studies 
in biological deprivation. When entities normally chosen to satisfy an animal’s 
needs are missing in the environment, almost anything can “trigger”33 a relevant 
reaction.34 In this way, time (and time-scale) enters the picture as a crucial factor. 
An animal exemplifi es a set of generic distinguishing behaviour patterns, which 
must have evolved in the history of the species. The objective correlates of these 
patterns may be viewed as “protocategories”. Thus, the categorizing history of in-
dividual exploration in successive generations sediments (we need not be diverted 
here by evolutionary mechanisms) into a generic “habit/at”: an indissoluble whole 
of distinguishing behavioural patterns in an environment. This is why some enti-
ties are default options (or prototypes), while others may be included in a category 
as the need dictates. When the habitat changes (as a result of deprivation or unu-
sual abundance, or an introduction of a new predator, or – most radically perhaps 
– due to a transfer to a different environment or a transforming genetic mutation), 
behavioural patterns must keep pace with the changes. On the one hand, then, 
there is a drive to fi x categories (as this guarantees greater effi ciency in standard 
conditions), while on the other hand, rigidity of categories would spell extinction 
(in times of change). To sum up the biological background sketched above: reality 
33 This behaviourist term reverses the genetic order (similarly to the “stimulus-response” se-
quence): it is only because an animal “projects” its environment as something (or takes up appropri-
ate stances) that things appear as good for some purposes.
34 “In a series of experiments with blond ring doves Craig removed the female from the male in 
a succession of gradually increasing periods. After one such period of deprivation, he experimented 
to see which objects were now suffi cient to elicit the courtship dance of the male. [After a few days] 
the male was ready to court a white dove which he had previously ignored. A few days later he was 
bowing and cooing to a stuffed pigeon, later still to a rolled-up cloth, and fi nally, after weeks of 
solitary confi nement, he directed the courtship toward the empty corner of his box cage where the 
convergence of the straight sides offered at least an optical fi xation point” (Lorenz 1963: 48–49). Or 
as shown by Weiner (1994), in periods of drought a particular species of fi nch chooses types of grain 
it would not normally consider as food.
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manifests itself according to what an organism searches for; biological needs are 
a kind of protoquestioning, while types of entities (categories) appear as yes – no 
answers (e.g. will or will not X do as food); a history of questioning underlies a 
particular exploratory infrastructure (the sensory apparatus and behavioural hab-
its), while a history of answers constitutes a given habitat.
We may now approach the issue of “ideality”, which surfaced in Taylor’s char-
acterization of CL in the context of the debate concerning “universals”: CL is 
taken to be “conceptualist”, with partly “realist” and partly “nominalist” leanings. 
This description has no philosophical signifi cance, i.e. CL takes no position in 
the ontological/epistemological debate about the status of concepts. CL merely 
assumes that some concepts are non-arbitrary, i.e. that they refl ect perceptual uni-
versals, e.g. focal colours.35 When one inspects this example at close range, it 
may be used to dispel several misconceptions. As is evident from Taylor’s pres-
entation, focal colours – taken as centres of fuzzy natural categories, whose pe-
ripheries merge – are invoked to counter the structuralist view that concepts are 
sharp (“classical”), while it is only their referential application which may be 
problematic. Taylor’s (more generally, CL’s) position is based on the doubtful as-
sumption that “colour categories” are natural concepts. If we accept it for the sake 
of the argument, we can see that the structuralist position is right: focal colours 
are sharp, i.e. clearly defi ned as opposed to their neighbours. Our sight responds 
differentially to those “concepts”. The fact that some colour samples are judged 
as better examples does not mean that the “concepts” are fuzzy and that there are 
“degrees of membership”. The “concepts” are there in the perceptual system – 
clearly opposed to one another. Their “defi nition” presupposes a boundary which 
– eo ipso – has no categorial status. Thus, by the very fact that we have “points of 
reference”, there must be some “middle ground” with uncertain status.
Moreover, Taylor’s argument does not take into account the fundamental 
fact that categories – basically, differential reactions – are not fi xed like Platonic 
“ideas”. Focal “red” may be recognized as such when confronted with “pink” or 
“yellow”, but it could be also classifi ed as a “light” colour or a “dark” colour, 
depending on its saturation. “Pink” could be opposed to “red” or treated as a kind 
of “red”, depending on the oppositions in question. In other words, the system of 
“concepts” is one thing, while its application to reality for some tasks – another 
one.
We can appreciate now that the role of oppositions is absolutely central, when 
one invokes concepts or categories. Of course, once a category is constituted, we 
can think that e.g. “red” or “yellow” is directly accessible, no matter what other 
colour categories are available. But this is an illusion based on self-forgetting (to 
recall the hermeneutical diagnosis). As we have seen, colour vision requires a 
re-shaping of the black and white spectrum, constituted by shades of grey. In this 
35 The existence of perceptual universals does not solve the philosophical problem of validity: 
such universals are still contingent, i.e. refl ect our generic way of viewing reality (as different e.g. 
from the way a daltonist, a bonobo or a bat views reality).
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mysterious process (why do we see colours at all?), vortices are formed, which 
exert their pull on all data provided by sight.36 As a result, there are no isolated 
colour perceptions: everything is drawn by one vortex or another. To be sure, this 
“conceptual” system does not run automatically: depending on the situation, i.e. 
the task at hand, the vortices may expand, contract, subdivide, merge along one 
dimension or another, revealing the same fragment of reality as X or Y or Z (cf. 
Eiser 1994 in a related context).
When one adopts some objective criteria of differentiation, e.g. “red” as de-
fi ned by light wavelength, it may seem that oppositions are not necessary. How-
ever, an objective defi nition takes for granted the process of constitution.37 We 
may translate “red” into a certain range of frequencies, because our vision has 
differentially cut up the visible light spectrum in a particular way. This shows 
that Rosch’s argument about the development of colour categories, as quoted by 
Taylor, is wrong. It is not true that a “colour term denotes, fi rst and foremost, a 
focal colour, and it is only through ‘generalization from focal exemplars’ [...] that 
colour terms acquire their full denotational range” (1989: 15). A colour term de-
notes fi rst and foremost the range within the boundaries staked out by oppositions 
to neighbouring terms. If the Dani use two colour terms, then focal colours (which 
they can clearly recognize) are not treated as centres of their categories (they 
could rely, perhaps, on saturation, if they oppose “light” to “dark”). In general, 
“objective” perceptual data (e.g. focal colours, saturation etc.) provide only a mo-
tive, which may be taken up in conceptual expression, i.e. in a linguistic reprise 
du sens of perceptual articulation (see 5.1.).
As for the “basic level” categorization, it is at least recognized by Rosch and 
CL that gestalts are “maximally distinct”. However, this is true in general: also at 
a given superordinate or subordinate level, because concepts tend to be maximally 
distinct within their standard context of use to remain functional (they are there to 
mark oppositions). One can claim that “trees” and “bushes” are distinct perceptual 
gestalts, i.e. natural categories. However, their opposition is symbolic: we learn to 
draw them differently in the kindergarten to mark “maximally distinct” types. In 
reality, particular specimens may very well look the same, while the gross percep-
tual differences represented schematically in drawings need not be primary in the 
conceptual constitution of these categories; cf. 1.2.2. on Langacker’s “develop-
mental story”. As pointed out by Harnad, the “basic level” is special only because 
it provides the defaults in everyday communication (but the defaults may be very 
different in specialist or special contexts).
The defi nitional problems discussed by Bolinger and Wierzbicka concern the 
status of category boundaries and the opposition between “natural” and “nomi-
nal” categories. As for the former issue, Bolinger points out (rightly, in my view) 
36 As long as some threshold of light intensity is attained – at dusk we return to black and white 
vision.
37 And distorts uncomfortable data or pushes them into the background, cf. 4.2. on the objective 
defi nition of length and width.
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that all boundaries are fuzzy – whether those drawn by nature (between species) 
or those drawn by man.38 As for the latter one, Wierzbicka is clearly motivated 
by her theoretical assumptions (concerning “natural” semantic primitives), when 
she says that bed should not be defi ned as “a kind of furniture”, because FURNI-
TURE is not a natural category and thus does not belong to a natural taxonomy. 
The real problem at issue here may be the difference between “folk” and “expert” 
categories, invoked by Taylor. In everyday communication we rely on “stere-
otypes”, e.g. a “fi sh” lives in water and looks like a fi sh (thus, a whale is a “big 
fi sh”). Stereotypes serve as our “points of reference” (or “vortices”) in everyday 
life, thus they may be as fl exible as it is functionally relevant (beaver’s meat 
may be a kind of “fi sh” on Friday in a Catholic country). Since experts aim at 
“carving nature at its joints”, they look for natural relations between entities and 
“objective” differences. As opposed to “people in the street”, they try to construct 
taxonomies not for some clearly pragmatic reasons, but to order the available ma-
terial in a perspicuous way, revealing natural relations between entities. However, 
alternative defi nitions of entities are still the norm and alternate functional wholes 
may be postulated.
I hope to have shown that “prototype effects” cannot lead directly to any con-
clusions about the structure of concepts or categories (whether perceptual or lin-
guistic). As we have seen, that position was actually adopted by Rosch (in refer-
ence to “mental categories”). Since the issues involved in the discussion raise 
several fundamental problems which cannot be satisfactorily investigated here, I 
hope to have given an idea of their complexity.
0.3. Cognitive linguistics as prototype semantics
The fi rst question to be raised – in view of doubts about the signifi cance of pro-
totype effects for the theory of categorization – concerns a phenomenal success 
of prototype modelling within CL. It is perhaps easy to understand why Rosch’s 
work was taken up with great enthusiasm by Lakoff. Since in his interpretation 
Rosch “provided a full-scale challenge to the classical theory [of categorization]”, 
Lakoff used her work to bolster up his own project to revolutionize not only lin-
guistics, but also several other disciplines, in which “the classical theory was 
taken for granted” (1987: 39). However, prototype models were also constructed 
and/or defended at that early stage by linguists who had no ideological axes to 
grind, e.g. Langacker (1987, 1988a, 1988b), Geeraerts (1988a, 1990, 1992a) or 
38 To repeat, this does not mean that we cannot have sharply defi ned concepts (Wierzbicka’s 
concern).
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Taylor (1988, 1989), and they were subsequently applied in a variety of fi elds by 
a legion of researchers.
One may suggest several reasons for this transfer of ideas. First (and most 
generally), cognitive linguists naturally looked for inspiration in other cognitive 
sciences as members of the same interdisciplinary research paradigm. Second, the 
focus on categorization – and more generally, on conceptual structuring of expe-
rience – meshed well with CL’s aims, as characterized, for instance, by Faucon-
nier: “CL has emerged in the last twenty-fi ve years as a powerful approach to the 
study of language, conceptual systems, human cognition, and general meaning 
construction” (2003: 1). Finally (and most specifi cally), the prototype approach 
seemed to be a promising alternative to the structuralist paradigm in linguistics,39 
as a way to a more realistic characterization of linguistic categories.
The last motive is clearly visible in the debate concerning the structuralist dis-
tinction between “linguistic” and “encyclopedic” meaning.40 The rejection of such 
oppositions underlies the cognitivist position in lexical semantics, as expressed 
e.g. by Langacker: “The distinction between semantics and pragmatics (or be-
tween linguistic and extralinguistic knowledge) is largely artifactual, and the only 
viable conception of linguistic semantics is one that avoids such false dichotomies 
and is consequently encyclopedic in nature” (1987: 154).
In his discussion, Taylor ties the structuralist or “autonomous” position on this 
issue with the analytic-synthetic distinction, which he exemplifi es (1989: 81) as 
follows:
(1) Dogs are animals.
(2) Dogs have four legs / have a tail / bark / do not miaow / do not have horns, 
 etc.
Sentence (1) is analytic, that is true by defi nition – it is a statement about relations 
in the classical system of categories, defi ned in terms of necessary and suffi cient 
conditions. Sentence (2), on the other hand, is empirically true, as it contains 
facts about dogs. Following Taylor, a structuralist linguist would argue that the 
defi nitional feature in (1) is purely linguistic (thus, belongs to the “dictionary”), 
while empirical facts about dogs expressed in (2) are of concern to zoologists and 
other specialists (the “encyclopedia”). Taylor admits that if a dog, for whatever 
reasons, lacks the features mentioned in (2), it will still remain a dog. Thus, they 
are not necessary for defi ning “dogness”. He claims however, following philoso-
phers criticising the analytic-synthetic distinction (Quine, Kripke, Putnam), that 
39 Whether in its neostructuralist or neogenerativist version, see Geeraerts (2002: 7); cf. Geer-
aerts 1988b: 673 and Geeraerts 1992b: 265. I believe, in accordance with Geeraerts historical 
classifi cation, that it is a quarrel in the family: CL is also a structuralist school of thought. However, I 
will argue in 5.2. – as already mentioned – that CL shares important assumptions with its generativist 
predecessor, as opposed to Saussure’s structuralism; cf. Pawelec (2005a: 156–157, 160).
40 Or the opposition between “dictionary” and “encyclopedia” – the title of Haiman’s seminal 
article; cf. Langacker (1987: 155).
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the same conclusion must be drawn in the case of (1), for such relations refl ect 
our present-day knowledge about the world, which may turn out to be false: “In 
the highly unlikely, but not totally inconceivable, event of dogs being discovered 
to be self-reproducing automata controlled by extraterrestrial minds” (Taylor 
1989: 82).
Taylor refers above to Putnam’s example (actually, about cats41), which cannot 
be discussed without analytic terminology. So far, I have talked interchangeably 
about “words”, “terms”, “categories” and “concepts”. Now it is time to introduce 
some relevant distinctions.
Intension vs. extension of a term
To make the question of word meaning more manageable, let us focus on simplifi ed 
(idealized) situations. The basic one is “naming”: a personal name (X) provides a 
unique identifi cation of a person (Y). X is a term (or a label), and Y is its “exten-
sion” – its range of application (in this case: a single person). X has no defi nitional 
meaning, no “intension”, since it does not relate to other terms – it just points to an 
object or designates it (as in an “ostensive” defi nition). A more complex situation 
was discussed by Frege in his classic article42 on sense and reference: the planet 
Venus is known both as Evening star and Morning star. These terms have different 
“intensions” or conceptual meanings (Frege’s “sense”): “the star which appears in 
the evening” and “the star which appears in the morning”. Their extension (Frege’s 
“reference”) is the same: they designate the planet Venus. 
Concept vs. category
More often, terms designate classes of things – categories. For instance, the inten-
sion of the term “human being” is a properly defi ned concept (a set of features), 
while its extension comprises all individuals to whom the term legitimately ap-
plies, or the relevant category.
To quote Rúa: “It could be said that a category is a class of objects which is 
apprehended by means of the corresponding concept” (Rúa 2003: 20). As she 
points out, due to this inextricable link the terms “concept” and “category” are 
often used interchangeably. Their identifi cation, however, can be justifi ed only in 
the ideal case of a class term with a fi xed intension (concept) and a fi xed reference 
(category). The paradigmatic example concerns analytic terms: the defi nition of a 
concept determines the relevant category, e.g. the term “triangle” designates enti-
ties defi ned as “a fl at fi gure with three straight sides and three angles”. As Frege’s 
41 Analytic philosophers often contrive outlandish thought experiments. A similar one by Putnam 
concerns “water” with a different chemical formula (not H20 but XYZ) on “Twin Earth” (1975: 223), 
cf. McLure’s account (1990: 510ff.).
42 Über Sinn und Bedeutung published in 1892. English translation On Sense and Reference 
(1993). 
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example shows, however, the relation between “intension” and “extension” is a 
complex one already on the level of individuals. It is only to be expected that it 
gets even less tractable on the level of classes.
We talked about “terms” designating individuals or classes as an ideal case. In 
normal communication, we use “words” which are vague and/or ambiguous:43 
neither their extension nor intension is fully specifi ed out of context. Only in some 
domains, e.g. trade or law, we stipulate ideally unambiguous intensions (but the 
problem of extension – i.e. which actual items or cases are covered by the con-
cept – will still remain in force, necessitating further intensional specifi cations). 
Generally speaking, categories are “sets” of entities, while concepts are “delimita-
tions” of relevant entities. It may be quite a different task to delimit a concept – to 
defi ne it in relation to other concepts – and to devise a procedure for recognizing 
members of a category.
If we return to Putnam’s example, we will see that he wants to defi ne the mean-
ing of cat or dog “extensionally”, i.e. on the basis of some recognitory procedures 
devised by experts (which would fail, if it turned out that the classes are automata, 
merely imitating animals). In intensional terms, however, the meaning of cat or 
dog need not change – people could simply start to call the creatures “false cats” 
or “automatic dogs”, to mark the additional distinction (their defective status).
We can see now that there is a gap between philosophical and linguistic aims. 
There may be no analytic terms (intensions) which necessarily determine their 
referents (extensions). Even the defi nition of the triangle quoted above may turn 
out to be too constraining, if we would like to call by this name (as would be 
natural) a three-sided fi gure drawn on the surface of a sphere (as in Rieman-
nian geometry), which would not have straight sides and would not be fl at. That 
does not mean, however, that a linguist cannot defi ne concepts according to the 
present state of knowledge, or as actually used (how else?). Consequently, Taylor 
is wrong to suggest that philosophical problems with the “analytic – synthetic” 
distinction count as an argument against discrete defi nitions. Extensionally, it is 
enough to identify a set of differentiating features (from related categories) as 
possessed by standard specimens. Intensionally, the description of dogs in (2) 
above is not useful because it does not consistently oppose DOGS to CATS (or 
some other concept).
Langacker argues that the account of the meanings of linguistic expressions 
offered by autonomous semantics cannot capture their full richness, as it leaves 
out “recalcitrant data for an ill-defi ned ‘pragmatic component’”. He suggests that 
autonomous semantics is grounded in methodological and aprioristic considera-
tions. Since it aims to describe language as a formal system, it focuses on a limited 
43 To defi ne these terms (in their most widespread interpretation): “vague” is extensional (or 
referential) – it is appropriate when we do not know if a given word legitimately applies to a referent 
(all words referring to things are potentially vague); “ambiguous” is intensional – it is appropriate 
when a given word applies to different concepts, e.g. school: 1. with pupils; 2. of dolphins (most 
words which denote something are ambiguous). 
I-lamanie POPRAWKI NANIESIONE IISek1:37   Sek1:37 2013-04-08   14:13:14
38
set of semantic properties. That goal, says Langacker, is gratuitous: “The fact that 
autonomy of language would be highly convenient for linguists does not amount 
to valid evidence for its reality”. Additionally, autonomous linguists do not think 
it is feasible to describe linguistic meaning as a matter of conceptualization. Lan-
gacker takes that stance to be pointless, “since meaning is, in the last analysis, a 
matter of conceptualization”, and adds rhetorically: “what else could it possibly 
be?” (1987: 156).
Generally speaking, Langacker argues in the name of realism, advocating 
greater faithfulness towards the phenomena or a fuller characterization of the ob-
ject of study. In itself, it is an admirable attitude – an expression of a truly scien-
tifi c spirit. Still, the objections reported above, and some of their presuppositions, 
are questionable. The claim that autonomous semantics does not deal properly 
with awkward data may be justifi ed as far as it goes, but it points to the legitimate 
problem of a demarcation between semantics and pragmatics (specifi cally, the 
issue of potentially infi nite fl exibility of word meanings in use). The same goes 
for the distinction between “dictionary” and “encyclopedia”. As pointed out by 
Taylor: “an encyclopaedist approach also brings with it a demarcation problem. 
We do not, presumably, want to say that everything an individual happens to know 
about dogs will be relevant for a characterization of his concept DOG” (Taylor 
1989: 83). Additionally, Langacker’s claim that “autonomous linguistics” is based 
on the assumption of “autonomy of language” goes too far. It may be justifi ed in 
reference to Chomsky’s position concerning the autonomy of syntax, but it mis-
represents the original impulse behind structuralism, i.e. how should one delimit a 
properly linguistic “object” of study?; cf. 4.1. Thus, the original problem remains: 
is linguistics to be conceived as a subdiscipline of psychology (or some other 
science), or rather as a separate fi eld of inquiry? If the latter, what is its “object”? 
The fi nal, apparently rhetorical, question posed by Langacker lies at the centre 
of the present investigation. Is meaning – specifi cally, linguistic meaning – to be 
equated with conceptualization? Are there any alternatives?; cf. 5.3.
At this stage, let us see how the cognitive “encyclopedic” approach differs 
from the structuralist “dictionary” approach. In Taylor’s account, both positions 
are similar at the point of departure. They accept that linguistic meanings do not 
exist as separate entities – they are context dependent. For the structuralist, how-
ever, the context is conceived as “the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations be-
tween signs within the linguistic system”. Thus, meaning is a language internal 
issue. For the cognitivist, on the other hand, meanings are defi ned in the context of 
language external “cognitive structures, embedded in patterns of knowledge and 
belief” (Taylor 1989: 83).44
44 The Chomskyan school, as represented by Jackendoff, accepts that semantic structures are 
“simply a subset of conceptual structures – just those conceptual structures that happen to be verbally 
expressible”. Thus, “when we are studying semantics of natural language, we are by necessity study-
ing the structure of thought” – quoted in Taylor (1996: 21). However, this position is still based on the 
“dictionary” view of semantics: the proper subject of semantic inquiry is limited to those aspects of 
I-lamanie POPRAWKI NANIESIONE IISek1:38   Sek1:38 2013-04-08   14:13:14
39
In what respect, then, does linguistic conceptualization differ for the cognitivist 
from conceptualization sans phrase? An answer is given in the title of a book by 
Langacker: Concept, Image, and Symbol. Out of all possible conceptualizations 
(the fi rst segment of the title), a language sanctions a subset of construals, which 
may be creatively extended, imposing a particular image on a given conceptual 
material (the second segment), thanks to its symbolic nature, that is conventional 
pairings of the conceptual and phonological pole on any level of linguistic struc-
ture: “all valid grammatical elements and constructs are held to be symbolic” 
(the third segment). Consequently, “viable semantic analysis ultimately reduces 
to conceptual analysis”, while grammar is symbolic: it forms “a continuum with 
lexicon” (1991: ix).
To understand the meaning of a linguistic form, we must place it in the context 
of relevant cognitive structures – its “domains”. For instance, the word hypote-
nuse can be understood given the concept of the right triangle; elbow – within 
the confi guration of the human arm; April – as part of the calendar. A given word 
gets its meaning by “profi ling”, or highlighting, a particular region in the relevant 
domains. Most semantic structures require several domains (or a “complex ma-
trix”) for their full description. For instance, the complex matrix for knife includes 
a shape specifi cation (space domain), its canonical function (cutting domain), its 
relation to other pieces of cutlery and any other piece of information relevant for 
its characterization (for instance, knife-throwing acts in circuses). As we already 
know, Langacker opts for a fully encyclopedic view: “Any facet of our knowledge 
of an entity is capable in principle of playing a role in determining the linguistic 
behavior of an expression that designates it (e.g. in semantic extension, or in its 
combination with other expressions)” (1991: 3–5).
A given semantic structure – for instance, one designated by hypotenuse – 
emerges when a bounding schema profi les the relevant region (the side opposite 
to the right angle) in the domain (a right triangle), which is called in this context 
its “base”. This is an example of “imagery”, that is “our manifest capacity to 
structure or construe the content of a domain in alternate ways”. In his theory of 
grammar, Langacker presents “conventional imagery”, that is construals sanc-
tioned by convention. There are several dimensions of conventional imagery: the 
“level of specifi city” at which a situation is construed, the “scale” and “scope of 
predication”, the “relative salience”, the construal of a situation relative to dif-
ferent background assumptions and expectations, as well as perspective (1991: 
5–12).
There is ample room in Langacker’s theory for prototype effects, i.e. an un-
equal status of category members or a nondiscrete characterization of catego-
ry structure. Since most lexical items designate an array of interrelated senses 
sanctioned by convention, Langacker represents them as a network. Some of 
the senses are “schematic” relative to others, which are their “elaborations” (at 
a word’s meaning that are perceived to be related to the syntactic behaviour of the word; see Taylor 
(1996) for a critique.
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a lower level of specifi city). Some senses are “extensions”, when they confl ict in 
some ways with their sanctioning schemas (low-level prototypes). The most en-
trenched, or cognitively salient, node is the category prototype. However, it is not 
always the case that there is only one node of this kind, nor can one always expect 
the existence of the highest-level schema (compatible with the specifi cations of 
every node). Consequently, the conventional meaning of a word is to be equated 
with the entire network (Langacker 1991: 2–3). From a complementary perspec-
tive, since a given word may belong to several morphosyntactic categories and 
its senses may be defi ned in alternate ways,45 “a single network [can] be divided 
into lexical items in multiple and mutually inconsistent ways” (Langacker 1987: 
388). Moreover, since grammar is symbolic, prototype effects may be found in 
all linguistic categories and constructions, e.g. in morphology, syntax, phonology 
(see Taylor (1989) for an overview). 
* * *
There are several problems raised in this account which seem tangential to the 
issue at hand (the signifi cance of prototype research in CL) but which are funda-
mental and central for my investigation (concerning the identity of CL in relation 
to its predecessors and the nature of its project).
The philosophical attempt to distinguish “analytic” from “synthetic” concepts, 
mentioned by Taylor, fails because concepts are grounded in reality: they offer a 
“perspective” on some referential domain. Even a geometrical concept like TRI-
ANGLE is “perspectival” and eo ipso provisional: it makes sense as a way of 
questioning reality which is open and may always surprise us (i.e. necessitate a 
broader defi nition, integrating previous ones46).
Putnam also aims to demonstrate that “analytic” concepts do not determine 
their extensions – that reality may surprise us. However, his “thought experi-
ments” do not adequately represent the relations between intension and extension. 
They suggest that the meaning of a term is purely extensional, to be determined 
by experts. In reality, however, we have a two-way process: intensions are provi-
sional ways of capturing relevant distinctions, which may prove inadequate, when 
45 E.g. mother may be either a noun or a verb. Cf. Lakoff’s comment on the noun: “even among 
[dictionary-makers] there is no single, generally accepted cognitive model for such a common con-
cept as ‘mother’” (1987: 76). While Lakoff’s analysis of mother is contestable – cf. Wierzbicka 
(1990: 353–354) – and his objection is based on his own theoretical constructs, the general point 
stands: a lexical item’s senses may be defi ned in alternative, criss-crossing ways; see for instance 
Geeraerts’s analyses of vers (1990) and fresh (2007: 1166–1169).
46 Thus, the analogy with the “elephant story” is limited: there is nothing to generalize in the 
partial “takes” provided by the groping blind men, since the story is about recognizing a known 
entity. Science is about discovering meaningful wholes, which one does not see clearly, in all of their 
manifestations.
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unexpected data are brought to light; this normally necessitates a restructuring not 
of a single concept, but of the whole semantic fi eld in question.47 
We can see now that the relations between “intensions” and “extensions” are 
complex and cannot be reduced to a single formula. It may seem, then, that the 
structuralist approach foregrounding intensions – as formulated on the basis of 
paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships of words – is questionable, since it 
backgrounds the issue of their application or actualization in context (as well as 
genesis). There is, however, an important difference between philosophical or 
scientifi c concerns (“what is the nature of concepts?”, “how concepts arise?”) and 
the concerns of a linguist (“how to represent linguistic knowledge?”). One may 
argue (as we shall see in 4.1.) that the structuralist position captures the intuitions 
of language users concerning the present senses of words (as opposed to the prag-
matic issue of their application in language use).
How should one view Langacker’s theoretical choices in this light? He ap-
parently takes the opposition “dictionary”/“encyclopedia” to be interchangeable 
with the opposition between “semantics” and “pragmatics”. In the former case, he 
rejects the dictionary approach to linguistic meaning, since any information (how-
ever idiosyncratic) could prove relevant in meaning extension or compositional-
ity. In the latter case, he rejects pragmatics as “ill-defi ned”, and on the grounds 
that linguistic meaning is a matter of conceptualization (“what else could it be?”, 
he asks rhetorically).
I submit, fi rst, that the distinctions are not interchangeable and, second, that 
they cannot be abolished. The fi rst one is about types of knowledge, the second 
one (in the interpretation relevant for us) – about the application of linguistic 
knowledge in discourse. Specifi cally, “dictionary” contains answers to the ques-
tion: “what do words mean?”, while “encyclopedia” contains answers to ques-
tions about factual matters. To be sure, in order to know what e.g. transcendental 
or dative means one should master some relevant facts. However, it is one thing 
to know how words are used and another thing to know factual distinctions of one 
kind or another. At some point, such distinctions may prove important enough to 
be lexicalized and enter general circulation (whether in a community of special-
ists, or in the community at large). Langacker is right that potentially any piece of 
information may fi nd its way to the lexicon but the question is about the status of 
lexicon (or linguistic knowledge, in general). Without the opposition with “ency-
clopedia” that issue is fudged.
When Langacker extends semantics to cover “an ill-defi ned ‘pragmatic com-
ponent’”, he fudges another important distinction: that between intersubjective, 
socially available senses of words and their specifi c construals in use. In other 
words, he injects contextual interpretations into the semantic system. Once he 
47 Thus, a purely extensional approach to concepts makes no sense. Putnam’s example of “wa-
ter” with a different chemical formula shows clearly that such a “freak of nature” – if it could not be 
accommodated in the available conceptual framework – would require a wholesale reformulation of 
chemistry (not just of our concept of WATER).
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takes this step, linguistic meaning is identifi ed with conceptualization (hence the 
rhetorical question). However, since any utterance is open to a potentially infi nite 
number of construals (based on more and more idiosyncratic information and 
scenarios), we require a distinction – in principle – between what is available 
socially, i.e. to standard language users in normal circumstances, and what is a 
matter of contextualized interpretations. In short, we need a distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics.
Linguistic “categorization by prototype”, i.e. in reference to the most repre-
sentative member or the template of a category, is not an issue in CL (as it is not a 
real issue).48 Some nodes in the network are important because of their “cognitive 
salience”. As cognitive “reference points” they provide sanction to elaborations 
and/or extensions. In the latter case, Langacker talks of prototypes. But they do 
not exert infl uence on the status of categories. Categories are taken for granted as 
networks of senses. Whether they are monocentric, or polycentric, their category 
status is assumed on some external grounds, rather than derived from the notion 
of “prototype”. Consequently, it is more adequate to say that CL proposes “repre-
sentation by prototype” or, better still, “according to prototype effects”.
What is their role in the network representations of lexical senses? Since some 
nodes are “more central”, the categories are “graded” – their members have un-
equal status. Specifi cally, as we shall see, they consist of “clusters”. Since a network 
may comprise several clusters, possibly criss-crossing, it is “nondiscrete” – it need 
not allow of a consistent characterization. Finally, separate clusters could be con-
ceptually so distant, that they may be connected only by “family resemblances”.
0.4. The intractability of polysemy49
The notion of polysemy, understood as “the existence of a diversity of related 
meanings expressed by the same word form” (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2007: 
139), may seem straightforward. Under closer inspection, however, it turns out to 
be elusive. A principal aim of my analysis of network models at the “objective” 
level is to show some of the reasons for its elusiveness.
The term was introduced in the nineteenth century by Bréal in his study of 
meaning change.50 He saw that polysemy results from the diachronic fact that 
48 In Langacker’s account. Prototypes play a more signifi cant role in Lakoff’s approach which 
is, however, much less tenable (see 1.1.). As I argued in 0.2., following Harnad, “categorization by 
prototype” is impossible, since category boundaries can be demarcated only in opposition to related 
categories.
49 The phrase is Geeraerts’s (e.g. 2007: 1161).
50 The account in this paragraph is based on Nerlich, Clarke (2007: 593–594).
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while words (word forms) acquire new senses, the old ones normally remain 
available. However, at any particular moment of language use polysemy does not 
really make itself manifest. With the exception of some special uses of language 
(jokes, puns), a word in an utterance is not normally felt to be ambiguous. Since 
in the context of discourse one is not aware of choosing from the multiplicity of 
senses listed in dictionary entries, polysemy appears to be “an artifact of lexicog-
raphers”.51 Consequently, Bréal distinguished a social classifi cation of word sen-
ses (abstract and decontextualized) contained in dictionaries from “isosynchronic 
competence” of language users, that is “a half-conscious type of user knowledge 
which only works inside concrete situations”.52 Thus, the question arises about the 
relationships between individual situated semantic knowledge and social polyse-
my. It is clear that language users must somehow acquire the set of conventional 
senses linked with a word form; and that such conventional, or lexicalized, senses 
must somehow arise (assuming they exist). One can see that there are several 
possible levels of analysis involved here, e.g. the original individual extension 
(not sanctioned by the social norm and which may involve linguistic creativity of 
a kind); the social acceptance or propagation of a new sense: lexicalization (both 
these levels are important for linguistic diachrony); a specifi cation of available 
senses of a word (a lexicographer’s or a linguist’s synchronic task); a develop-
mental appropriation of available social senses (language acquisition); the use of 
lexicalized senses in discourse (with infi nitely fl exible meanings).
Both notions mentioned last – social “lexicalization” and individual fl exible 
use in discourse – point at another relevant aspect of polysemy from the theoreti-
cal perspective. It is not enough that meanings conveyed by a lexeme are differ-
ent; they must be suffi ciently different to count as “distinct senses” (this is a con-
junction of conditions: socially sanctioned difference of construals). Alm-Arvius 
tried to capture this point in her distinction between “lexicalised polysemy” and 
“incidental polysemy” (2007: 44). For her distinction to make sense, one must 
understand “polysemy” broadly,53 following Croft and Cruse: not just as the exis-
tence of “distinct, established senses”, but as “variation in the construal of a 
word on different occasions of use” (2004: 109).54 The label “incidental” is not, 
however, quite adequate. It may cover “nonce uses”, when a word is used idio-
syncratically – as in creative extensions (Alm-Arvius does not cite examples). It 
51 Cf. a similar statement by Dunbar (following Barsalou) in his cognitive account of lexical 
senses (or concepts): they are “fi ctions created by theorists out of convenience”. He adds: “the posi-
tion of a lexicographer [is] a perfectly respectable stance but one tangential to the investigation of the 
comprehension of language” (1991: 54).
52 Bréal was Saussure’s mentor, cf. Joseph (2004: 61).
53 If the former label is not to be pleonastic, and the latter – a case of contradictio in adiecto. The 
defi nition of polysemy by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, quoted above, is ambiguous in this respect 
(“meanings” may be interpreted as “senses” or as “construals”).
54 This defi nition still allows to retain the opposition between semantics and pragmatics, since 
lexical senses are treated as “pre-meanings”, pragmatically actualized in discourse. Cf. note 5 in the 
Introduction.
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is not felicitous, though, as a description of regular senses of an item, which are 
not felt to be suffi ciently distinct.
An extensive discussion of such “sub-senses”, which do not have the level of 
autonomy of full sense units, is provided by Croft and Cruse (2004: 116–140). 
By “autonomy” they mean “the ability of a unit to behave independently of other 
units that might be construed in the same context”, i.e. to be antagonistic to them 
(p. 112). They distinguish two categories of sub-units which do not display such 
antagonism and, consequently, can be unifi ed: “facets” and “microsenses”. The 
former can be unifi ed to form a global gestalt, while the latter can be unifi ed into 
a superordinate category, or a hyperonym (p. 116).
The notion of “facets” may be illustrated by the following example:
(1) a. Britain today lies under one meter of snow. [LAND]
 b. Britain is today mourning the death of the Royal corgi. [PEOPLE]
 c. Britain declares war on North Korea. [STATE] (p. 117)
This global gestalt – which can be glossed as the “country” – comprises at 
least three55 ontologically different entities. Since a difference of ontological type 
normally signals a substantial semantic distance, the question arises why facets 
are not felt to be distinct senses. Croft and Cruse speculate that they “operate in 
a kind of functional symbiosis”. This is more than a regular co-occurrence of 
entities: the state is a political manifestation of a people settled on its territory. In 
Langackerian terms, these concepts “are jointly profi led against a single domain 
matrix” (p. 122).
The notion of “microsenses” may be exemplifi ed as follows:
(2) a. I got a card the other day from Ralph, who’s on holiday in Tenerife.
 b. Let me give you my card; let me know as soon as you have any news.
 c. The box was full of cards of various sorts.
Even though the senses (2a) and (2b) are covered by the more general sense in 
(2c) – and thus could be viewed as contextual specifi cations – they are partly au-
tonomous. As Croft and Cruse put it: card has “a hyperonymic reading and a clus-
ter of hyponymous readings, whose default construals are sister incompatibles”. 
In other words, in the default context one expects not the hyperonimic reading but 
one of the hyponymous variants – a phenomenon which the authors term “default 
specifi city”. This is different from standard cases, in which the default reading 
is unspecifi c, or neutral with respect to some potentially applicable features, as 
exemplifi ed below:
(3) My best friend married my brother / sister.
55 Croft and Cruse note that in principle the set of facets of a sense need not be determinate 
(2004: 117).
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In the absence of contextual pressure (“brother/sister”), the neutral reading of 
friend (without gender specifi cation) will be construed, while the specifi c variants 
in (3) are “contextual modulations” (pp. 26–28).
As compared with facets, microsenses illustrate a converse problem: since 
they belong to one ontological type (the reason why a hyperonymic reading is 
possible), one would expect a neutral default sense, while in fact specifi ed ones 
are the case. Thus, the question now is about the unexpected boundaries. As with 
facets, the answer concerns the domains in which microsenses operate: while joint 
relevance of domains counterbalances semantic distance in the cases of facets, 
distinct habitual contexts counterbalance semantic closeness in the case of micro-
senses (p. 131).
Even lesser autonomy is displayed by “ways-of-seeing” (WOS), that is differ-
ent ways of looking at the same thing.56 Croft and Cruse mention four types:
a. the part-whole WOS: an entity is viewed as a whole with parts (e.g. a horse 
as viewed by a vet);
b. the kind WOS: an entity is viewed as a kind among other kinds (e.g. a horse 
as viewed by a zoologist);
c. the functional WOS: an entity is viewed in terms of its interactions 
(e.g. a horse as viewed by a jockey);
d. the life-history WOS: an entity is viewed in terms of its life-history (e.g. 
a book as viewed by an author or publisher).
Even though they do not correspond to distinct concepts and they are not 
referentially distinct, ways-of-seeing display some autonomy. Take hotel: when 
viewed as a building, it will contrast with houses or factories; when viewed as 
a type of accommodation, it will contrast with hostels or motels (p. 137). 
The lowest degree of autonomy is displayed by “active zones”, i.e. extensional 
in nature “parts of something which are isolated for compositional purposes”, 
and “semantic components”, i.e. intensional in nature “parts of a more inclusive 
sense which are compositionally active”. Specifi cally, a relevant segment of an 
entity or a sense is selected by the context, while some choices may be the default 
construals. Consider, for instance, the ambiguous phrase an old friend: under ne-
gation, the default reading of “old” would apply to the relationship, and not the 
person (pp. 138–139).
With “contextual modulations”, as in (3) above, we reach the zero point of 
the scale: specifi cations are contributed by the context, rather than selected or 
triggered (p. 140). Before we return to the highest point of that scale in Croft and 
Cruse’s account – i.e. “full sense boundaries” – let me fi rst present some tradi-
tional distinctions and issues discussed in this context.
The most basic distinction is one between “homonymy” and “polysemy” not 
in the synchronic sense introduced at the beginning (i.e., in reference to one of the 
three levels of granularity in semantic representation) but in the diachronic sense: 
56 As the authors note, the term corresponds to what Pustejovsky calls “qualia roles”; see Croft, 
Cruse (2004: 137) for a comparison.
I-lamanie POPRAWKI NANIESIONE IISek1:45   Sek1:45 2013-04-08   14:13:14
46
whether some identical word forms with distinct senses are derived from a com-
mon source (polysemy) or from different lexical sources (homonymy), and their 
formal identity57 is due to various historical contingencies. As noted by Croft and 
Cruse, this etymological distinction “is a yes/no matter, [...] a question of histori-
cal fact, resolvable in principle, if not always in practice” (2004: 111). The situ-
ation gets complicated, however, as soon as one postulates that “related” senses 
in the defi nition of polysemy should be felt to be related. From this perspective, 
some senses of a polysemic item would not be normally related (e.g. pupil in the 
senses: “a pupil at school” and “the pupil of the eye”), while homonyms could be 
felt to be related, as pointed out by Langacker: “Many speakers treat the meaning 
of ear implied by ear of corn as an extension from the prototypical value of ear 
as a body-part term” (1987: 387).58 Since CL accepts the standard of “psychologi-
cal reality”, a possibly uncomfortable situation arises when respondents begin to 
relate conceptually any homonyms (e.g. to treat light as antonym of heavy and 
dark), when asked to fi nd “a similarity”. As noted in 0.2., one can associate any 
two items along a potentially infi nite number of dimensions. However, Langacker 
does not talk about a laboratory situation: the existence of “folk etymologies” 
shows that language users tend to assimilate in some manner what they do not 
understand, and the same word form – or merely a similarity of forms – may be a 
prima facie reason to relate its different senses; cf. Vandeloise’s jocular treatment 
of Fr. large: 4.2., note 21. On the other hand, language “experts” (as in Putnam’s 
position concerning the division of linguistic labour) may keep in check such ten-
dencies. Clearly, to have a conception of polysemy based on “felt relations”, one 
must take into account the interplay between individual and social level.59
In the previous paragraph, the presence of intuitively distinct senses was as-
sumed. Linguists (and philosophers), however, look for diagnostic criteria of 
polysemy. There are three kinds of polysemy test available: logical, linguistic and 
defi nitional. According to the logical test proposed by Quine, “a word is polysem-
ic if an assertion involving that word can be both true and false of the same refe-
rent”, e.g. a feather is “light” (not heavy) but “not light” (dark)” – Quine’s original 
example quoted by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2007: 141). Thus, the test does 
not distinguish homonymy from polysemy in the etymological sense. As pointed 
out by Geeraerts, the test also neglects the infl uence of context. For instance, 
hedges like “technically speaking” make it easy to assert “X is p and not p”, since 
they change the range of extension of a lexical item (1993: 247). Tuggy shows 
57 Some (complex) issues concerning the identifi cation of Polish lexical homonyms by the lexi-
cographer are discussed by Buttler (1988: 5–12).
58 These examples are taken from Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2007: 142).
59 Croft and Cruse also raise the issue of “plausibility” of a particular interpretation. And they 
point out: “There is a difference between (i) ‘I can sense a connection between the two meanings’, 
(ii) ‘I understand your explanation of how one meaning gave rise to the other’, (iii) ‘If I had never 
met meaning B before, only meaning A, I would understand the word in sense B if I encountered it 
in a suitable context” (2004: 111). The question of the social status of an interpretation seems to be 
at least implied here.
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in greater detail (using various scenarios concerning “painting”) that the logical 
test does not really remove uncertainty whether particular meanings in context 
can be both predicated of someone or not (1993: 275–278). In general, the logical 
test is based on referential differences, while in many contexts this aspect may 
be irrelevant (e.g. are two types of the same activity referentially equivalent?) or 
negotiated (e.g. for defi nitional purposes).
The linguistic tests (there are several variants) are based on the observation 
that in some contexts the use of one word with two distinct meanings is felt to be 
awkward (a phenomenon called variously: punning, zeugma or syllepsis60). For 
instance:
(4) ?George and his driving license expired last Tuesday.
In another test, the anaphora signalled by so indicates the expectation of a sin-
gle sense. As a result, the following sentence with two senses of port is zeug-
matic:
(5) ?At midnight the ship passed the port, and so did the bartender.61
Still, it is possible to devise contexts (of the defi nitional type, as above) in 
which a sentence with anaphoric clause is acceptable:
(6) Daddy, what is a race: a group of people or a competition? Well, son, a group 
 of people is a race, and so is a competition.
The defi nitional test is traced back to Aristotle: a word is polysemic if more 
than one defi nition is required to cover its range of meaning. In more detail, a 
defi nition of a word should be maximally general (to cover as much of its exten-
sion as possible), while at the same time minimally specifi c (to distinguish it from 
other words). Thus, a maximally general defi niton of port (“harbour”, “fortifi ed 
wine”) to cover both extensions – e.g. “an entity” – is excluded because it does 
not capture the specifi city of port (in either of its senses) as distinct from other 
words. As a result, in Geeraerts’ “popular paraphrase”: “If you cannot achieve 
maximal generality, settle for the next degree of generality that you can attain”. 
He points out that while previous tests are merely diagnostic, the defi nitional test 
is also explanatory: it “embodies a hypothesis about the principles of categoriza-
tion that human beings employ”, i.e. that they aim at generality or maximal ab-
straction (1993: 236–237). Let us notice, however, that the test gives no procedure 
for defi ning, thus it is hardly diagnostic as long as one does not come up with a 
60 The terms are distinct but all are applicable in this context, cf. Croft, Cruse (2004: 113).
61 Geeraerts’ example (1993: 229). The discussions of polysemy tests by Geeraerts (1993), Tug-
gy (1993), Croft, Cruse (2004: 109–115), Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2007: 141–144) mostly rely 
on the same set of examples invoked in the literature.
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defi nition, while a defi nition may be contested or seem intuitively unconvincing 
and so on.
Geeraerts’ discussion is an extended attempt to undermine the credibility of 
polysemy tests. He points out that they are not reliable (when one fi xes the context 
properly) and that they may yield mutually inconsistent result. One such case con-
cerns “autohyponymous words” such as dog, whose more general sense (“the spe-
cies”) includes extensionally the more specifi c sense (“the male of the species”). 
As a result of this unusual relationship, the word will pass the logical test (“Lady 
is a dog alright, but she is not a dog”). It cannot pass, however, the defi nitional 
test, since “male dog” properly belongs to “the species dog” (it is not an independ-
ent sense in the defi nitional context), while in the linguistic test only one of the 
senses will impose itself, e.g. “Fido is a dog, and so is Lady” (hence, the double 
meaning will not be detected). Without going into further details, let us notice that 
the cases of inconsistency put forward by Geeraerts are not standard examples of 
polysemy (e.g. dog, newspaper, fruit).
Geeraerts also mentions the “contextual” criterion considered above by Croft 
and Cruse, i.e. whether an interpretation is contributed or selected by the context. 
In the former case, cognitive linguists talk of “vagueness” rather than polysemy 
(the latter case). Traditionally, however, as pointed out by Geeraerts (1993: 228) 
and Zlatev (2003: 482), “vague” is opposed to “ambiguous” to differentiate “refe-
rential indeterminacy” from multiplicity of senses; cf. note 43 above. Consequent-
ly, Zlatev proposes to replace “vagueness” in the present sense62 with the term 
“generality” (I have already followed this suggestion). Geeraerts argues against 
the contextual criterion, pointing out that not only the cases of generality, but also 
of polysemy are resolved (specifi ed) in the context. One needs proper context to 
resolve the generality of student: to know whether it refers to a male or a female. 
Similarly, one needs context to resolve the ambiguity of position: whether it refers 
to a “mental attitude” or an “occupied place”. Thus, if the contribution of context 
is necessary in both cases, it cannot serve as a criterion to distinguish generality 
from polysemy (1993: 267–268, note 16).
As we have seen, however, this objection does not take into account the dif-
ference between conventional “pre-meanings” (at the level of “full sense units”) 
and actual meanings, or the difference between intersubjective senses and their 
referential specifi cations in use. In other words, Geeraerts questions the existence 
of full sense boundaries (or senses of words) before an actualization in context. 
Such, indeed, seems to be the conclusion of his article: “lexical meanings are not 
to be thought of as prepackaged chunks of information, but as moving search-
lights that may variously highlight subdomains of the range of application of the 
lexical item in question” (1993: 263). We may return now to Croft and Cruse’s 
62 Vague meanings could be defi ned as meanings “unmarked for a certain category distinction”, 
e.g. student is vague with regard to the distinction between “male/female” (Lewandowska-Tomasz-
czyk 2007: 141).
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exposition and ask about the grounds they give for the (pre-)existence of such 
boundaries.
They believe that the linguistic tests are basically correct and that they reveal 
“antagonism” between distinct senses of a lexeme. In other words, such senses are 
competitive: if one is at the focus of attention, the other one is backgrounded. This 
is what happens in standard use, as opposed to zeugmatic contexts, which evoke 
both senses. The (intuitively obvious) difference between polysemy and generali-
ty is clear from this perspective: in the latter case the function of the context is 
not to exclude some pre-existing senses (or to select a given full sense), but to 
add information which need not be specifi ed. Geeraerts fudges this issue – like 
Langacker, discussed in 0.3. – which basically concerns the distinction between 
semantic information and pragmatic construal, when he offers the following hy-
pothetical statement: “There seems to be no reason to restrict [contextual infor-
mation] to purely linguistic contextual information, if only because any relevant 
piece of extralinguistic, encyclopedic or situational information could be turned 
into a piece of linguistic context by expressing it in words” (Geeraerts 1993: 267–
–268). The question, however, concerns not “adding” encyclopedic information 
(i.e. formulating it verbally), but “lexicalizing” it (i.e. making it conventionally 
available).
In Croft and Cruse’s account, “pre-meanings” place various constraints on 
actualizations in context. Full sense boundaries place the strongest constraints 
on an actualization of distinct senses in a single context, but the boundaries are 
not absolute, as shown by defi nitional contexts pointed out by Geeraerts (hedges, 
crossword puzzles etc.). Since, however, such contexts are exceptional – and they 
may serve to “unify” any two meanings, or temporarily suspend their boundaries 
– the linguistic test is valid (Croft, Cruse 2004: 112–113).
What makes full sense units antagonistic? The most obvious reason is seman-
tic distance: the senses (tend to) have few elements in common, belong to dif-
ferent domains, their referents have a different ontological status etc. However, 
as exemplifi ed by the two senses of month: “calendar month”, “period of four 
weeks”,63 some senses may be very close and still antagonistic. A deeper explana-
tion (“but which is still in some ways mysterious”) refers to the notion of “unifi -
cation” presented in the context of “sub-senses”: antagonistic readings resist any 
kind of unifi cation mentioned there (Croft, Cruse 2004: 115).
* * *
The notion of “polysemy” raises several issues, which one should try to keep 
separate. The issue of polysemy tests is perhaps least troublesome. All of them 
take the intuitive presence of polysemy – i.e. antagonistic senses linked to one 
63 “It would hardly be possible to fi nd an ambiguous word whose component units were closer” 
– Croft, Cruse (2004: 115).
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word form64 – for granted. Thus, they do not really “diagnose” it, since the antago-
nism is felt (to verify the antagonism, one could ask respondents rather than try 
to apply the tests). The tests are not reliable primarily because the role of context 
and contextual interpretation is no less elusive than the notion of polysemy. Ad-
ditionally, there are unusual sense relations (autohyponymous words) and sub-
senses, which are not straightforwardly antagonistic or unexpectedly antagonistic 
in some contexts (we will return to sub-senses below).
Traditionally, polysemy denotes a historical relatedness of senses linked to 
one word form, as opposed to homonymy, when two words – due to historical 
contingencies – acquire the same form. This case is not as simple, in principle, 
as Croft and Cruse make it, since the historical contingencies in question may 
actually involve the perception of similarity of etymologically different words. 
Thus, Langacker’s example concerning the “ear of corn” could have – hypotheti-
cally – a diachronic signifi cance, if both word forms converged because people 
felt their senses were related. As a result, the distinction between polysemy and 
homonymy would be much less secure.
In CL, “polysemy” is redefi ned as a “variation in the construal of a word on 
different occasions of use” (Croft, Cruse 2004: 109). Since such construals are 
“nondenumerable”, “polysemy” in this formulation would lose all meaning (it 
could not be opposed to something) and, a fortiori, could not be modelled. As 
argued, we need a distinction between pragmatic construal in use and semantic 
availability of distinct senses out of the context of use. In Croft and Cruse’s con-
ception, semantic information takes the form of “pre-meanings”, actualized in 
discourse. Distinct senses are most antagonistic in the whole range of such “pre-
meanings”: they place the strongest constraints on actualization in one context. 
What are the sources of antagonism? We would have an answer, if we knew 
why full senses resist unifi cation. Croft and Cruse’s discussion of sub-senses is 
very instructive in this respect. Basically, they show that full senses do not have 
a common referential context, nor a close superordinate term, which could unify 
them. Antagonism is born when a word is applied to referentially distinct situa-
tions. A key in the lock is antagonistic to a key in the keypad because they arti-
culate slots in different “frames” (to use Fillmore’s term). It does not matter 
whether the former entity is a piece of metal or an electronic card or any other 
device invented for the purpose, since they all articulate the same slot in an intui-
tively distinct situation. Thus, senses form a complex with referential situations 
which they have helped to articulate. Apparently, it is those default “situations” 
which are antagonistic. Facets can be unifi ed because in some contexts of use 
such ontologically different entities can fi ll the same “situational” slot (due to 
their “functional symbiosis”). With microsenses, we actually witness the origin of 
sense antagonism when distinct situational uses (e.g. card sent from holidays or 
used in banking) are splitting the more general meaning apart. Apparently, once a 
particular usage is felt to co-articulate a separate referential situation, it acquires 
64 As noted, they do not distinguish diachronic polysemy from homonymy.
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the status of a distinct sense. For instance, the verb tease is felt to merit four sub-
entries in Longman Dictionary:
1. To laugh at someone and make jokes in order to have fun by embarrassing them;
2. To deliberately annoy an animal;
3.  To deliberately make someone sexually excited without intending to have sex with 
them;
4.  (AmE) To comb your hair in the opposite direction to which it grows, so that it looks 
thicker.
It seems that once we can distinguish a separate (existentially different) con-
text of use, however close the general meaning (as with the fi rst three entries), we 
feel justifi ed to postulate a distinct sense. On the other hand, eating “with a spoon, 
fork or chopsticks” may be referentially varied,65 but such uses do not merit the 
status of polysemy, since they fi ll a single slot in the same situation type.
This interpretation of polysemy, I believe, accords well with Zlatev’s critique 
of CL’s “mentalism” and his suggestion that the “semantic pole” of linguistic 
symbols should be conceived not as a “conceptualization”, but as a “situation 
(type)” (2003: 455). It is not easy to fathom the consequences of Zlatev’s proposal 
for linguistics. I will return to it in my plea for “expressive linguistics” submitted 
in 5.3.
0.5. A recapitulation
One may rightly complain that the complex of issues discussed above is hardly 
penetrable, while my preliminary results are nothing more but one way of look-
ing at this material. It should be remembered, however, that the issues, which I 
have tried to follow and elucidate, are raised in standard accounts of “prototype 
semantics”. CL kindled such great hopes and evoked such an overwhelming re-
sponse66 precisely because it aimed at an integration of wide-ranging perspectives, 
encompassing philosophical inquiries into the nature of meaning, psychological 
studies of categorization and conceptual processing, anthropological explorations 
65 As pointed out by Weinreich – who in the sixties criticised accounts leading to an “infi nite pro-
liferation of senses” – one could ascribe a plethora of meanings to eat, since “eating with a spoon”, 
“eating with a fork” etc. is performed differently; cf. Ravin, Leacock (2000: 10). 
66 Cf. Langacker’s repeated expressions of gratitude to his graduate students: “Without the secu-
rity of tenure, they have been willing to pursue a non-establishment vision they believe in, with full 
cognizance of the likely professional consequences. Regardless of theoretical orientation, I think we 
can all agree that such courage deserves to be admired, if not tangibly rewarded ” (1991: ix). This 
statement, reminiscent of “fi rst Christians mentality”, is an indication how far CL has progressed in 
the last twenty years.
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of culture systems and so on. As a countervailing force against the “generativ-
ist excesses” and the structuralist “prison-house of language”,67 CL attempted to 
build new interdisciplinary foundations for linguistics “with a human face”. That 
impulse was liberating and benefi cial, while it clearly entailed the risk of infl ated 
ambitions and eclecticism. As a result, CL was in some ways misguided68 both in 
its opposition to the predecessors and in its access to the cognitivist paradigm. I 
will return to the historical context in 5.2.
At this stage, with hindsight, let us try to see the issues discussed above in 
their (more) correct proportions. “Prototype effects” – treated by Rosch as data 
to be integrated into a psychological theory of categorization – were hailed by 
Lakoff as “a general challenge to the classical theory [of categorization]” (1987: 
42). For Langacker, they were consonant with his conviction that “autonomous 
semantics” is unable to faithfully represent linguistic data, thus a more fl exible 
approach is needed to achieve descriptive adequacy. I have argued that prototype 
effects studied by Rosch reveal an important difference between folk “categori-
zation” based on cognitive reference points and expert categorization aiming at 
full taxonomies, i.e. comprising all relevant entities within a discrete conceptual 
system. The former stance is openly pragmatic – refl ecting our everyday need to 
“domesticate” reality. In other words, folk “differential treatment”69 is rooted in 
various existential motivations rather than in the theoretical stance. If one wants 
to have varied meat dishes on Friday in a Catholic country with fasting rules, a 
beaver provides better “motives” than chicken or deer to be identifi ed with fi sh. 
Theoreticians, on the other hand, are supposed not to be swayed by such mundane 
considerations.70 Their goal is a complete, hierarchical system of categories – a 
rational view of things as they are.
Consequently, Lakoff’s interpretation of Rosch’s data makes no sense. In eve-
ryday communication, people rely on local stereotypes of various kinds and are 
not normally bothered by delimitation problems or the overall consistency of their 
“conceptual system”. Such a system is a theoretical construct proposed by some 
cognitivists (notably, those belonging to Lakoff’s circle) to explain in a hysteron 
proteron, rationalist manner what people do in their situated, pragmatic, histori-
cal, contingent (and often thoughtless or unrefl ective) ways. Only if one proposes 
such a cognitive system in the cognitive unconscious (psychologist’s fallacy), can 
one see any analogy between contextual use of language and theoretical categori-
zation. As we shall see below – 1.1., note 11 – Langacker’s arguments against the 
“classical model” of linguistic categorization are based on this misconception.
Prototype effects, as pointed out by Harnad, are relatively superfi cial pheno-
mena. They cannot be relevantly invoked in a discussion concerning the constitu-
67 The title of Jameson’s monograph of structuralism and Russian formalism (1972).
68 I refer to some formulations of CL’s agenda. As we shall see more clearly in 1.1., CL has never 
been unitary in its assumptions.
69 Harnad’s defi nition of categorization in its basic or primitive form: “at bottom, all of our cate-
gories consist in ways we behave differently toward different kinds of things” (2005: 30).
70 But see note 25 in the Introduction on sociology of science and “paradigms”.
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tion of categories. The genetic issue is foundational, as shown by roboticists, who 
attempt to elucidate it in a practical manner (by teaching machines to “create” 
categories), or by hermeneuticists, who try to uncover layers of constitution in 
their search for the most “originary” view. The latter venture is embedded in the 
philosophical inquiry concerning the status of “ideality”, as refl ected in the debate 
about “universals”, cited by Taylor. Since CL aims to capture the linguistic results 
of unexplored processes of categorization, it cannot take a principled stand in that 
foundational debate.71
What, specifi cally, is CL’s agenda? In Langacker’s view, language is (sym-
bolically anchored and mostly conventional) conceptualization. Linguistic units 
at all levels of analysis – morphemes, lexemes, collocations, idioms, syntactic 
structures, sentences, utterances – are packages of phonological form and seman-
tic content. It is clear by now, I hope, that this identifi cation of language with 
conceptual structure is post hoc. One can treat linguistic units in this way because 
they have been constituted in a history of expression (and actualized in acts of 
expression). One may ascribe a set of meanings to, for instance, the dative case 
in Polish or over in English because both forms have evolved in some historical 
(and unexplored) processes of linguistic articulation. Similarly (but at an indi-
vidual, rather than social level), words and sentences in a context may be treated 
as conceptualizations because they have been interpreted, or used to articulate a 
given existential situation.
CL’s approach – after (for many) stifl ing formalisms of TG – was a waft of 
fresh air; it opened exciting vistas before linguists who felt that language is prima-
rily about meaning and only secondarily about formal structure. As a result – and 
this is my main claim in this book – CL has merely changed the focus from one 
factor in the equation to another, while sharing an important set of assumptions 
with TG (“linguistic mentalism”). The real challenge, however, is to genetically 
link both form and meaning: to show their mutual development as a way of do-
mesticating reality. This statement should be taken in the proper spirit. My inten-
tion is not to belittle CL’s tremendous achievements. As a correction of its prede-
cessors, it has (re)introduced themes of primary importance into the research 
agenda. Specifi cally, since it takes language to be a mental faculty, it has not only 
returned in its own way to Humboldt – the father of modern linguistics, cf. 5.2. 
– but it has been able to show in a transparent manner how linguistic forms are 
correlated with semantic content. This is a task of vast proportions which involves 
an integration of linguistic and cross-linguistic material from all areas of research. 
Such conceptual representations reveal important analogies and continuities at 
various levels of schematicity. My point concerns the limits of CL’s method or its 
proper “object” of study: this approach captures the results of social processes of 
linguistic articulation rather than hypothetical mental structures and processes in 
individual minds.
71 To repeat, prototype research and CL assume the existence of categories and explore problems 
with their extensional applications or intensional defi nitions.
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From this vantage point, the distinctions blurred by Langacker (and partly 
Geeraerts) – between lexical and encyclopedic knowledge on the one hand, and 
semantics and pragmatics on the other one – are pivotal because they express the 
basic opposition between what is social and what is individual: between intersub-
jectively available senses and individual (or special) knowledge, between generic 
(cultural) interpretations and individual readings in the context. Both distinctions 
bear directly on the issue of polysemy. As concerns the former one, some uses of 
a word (its senses) are felt to be available prior to acts of expression. To be sure, 
one can recognize the possibility of a novel use in an unusual context but such 
extensions are merely understandable – not socially available. As concerns the 
latter one, an “actualization” of a word is a situated application of its “semantic 
potential” to articulate some pragmatically relevant distinctions. Without a con-
text, one takes for granted the most typical social scenarios (“default contexts”). 
In situated use, a pragmatic interpretation may involve very unusual scenarios. To 
conclude: we need to keep separate the social and the individual perspective to 
make sense of polysemy. 
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CHAPTER 1. NETWORK MODELS: FOUNDATIONAL
  ACCOUNTS
1.0. Introductory remarks
Network models1 constitute a family of formats for representing lexical polysemy. 
Thus, they provide a particular type of answer to the question concerning the 
appropriate level of granularity of semantic defi nitions, i.e. “the level at which 
the relatedness of senses can be best observed and captured”.2 As pointed out 
by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, the monosemy position (espoused by neostruc-
turalists) strives for the most parsimonious or schematic representation (a single 
sense), while the homonymy position (associated with generativists) is primarily 
concerned with deriving (any number of 3) senses from sets of matrices of linguis-
tic properties (2007: 152). Both approaches are obviously motivated by different 
theoretical assumptions. I have little to say about the generativist approach (see 
J. Taylor 2007; and more generally Seuren 1998), which in CL plays mostly the 
part of the polemical “bogeyman” (as will be exemplifi ed in the next paragraph). 
That approach seems to be motivated by the idea that linguistics should be chiefl y 
concerned with “the underlying reality of language” (cf. Katz 1971), thus (in se-
mantics) it neglects many of its surface manifestations. The level of granularity 
considered appropriate in particular cases is achieved by combinations of atomic 
properties.
The motivation for the monosemy position is much more complex and impor-
tant in our context in view of the claims that CL is solidly based on Saussurian 
foundations. For instance, in his discussion of cognitive models Taylor mentions 
the structuralist doctrine of “the unity of the sign” and in this context puts forward 
two claims. First, that “the ‘indissoluble dualism’ of the sign predicts the ultimate 
sterility of any approach to language which focuses only on form” (a snipe at 
TG4). Second, that in view of a widespread “formal and semantic polyvalence”, 
1 As developed in CL. Network representations of semantic knowledge (in computational ap-
proaches) constitute a wider (and related) fi eld, cf. Evens (1988).
2 As already noted in the Introduction: note 8.
3 This approach is focused on formalizing types of relations, thus it manifests “a practical disre-
gard for the polysemy-homonymy distinction” (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2007: 152).
4 Examples of this kind in CL are legion. They are commented on by Taylor (2007), who urges 
a more conciliatory attitude. As I will argue below, and more extensively in chapter 4., CL shows a 
complementary disregard for the “indissoluble unity” of the sign, focusing on conceptual relations 
(rather than on the interplay between formal and conceptual structure).
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which prima facie breaks the unity of the sign, the Saussurian heritage “imposes 
the need to search for unitary representations of the [...] one-to-one relationship 
between signans and signatum”. And he concludes: “Respect for the unity of the 
sign, in both senses of the expression, lies behind a number of important devel-
opments in cognitive linguistics, as expounded, for example [by] Ronald Lan-
gacker [...] and George Lakoff” (Taylor 1990: 522–523). Such claims, however, 
are clearly exaggerated5 and they misrepresent the structuralist position.
The notion of the unity of the sign may be understood in the light of the fam-
ous passage from Saussure: “The characteristic role of language with respect to 
thought is not to create a material phonic means for expressing ideas but to serve 
as a link between thought and sound, under conditions that of necessity bring 
the reciprocal delimitation of units” (1959: 112). For Saussure, the essence of 
language lies in the combination of sound and thought – not “pairing” (which pro-
duces “nomenclature”, or a list of words) but “reciprocal delimitation”.6 Conse-
quently, the sign can be a vehicle of meaning – in the system of oppositions – only 
if it preserves this unity (one-to-relationship between signans and signatum). This 
fundamental idea is missing in the CL paradigm.
To be sure, the Saussurian notion of the unity of the sign is diffi cult to apply: it 
seems hardly credible when confronted with the facts, i.e. the “formal and seman-
tic polyvalence” noted by Taylor.7 For instance, a monosemic representation of 
climb, which is used to denote both upward and downward movement (cf. Taylor 
1989: 105–109), may seem clearly impossible and hardly desirable. Still, I will 
argue for the original Saussurian insight, as opposed to its skeletal version under-
lying CL in Taylor’s account. I believe that, at some level, the unity of the sign 
is a necessary assumption, if one wants to understand language, while obviously 
it must be interpreted in a way which makes space for the facts. As a result, the 
polysemy position is prima facie the most “realistic” option and – consequently 
– it faces an additional problem of representation: it is not enough to defi ne a set 
of distinct senses (as in the homonymy position), but one should also try to show 
how they are related.
In this chapter, I will present two “foundational” accounts of such model-
ling by Langacker and Lakoff, who approach (or sidestep) both basic problems 
mentioned so far (1. How to defi ne distinct senses?; 2. How are the senses re-
lated?) in a different manner. Usually, only the differences in the format of their 
5 The only evidence of the “Saussurian debt” is Lakoff’s defi nition of there constructions as 
“pairings of form and meaning” and Langacker’s defi nition of “symbolic units” (Taylor 1990: 523; 
repeated 1999: 19, 41 note 1). As for the “search of the unity of the sign” (advertised in the title of 
Taylor’s fi rst article and taken below in his own meaning), that claim makes almost no sense in the 
context of network models: as we shall see, in Langacker’s version, the unitary schema of a network 
is not necessary (and uninformative, if possible), while a lexical item is defi ned in an arbitrary fa-
shion. In Lakoff’s version, unitary representations are openly rejected as a realistic goal.
6 In other words, a linguistic symbol is “a form, not a substance” (Saussure 1959: 113) – it is a 
way of giving shape to the material (sound and thought simultaneously).
7 As he says: “instead of the one-to-one relationship of signans to signatum, we have a one-to-
many, a many-to-one, or, more typically, a many-to-many relationship” (1990: 522).
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approaches are pointed out and discussed (Lakoff’s “radial” model is built around 
the prototype, while Langacker’s “schematic network” involves both prototypes 
and schemas). I will try to show that these differences are secondary: they result 
from assumptions about the nature of linguistic categories as conceived by Lakoff 
(“natural categories of senses”) and Langacker (“complex categories”). I will give 
a detailed resume of both positions, followed by a presentation of a critique (from 
the monosemic perspective) of Lakoff’s model of over (Vandeloise 1990). Some 
of the points made by Vandeloise apply to network modelling in general.
In Chapter 2, I will present four subsequent attempts to improve Lakoff’s 
model of over. In Chapter 3, I will present a Langackerian model of Polish za(-) 
– primarily a preposition, which in a range of its senses is an equivalent of over, 
and a verbal prefi x. The model of the latter will be discussed in the diachronic 
context. In Chapter 4, I will raise the question whether network models represent 
“diachrony within synchrony”.
1.1. Motivations behind the Langackerian 
and Lakoffi an models
I want to ask fi rst about the rationale for adopting the new approach to the re-
presentation of linguistic categories. In this respect, the accounts provided by the 
“founding fathers” of prototype semantics – Lakoff and Langacker – are signifi -
cantly different. I will try to charter some of the differences below.
Lakoff’s declared aim is incredibly ambitious and extends far beyond the do-
main of linguistics (as documented in note 12 and 17 in the Introduction). He wants 
to provide an alternative to “the traditional view” about the nature of language, 
mind and reality (he calls “objectivism”), “which is tied to the classical theory [of 
categorization, according to which] categories are defi ned in terms of common 
properties of their members” (Lakoff 1987: xii). The alternative proposed by him 
– a theory based on prototypes – is to serve as a lynchpin of a new view, bringing 
forth a revolution in philosophy and science. The wider implications of Lakoff’s 
proposal go far beyond the present context.8 As concerns language, Lakoff says:
One of the principal claims of this book is that language makes use of our general cognitive 
apparatus. If this claim is correct, two things follow:
– Linguistic categories should be of the same type as other categories in our conceptual 
system. In particular, they should show prototype and basic-level effects;
8 As already mentioned, I analysed that ideological project of “Lakoff’s circle” primarily in 
Pawelec (2005a).
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– Evidence about the nature of linguistic categories should contribute to a general under-
standing of cognitive categories in general. Because language has such a rich category 
structure and because linguistic evidence is so abundant, the study of linguistic categoriza-
tion should be one of the prime sources of evidence for the nature of category structure in 
general (Lakoff 1987: 58).
It seems, prima facie, that Lakoff merely assumes that linguistic categories are 
like “other categories in our conceptual system” and are structured around proto-
types, or “radially structured”. I will look at his argument in greater detail below. 
Here, it is enough to point out that Lakoff treats prototype models in semantics 
as evidence for the existence of prototype-based categorization (“psychologist’s 
fallacy”). As he puts it: “polysemy appears to be a special case of prototype-based 
categorization, where the senses of the word are the members of a category. The 
application of prototype theory to the study of word meaning brings order into an 
area where before there was only chaos. [...] Each of these case studies9 demon-
strates the reality of radially structured categories” (Lakoff 1987: 378–379).
Langacker, on the other hand, notices in a matter-of-fact fashion that: “Much 
in language is a matter of degree. [...] Nondiscrete aspects of language structure 
must be accommodated organically in the basic design of an adequate linguistic 
theory”. He subsequently raises the issue which concerns us here: “whether the 
criterial-attribute model or the prototype model offers a better account of lin-
guistic categorization”. As he explains: “The criterial-attribute model characteri-
zes a class by means of a list of defi ning features;10 in its strict form, it requires 
that every member of the class fully possess every property on this list, and that 
no nonmember possess all of the listed properties. Class membership is thus an 
all-or-nothing affair; a sharp distinction is presumed between those entities that 
are in the class and those that are not”. Langacker points out three “well-known 
problems” with this model. First, some indubitable members of a category may 
lack attributes intuitively judged criterial for it (e.g. fl ightless birds). Second, a set 
of features suffi cient to delimit a category, i.e. “to pick out all and only the mem-
bers” of a class, “might still be incomplete and inadequate as a characterization of 
that class” (e.g. “[featherless] [biped]” as defi ning humans). And third, in actual 
use the criterial attributes are not judged necessary to ascribe class membership. 
For instance, a baseball which is the wrong colour is still called a baseball.11 Ac-
9 There are three extended case studies in Lakoff’s opus magnum. As he says (exemplifying 
again the “psychologist’s fallacy”): “Since radially structured categories differ most radically from 
classical categories, it is important to have detailed case studies that document their existence” (1987: 
379). In the fi rst study (produced in cooperation with Kövecses), Lakoff discusses “idealized cogni-
tive models” underlying in his theory linguistic expressions referring to ANGER. The second one is 
a radial “image-schematic” model of over (developed on the basis of Brugman’s thesis), which will 
be presented in 1.3. below. The last one is a study of “symbolic” there constructions.
10 Conventionally placed in square brackets.
11 None of these arguments is a serious problem for the “classical” model. The fi rst one ignores 
the distinction between “folk” and “expert” categories (“intuitively criterial” refers to the former, 
while necessary and suffi cient features are searched by “experts”). The second one merely states that 
the search for essential features is diffi cult (it misrepresents the nature of this search: its point is not 
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cording to Langacker, the prototype model avoids these problems. First, “it does 
not require that every member of a category possess a given feature (or even that 
there be any salient property shared by all members)”. Second, “the characteriza-
tion problem is avoided because the prototype model is not inherently minimalist 
in spirit; instead it encourages the fullest possible characterization of prototypi-
cal instances, if only to specify the basis for assimilating the full range of non-
prototypical instances to a category”. And third, “the prototype model allows an 
entity to be assimilated to a category if a person fi nds any plausible rationale for 
relating it to prototypical members” (Langacker 1987: 14–17). Thus, Langacker’s 
preference for prototype models is based on the factual assumption that linguistic 
categories can be represented more adequately in this way than by the criterial-
attribute model.
Both accounts are superfi cially similar – they propose prototype models in 
preference to discrete models in semantics – while differing in important respects. 
Crucially, Langacker’s view that linguistic categories may require special treat-
ment because of “the organization and complexity of the linguistic data” (Lan-
gacker 1987: 17) seems opposed to Lakoff’s assumption that they are like “other 
categories in our conceptual system” (Lakoff 1987: 58). Furthermore, Langack-
er’s approach is primarily descriptive: in his view, the prototype model provides 
a more adequate representation of a range of linguistic phenomena than the crite-
rial-attribute model. Lakoff believes that the prototype model is explanatory: that 
it shows how language and mind work.
The notion of “linguistic categorization” plays a central role in the remarks 
quoted above. As already mentioned (0.2.), it is ambiguous. In Taylor’s formula-
tion: whenever we use the same word to refer to various specimens of something, 
we categorize, or name “sameness in difference”. Since words can also refer to 
linguistic entities, the term “linguistic categorization” covers not only categories 
in the world verbalized in a language, like DOG, but also linguistic categories, 
like WORD or LEXEME. To distinguish between these cases, in the latter one, 
which Taylor calls “refl exive” (1989: vii–viii), Rúa proposes to talk about “meta-
linguistic categories” (Rúa 2003: 46).
Let us notice, however, that this disambiguation does not seem to address the 
crucial issue. When Langacker mentioned the problem facing the linguist: “the 
organization and complexity of linguistic data”, he did not mean linguistic cate-
gories like WORD or LEXEME, but rather linguistic phenomena, e.g. polyse-
mic words or grammatical structures with a number of conventional uses. While 
it makes sense to use the term “metalinguistic categories” to refer to folk (e.g. 
WORD) or expert (e.g. LEXEME) categories ordering in some ways linguistic 
data, this description does not seem obviously applicable to the data. In his expo-
to provide some unique description of a class, but to locate the class in a taxonomy). The last one 
presupposes that “literal” uses of a word are rigidly tied to some defi nitional context (it identifi es 
language use and the theoretical quest for representations of linguistic categories).
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sition, Taylor disregards this point since he assumes (together with Lakoff) that 
linguistic objects are like non-linguistic objects:
Just as a botanist is concerned with a botanical categorization of plants, so a linguist un-
dertakes a linguistic categorization of linguistic objects. The second half of the book, in 
particular, will address the parallels between linguistic categorization in this second sense, 
and the categorization, through language, of the non-linguistic world. If, as will be argued, 
categories of linguistic objects are structured along the same lines as the more familiar 
semantic categories, then any insights we may gain into the categorization of the non-lin-
guistic world may be profi tably applied to the study of language structure itself. (J. Taylor 
1989: viii)
Rúa takes Taylor to task for treating what she calls “metalinguistic categories” 
on a par with other kinds of categories. She claims that linguistic categorization 
proper involves objects which are “intrinsically” linguistic, rather than “addition-
ally” linguistic. As she explains: 
In simple terms, one thing is categorizing objects which have a concrete or 
abstract correlate in the world, and subsequently resorting to language in order 
to express the result of that categorization [...]; a different thing is categorizing 
objects which lack this correlate, or simply do not make sense in isolation from 
the system they belong to. (i.e. from language) (Rúa 2003: 32)
Consequently, Rúa postulates three types of “linguistic categories” (a superor-
dinate, neutral term):
(a) Metalinguistic categories (purely linguistic): they must be assigned a linguistic expres-
sion; (b) Semilinguistic categories: they are subdivided into cognitive linguistic (bird) and 
perceptual linguistic (red), since the latter type is highly dependent on sensory perception. 
Their linguistic expression is expected as a natural complement; (c) Extralinguistic cate-
gories (purely cognitive/perceptual): their linguistic expression is possible but not strictly 
required. (Rúa 2003: 33)
The criteria of Rúa’s classifi cation (whether a category must, should or may 
be verbally expressed) seem to be rather ad hoc. It is quite clear, for instance, that 
what would be an “extralinguistic” category in one language, could be a “semilin-
guistic” one in another, if conventionally expressed (rich evidence is provided by 
studies in the domain of colour perception and expression). But her point is con-
sonant with Langacker’s concern: “purely linguistic” categories – linguistic phe-
nomena – may have unique properties which require special treatment. Still, the 
term “metalinguistic categories” is an unusual label for naturally, i.e. historically, 
developed linguistic categories or “natural categories of senses” (as opposed to 
refl exive metacategories). Rúa is aware of this problem: “there are problematic 
cases of diffi cult ascription (what kind of ‘objects’ are categorized under over or 
hate?)”, she wonders (p. 33). It is legitimate to ask, then, in what sense linguistic 
phenomena – e.g. polysemic words – are “categories”? What is their “sameness 
in difference”, in Taylor’s expression?
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1.2. Schematic networks
1.2.1. A resume of Langacker’s position
Langacker’s guiding principle is descriptive adequacy. In his treatment of linguis-
tic categorization he points out two crucial aspects of phenomena, which must 
be taken account of: variability and conventionality (Langacker 1987: 369–373). 
Since symbolic units are generally variable both in form and meaning,12 he thinks 
it is best to analyse their phonological and semantic pole as “complex categories”. 
These categories are complex because “they group together, and treat as equiva-
lent for certain purposes, a variety of distinct and sometimes quite disparate ele-
ments” (p. 369) As a result, “membership is commonly a matter of degree, resis-
tant to strict delimitation, and subject to the vicissitudes of linguistic convention” 
(pp. 369–370).
Langacker argues for a nonreductive, usage-based model of symbolic mean-
ing: even though a theorist rightly aims at a generalization, he should not eschew 
enumerating established senses covered by it, since they belong to a speaker’s 
knowledge of linguistic convention. As Langacker says about a lexical item: 
“Even when all its attested values are plausibly analyzed as instantiations of a 
single abstract schema, or as extensions from a single prototype, there is no way 
to predict from the schema or prototype alone precisely which array of instantia-
tions or extensions – out of all the conceivable ones – happen to be conventionally 
exploited within the speech community” (p. 370).
Specifi cally, Langacker opts for a “unifi ed” account which “requires the listing 
of all conventionally established values of a lexical item, as a minimal descrip-
tion of the empirical data”. The next step is “an analysis of how the category is 
structured, i.e. how the different senses are related to one another”. There are two 
principal types of relationship to be accommodated in the model: “elaboration 
(the relation between a schema and its instantiations) and extension (the rela-
tion between prototypical and peripheral values)”. The resulting network model 
“incorporates (as schemas) whatever generalizations can be extracted from spe-
cifi c instances and refl ects the many categorizing judgments through which the 
complex category has evolved”. Thus, Langacker’s network model of a complex 
category comprises two kinds of categorization – by schema and by prototype 
– “as aspects of a unifi ed phenomenon” (pp. 370–371).
The postulated compatibility of both types of categorization is represented by 
Langacker in the formula: 
S > T = V
12 The “formal and semantic polyvalence” mentioned by Taylor (1990: 522).
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The conceptualizer (not represented) observes in the target (T) a confi gura-
tion that satisfi es the specifi cations of the standard (S) to some extent (V) – the 
magnitude of discrepancy between the standard and target. When T satisfi es the 
specifi cations of S fully, then V = 0 (or more precisely, V falls below a certain 
threshold of tolerance). In such cases, S is referred to as a schema and the catego-
rizing relationship between S and T (ST) is one of elaboration or specialization: 
T exemplifi es S in fi ner detail. When T is inconsistent with some specifi cations of 
S (V > 0), then S is referred to as a prototype, and the relationship between S and 
T (S--->T) is one of extension (p. 371).13
Langacker admits that even though it is sometimes diffi cult to distinguish them 
in practice (when V is close to the threshold on either side), both types of catego-
rization are qualitatively different. Categorization by schema enjoys privileged 
status because it provides “full sanction” – it exemplifi es conventional usage (cf. 
pp. 62ff.) or grammatical “well-formedness” – while categorization by extension 
provides only “partial sanction” and exemplifi es nonconventional usage or gram-
matical “deviance”. Langacker speculates that schematic relationships have spe-
cial status because they represent the limiting case of S/T discrepancy (when V 
= 0). This is based on the general assumption that “qualitative distinctness and 
special cognitive salience often attach to an element that occupies the extremity 
of a continuous scale”. Langacker concludes that discrete judgements of well-
formedness can be “accommodated even in a model describing sanction and con-
ventionality in continuous terms” (p. 372).
Langacker goes further in his attempts to reconcile both types of categoriza-
tion. He claims that “categorization by extension typically presupposes and incor-
porates schematic relationships”. If we have a concept X which is inconsistent in 
some respects with a prototype PT, it can still be assimilated to the category, if the 
conceptualizer observes some similarity between X and PT – relevant for his pur-
poses – and is willing to overlook the discrepancies. In such a case, the situation 
comprises three elements: PT, X and their perceived similarity “which amounts to 
a schema (SCH) that PT and X elaborate in alternate ways”. 
Consequently, categorization by extension is to be depicted in the following 
way:
13 A solid arrow represents full schematicity, while a broken-line arrow represents partial sche-
maticity (Langacker 1987: 69).
SCH
PT X
Figure 1: Langacker (1987: 373)Based onFigure 1: After Langacker (1987: 373)
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Langacker admits that neither the conceptualizer need be aware of the schema 
sanctioning the perceived similarity, nor the entrenchment of the extension (“re-
peated use”, cf. p. 59) need raise the schema to unit status or cognitive salience. 
Still, “If we think of an extension as a ‘horizontal’ relationship, and schematicity 
as a ‘vertical’ one, we can say that the ‘outward’ growth of a lexical network by 
extension from prototypes is inherently associated with its ‘upward’ growth by 
extraction of schemas”. Langacker concludes: “One is not impossible without 
the other, but they tend to co-occur as interrelated facets of the same expansive 
mechanism” (pp. 372–373).
This initial account is programmatic and highly abstract. Langacker provides 
an example: of a child learning the conventional senses of a lexical unit tree (pp. 
373–388). In Langacker’s notation, symbolic units are represented as [[TREE]/
[tree]]. Square brackets denote unit status or entrenched cognitive routine (as op-
posed to round brackets which denote a novel use or “conception”). The name 
in capitals denotes the semantic pole, while the name in lower case – the phono-
logical pole (cf. 57ff.). While discussing semantic phenomena, Langacker usually 
limits his description to the semantic pole.
Langacker asks the reader to imagine a child learning the conventional senses 
of the word tree, in his early experience fi rst applied to ordinary deciduous trees: 
oaks, maples, and elms: “Their perceptual prominence and obvious gross simi-
larities enable the child to extract a conception that embodies their commonality, 
while excluding the many properties that vary from one instance to the next”. As 
a result, the child produces an abstraction – a low-level schema – which “presuma-
bly [...] emphasizes intrinsic, characteristic, and cognitively salient properties 
(e.g. shape, size, color, brachiation, leaves)”. This schema – as the starting point 
for the evolution of a complex category – serves as “the category prototype” (p. 
373).
Subsequently, the child encounters a pine and learns to call it a tree. The new 
symbolic unit derived from the original [[TREE]/[tree]] is represented as [[PINE]/
[tree]]. The extension refl ects the categorizing judgement of partial schematicity: 
[[TREE]--->[PINE]], since pines have needles as opposed to leaves. Langacker 
speculates that the child may conceive the schema (TREE’) that embodies the 
commonality between [TREE] and [PINE] and neutralizes the difference in foli-
age type. If (TREE’) becomes entrenched and achieves the unit status [TREE’], it 
may sanction other extensions (accommodating e.g. a palm to the category) and 
give ground to a higher-order schema [TREE’’]. Since it is not certain, however, 
whether further extensions are derived from the PT [TREE] – which is cognitively 
salient because of its strongest entrenchment – or from the higher-level schema 
[TREE’] – which is more abstract, hence confl icts less sharply with the specifi ca-
tions of [PALM]) – in the model of this process depicted below there are broken-
line arrows leading from both schemas: 
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Langacker comments that the “meaning of tree for the child at this point is not 
just the schematic [TREE’], nor is it just the prototype [TREE]; rather its meaning 
is given by the entire schematic network, any node of which can be accessed by 
the phonological unit [tree]” (p. 374).
Langacker points out that the schematic network is a dynamic structure: 
“changes in patterns of experience and communicative needs can alter the spe-
cifi c confi guration of a network even for a mature speaker. Elms and maples may 
not survive as prototypical trees for a speaker who has lived for forty years in the 
desert”. By a stretch of imagination, “there are speakers for whom the term apple 
now designates a fruit only by virtue of semantic extension, based on its similarity 
[...] to a computer logo”. Langacker believes, however, that such a variation does 
not hinder effective communication due to “substantial overlap” (p. 376).
This story is supposed to show how the schematic network develops in prin-
ciple. Langacker states that “much less hinges on the specifi c details of a network 
than one might think”. This is so for two reasons: one can adopt a conventional us-
age without forming the postulated higher-order schema (i.e. noticing the similar-
ity motivating a particular extension); besides, “the entrenchment and cognitive 
salience of such structures is in any case a matter of degree” (p. 377).
As concerns the structure of a lexical network, its nodes should not be con-
ceived as “discrete containers” but rather as “‘windows’ on a common knowl-
edge base”. Each node “affords a different view by structuring this base in its 
own fashion, and by introducing supplementary specifi cations” (pp. 378–379). 
As we know, the relationships between nodes exemplify two types of categori-
zation: specialization and extension (the former is treated as a limiting case of 
the latter). Since they are graded phenomena, one may talk about “elaborative 
distance” between a particular schema and its instantiation, and about the degree 





Figure 2: Langacker (1987: 374)Based on Figure 2: After Langacker (1987: 374)
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when domain shifts restrict the similarity between standard and target to abstract 
confi gurational properties” – an extension is considered metaphorical, e.g. tree in 
Chomsky’s phrase tree (p. 379).
Additionally, bi-directional relationships are possible. “If a perceived similar-
ity motivates the extension of A to B, the same similarity can motivate the exten-
sion of B to A”. Since this point shows Langacker’s fi delity to phenomena, let 
me quote at length: “Often there are grounds for positing a particular direction 
of extension: speaker intuition, the obvious prototypicality of A or B, or general 
principles of semantic extension (e.g. it typically proceeds from concrete to more 
abstract domains). However, nothing guarantees that a nonarbitrary choice can al-
ways be made. The relationship A<--->B then indicates that the speaker perceives 
the similarity of each element to the other without attributing primacy to either 
one. By my own intuitions, various specifi c senses of drive are related to one an-
other in this way (drive a car, drive a ball, drive a nail)” (pp. 379–380).
As concerns the privileged status of the nodes functioning as the category 
prototype and highest-level schema, Langacker says that the former is important 
“because of its developmental priority and notable cognitive salience”, while the 
latter – “because it embodies the maximal generalization that can be extracted”. 
Developmental priority of the prototype is supposed to defi ne “the center of grav-
ity for the category”. Simultaneously, “not every complex category offers viable 
or unique candidates for the roles of prototype and schema at the ‘global’ lev-
el”. Langacker points out two criteria distinguishing the global prototype: “it is 
substantially more salient that any other and functions as the apparent basis of 
more extensions”. Since these conditions need not be satisfi ed, it is possible that 
“multiple prototypes of considerable local prominence will [...] arise in different 
portions of an extensive network”. Similarly, there is no assurance that one can 
plausibly posit a single “superschema” for a category and that efforts to locate it 
would be worthwhile, since “it may well be only minimally entrenched and have 
very little cognitive salience” (pp. 380–381).
Towards the end of his exposition, Langacker mentions “semantic extensions 
that appear not to be based on any judgment of similarity”. He cites the clas-
sic example of Middle English bedes – the extension from “prayers” to “beads”. 
According to Langacker such extensions, based on cultural associations, can 
be treated as a special case of extensions based on resemblance. He points out 
that in the single relevant domain linking them – that of saying prayers – “both 
[PRAYERS] and [BEADS] evoke the conception of a one-to-one correspon-
dence between prayers in a cycle and balls on a rosary; they contrast only by their 
choice of profi le”. Since this correspondence functions as a mediating schema, 
“the extension is quite comparable to those based on similarity”, if one factors out 
profi ling (p. 384).
Finally, Langacker comments on the notion of a lexical item: “To the extent 
that a semantic network with common symbolization approximates a coherent 
category, we can reasonably speak of a lexical item. Despite its convenience, 
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however, this construct is more a descriptive fi ction than a natural unit of linguis-
tic organization. Not only is coherence inherently a matter of degree, but also 
the defi nition allows a single network to be divided into lexical items in multiple 
and mutually inconsistent ways. I regard this as a realistic characterization of the 
phenomena in question” (p. 388).
1.2.2. A discussion
Basically, Langacker offers a format for representing any meanings of a lexeme, 
whether they are conventionally sanctioned senses (his minimal requirement: the 
network should be capacious enough to contain all established senses, as found in 
a dictionary or elicited in one way or another), or nonce uses. Thus, he avoids the 
problem of how to identify distinct senses at the cost of eliminating the boundaries 
between lexical/encyclopedic knowledge and between semantics/pragmatics 
(see 0.3. for a critique). The format is based on schematic similarity, which is un-
problematic in the case of specialization; in the case of extension one is required 
to fi nd a similarity between a prototype and a novel use, apparently motivating the 
latter. This requirement puts no signifi cant constraint on extension. As mentioned 
in 0.2., one can fi nd similarities between any two entities. Moreover, the division 
of represented meanings into “units” (dictionary senses?) depends on defi nition, 
thus it is – to some extent – arbitrary.
At one level, this is clearly realistic. Words (like star) can be used in distant 
domains (“astronomy” ---> “showbiz”) to designate something objectively un-
related to the original referent. As for defi nitions, a set of uses of a word can be 
classifi ed differently, depending on the criteria of classifi cation; cf. e.g. Geeraerts 
(2007). Consequently, it makes sense to have a highly fl exible format, which al-
lows to incorporate – compare, classify etc. – any relevant phenomena (the rea-
son, I believe, why Langacker’s account is very much “in principle”14).
But is it “descriptively adequate”? Let us focus fi rst on a problem with me-
tonymy, which is evident in Langacker’s discussion of bedes (PRAYERS / 
BEADS). As commonly explained, the metonymic extension is motivated not by 
the schematic similarity between both concepts which Langacker fi nds (the cycle 
of prayers ---> beads in a rosary), but as a result of the functional (situational) sa-
lience of an aspect of the referent. It makes sense to call BEADS prayers15 and a 
CUSTOMER a ham sandwich not because of some common schema one can de-
14 The format is infi nitely fl exible because a “schema” of a highly general kind (e.g. ENTITY) 
can be extracted for any two uses of a word. That is why it plays no real role in the representation (and 
generation) of phenomena, as I will show below. Langacker fudges this issue by his “in principle” 
treatment: “Our inability to demonstrate directly and conclusively that a particular schema has been 
extracted [...] does not invalidate the claim that speakers do extract schemas” (1987: 377). But the 
question is: do speakers use (need) schemas, when extending a word’s sense? And on the level of 
theoretical representation: what is the use of schemas which do not capture “essential” similarities, 
i.e. do not identify the higher level in a taxonomy.
15 Cf. a similar extension in Polish: pacierze ---> paciorki.
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tect in the bases of both concepts within a common domain16 (a task which would 
probably pose a greater challenge in the latter case), but because in the situation 
a given aspect of the referent in question (“something used for saying prayers”, 
“the one who ordered a ham sandwich”) is found suitable for its identifi cation. 
However, when one looks closer at the bedes example – cf. Queller (2008: 15–16) 
– even the standard metonymic explanation need not be required. Queller argues 
that in an original context of use (Middle English) the sentence below could have 
two readings:
(1) She’s counting her beads [bedes].
(1) a. She’s saying her prayers. (the standard sense)
(1) b. She’s counting her beads. (the modern sense)
Once the possibility of a new reading is inferred in a context, it can coexist 
with the standard sense, because it does not lead to a communication breakdown.17 
Only when it is invoked out of the original context (e.g. “You have mislaid your 
prayers”), the semantic extension makes itself manifest and may become stan-
dard. This does not yet explain the actual social process of semantic shift but it 
clearly shows that apart from cognitive factors (schematic similarity, cognitive 
salience), other factors may be more relevant (contextual ambiguity of a given 
formal sequence).18
When we accept this possibility, Langacker’s “schematic similarity” looks post 
hoc – a theoretician’s device to represent the results of unexplored processes of 
extension. We may fi nd a common schema for star as used in astronomy and show-
biz, but the perception of similarity need not have been operative in the actual ex-
tension. As will be documented in 3.3. – on diachronic processes concerning Polish 
verbal prefi xation – non-cognitive factors are clearly at play in semantic shifts.19
The hysteron proteron approach is even more striking in the case of the acqui-
sition just-so story. It is completely wrong as a developmental account. As shown 
by Piaget (1966a, b) – cf. Donaldson (1986) – schemas are extracted not on the 
16 Finding a place for metonymy in Langacker’s format based on schematic similarity is diffi cult, 
as shown by Tuggy’s discussion (2007: 103–105). Tuggy’s claim that a “conceptual unifi cation of 
[metaphor and metonymy] is surely a desirable result” (p. 104) is unconvincing. One can conceptu-
ally unify anything with anything; the point is whether both phenomena have something essential in 
common. 
17 Cf. a possible double sense of the following sentence in modern Polish: “Klepie paciorki” (“S/
he is saying her prayers / s/he is tapping her beads” – my example; all further examples, when no refer-
ence is provided, are mine). To be sure, both senses of paciorki are established, while in the context 
of prayer with a rosary normally only the former one is active. My point is to show that interlocutors 
can construe both of those readings in the same context without causing a communicative problem.
18 This is a standard explanation of grammaticalization in diachronic linguistics as “reanalysis” 
and “extension”, cf. Itkonen (2002).
19 Non-cognitive in the sense: not based on a perception of similarity (metaphor) or functional 
salience (metonymy). Any act of language use is cognitive in some sense, but that unspecifi c usage 
would be uninformative.
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basis of “perceptual prominence and obvious gross similarities”, but in the fi eld of 
action – when necessary to achieve one’s goals. For a child, a tree could be simi-
lar to things affording related types of activity (e.g. climbing, aiming at, jumping 
from etc.). Distinguishing a tree as a tree would make sense only if it could be 
opposed to something in the context of an activity (e.g. a bush: “something to 
hide in when crouching” as different from “something to hide in when climbing”). 
The prototypical schema of a tree which Langacker has in mind (but which may 
have little to do with the actual type of trees in one’s vicinity) would probably 
be fi rst acquired during drawing lessons, when a child is taught what a “tree”, 
“house”, “doggy” look like.20 Additionally, acquiring a linguistic category like 
TREE is not a matter of generalization, but – on the contrary – of limiting initial 
overgeneralization, or rather “syncretic” use, cf. Vygotsky (1962). To conclude, 
Langacker invokes a standard empiricist scenario of step-by-step generalization 
which is philosophically discredited since Hume and Kant, and replaced by more 
adequate psychological accounts at least since Vygotsky and Piaget (and earlier 
by the Gestalt school). As we have seen (0.2.), this account assumes from the start 
the existence of the category.
The acquisition story would not be of much importance, if we were not sup-
posed to take it as an analogy to the process which we try to fathom, i.e. the de-
velopment of a complex category.21 Langacker’s analogy is in itself paradoxical, 
because TREE in the acquisition story is a standard – classical – category. The 
analogy would be more adequate, if the child in Langacker’s account learned to as-
sociate trees in the park, Chomsky’s phrase trees as well as anything s/he could fi nd 
similar in shape or function (or for any idiosyncratic reason) to the fi rst referent 
(which means: virtually anything, as in fact happens, and as Vygotsky’s examples 
from the “syncretic” stage amply demonstrate). To be sure, such “complex cate-
gories” are not “classical categories”, for they do not really classify – they do not 
refl ect a given practice or provide a stable insight into some referential domain.
Thus, Langacker’s description of the development of a complex lexical cate-
gory fi ts much better a theoretician’s attempt at a representation of a classical 
referential category (i.e. of a category of objects in the world). Consequently, the 
following passage describes an analyst’s attempt to provide a representation of a 
monosemic category rather than the actual development of a complex category: 
“If we think of an extension as a ‘horizontal’ relationship, and schematicity as a 
‘vertical’ one, we can say that the ‘outward’ growth of a lexical network by exten-
sion from prototypes is inherently associated with its ‘upward’ growth by extrac-
tion of schemas. One is not impossible without the other, but they tend to co-occur 
as interrelated facets of the same expansive mechanism” (p. 373).
20 “As is known today, image is not an element of thought, nor a direct continuation of percep-
tion: it is a symbol of an object; what is more, it does not appear yet at the level of sensorimotor 
intelligence (otherwise the solution of various practical problems would be much easier). Image can 
be treated as internalized imitation” (Piaget 1966a: 91).
21 “For illustrative purposes, let us sketch a plausible (though simplistic) scenario for the evolu-
tion of a complex category” (Langacker 1987: 373).
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Both networks discussed by Langacker (ring and run) are perhaps not ex-
tensive enough22 to make that obvious but when one considers a fuller account, 
e.g. Tabakowska’s model of KLUCZ [KEY] (1995: 51), which also comprises 
historically related forms, it is clear that a complex category consists of clusters. 
The category KLUCZ contains two opposing senses: OPENING and CLOSING, 
motivated by both salient functions of the key. There is little generalization apart 
from the extensions: “opening” ---> “providing access”; “closing ---> “denying 
access”. There is, however, plenty of variation around salient cases (I will quote 
an English dictionary, which lists similar items):
(1) an instrument for locking or unlocking, winding up, turning, tuning, tightening or loos-
ening;
(2) in musical instruments, a lever to produce the sound required; a similar part in other 
instruments for other purposes, as in a typewriter [and now a computer, mobile phone and 
so on – A.P.];
(3) a system of tones related to one another in a scale; a scheme or a diagram of explanation 
or identifi cation; a set of answers to problems; a crib translation. (Chamber’s Dictionary)
The list is much more extensive, but the clusters relate mostly to shapes and 
functions (often in surprising or apparently confl icting ways). 
Thus, lexical categories display family resemblances. As famously pointed 
out by Wittgenstein, one cannot defi ne even such a relatively coherent lexical 
item as Spiel.23 As for its English equivalent game, referentially it comprises e.g. 
“volleyball” and “animals good for hunting”. Do they have a common schema? 
One of an extremely general type: “ACTIVITIES performed/ANIMALS killed 
for fun”. This disjunctive schema (two schemas?) is obviously not a defi nition 
– at this abstract level it could referentially cover a good part of reality and (the 
crucial thing) it has no place in a taxonomy (except, perhaps, one borrowed from 
Borges). This clearly shows that the development of a complex category can-
not be meaningfully compared to categorizing, while its representation does not 
primarily involve a search for common schemas (or defi nitions) but rather an 
identifi cation of clusters.
The KEY example shows that an important part in extension process is played 
by the actual physical and functional features of a salient referent. Assuming that 
the key used to lock doors is prototypical (i.e. salient), key offers itself as a suit-
able name for a range of referents involving related activities, e.g. “winding up, 
turning, tuning, tightening or loosening”. Thus, (in a set of cases) it may be the 
22 Since Langacker’s schematic model is very much an account “in principle”, rather than “in 
fact”, his own examples (two in all, two pages long) are fragmentary: they are used to illustrate the 
model rather than to be treated as serious analyses; cf. Langacker (1988a: 51–53; 1988b: 135–136, 
repeated in 1991: 267–268).
23 “How is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer does? 
Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn. (But that never 
troubled you before when you used the word ‘game’)” (quoted in J. Taylor 1989: 39). To be sure, 
the label “family-resemblance model” makes little sense, assuming that a model should be based on 
principles refl ecting insight into the structure of the reality modelled.
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social availability (common experience) of the sense of action invoked by a proto-
type which drives extension: people will use a term which easily springs to mind 
when they do something similar.24 To be sure, one would feel that a given activity 
is similar e.g. to “rummaging with a key in the lock”, when actually rummaging 
with a tool in an object providing resistance. But the feeling that one engages in “a 
similar thing” can apparently drive extension process without a common scenario, 
as shown perhaps by both senses of game.25 
The KEY example also shows, confi rming Langacker’s general remark and 
Geeraerts’ lexicographical observations (2007), that pointing out clusters is intui-
tive and depends on one’s classifi catory criteria. If one relies on “shape”, one can 
assume perhaps that a musical clef represents the same type of extension as ana-
tomical clavis (i.e. CURVED OBJECTS). If one relies on “function”, one could 
place clef in the category OBJECTS PROVIDING ACCESS (like “translation 
crib” or Polish “cipher”26).
To conclude, Langacker’s format is so fl exible that the issue of “distinct” 
senses is dissolved (along with both distinctions mentioned), while the issue of 
relatedness of word uses (based on schematic similarity) may seem largely un-
problematic, since there is no “reality check” built into the model. I will offer an 
assessment at the end of the chapter 1.4.
1.3. Radial categories
As opposed to Langacker, Lakoff does not provide a general discussion27 of the 
structure of “natural categories of senses” (1987: 418).28 He states, however, what 
a representation of such categories requires from an analyst:
24 If so, then the similarity of shape or function (invoked in the metonymy explanation) could be 
perhaps relevant post hoc: while those objective features could be incidental or not actually operative 
in an act of extension, they would make its propagation more likely.
25 I do not take into account the fact that the hunting sense involves a metonymy. In my context, 
the important thing is an objective difference between “playing volleyball” and “shooting pheasants”, 
while the common name implies a commonality of sorts.
26 In Tabakowska’s model (1995: 51), “cipher” is described as “denying access”, which is its 
primary function from the vantage point of a sender. From complementary points of view (of a 
receiver or interceptor), it “provides access”. This social complementarity of perspectives could be 
an actual driving force of generalization (in the case under inspection, however, there is no “integra-
tion” of perspectives possible – we have a disjunctive schema or two schemas: “ENTITY WHICH 
PROVIDES/DENIES ACCESS”; thus, an analyst is forced to choose a preferred level of generality 
of his representation).
27 To repeat his statement: “I generally prefer not to engage in methodological discussions and 
would rather just get on with my work” (1990: 39).
28 Lakoff does not specify the meaning of this phrase. He uses it in his discussion of window 
– which, as he says, can mean either “opening”, “frame” or “glass” – to point out the natural related-
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1. One must provide a representation for the central subcategory and representations for 
each of the noncentral subcategories, since there are no general principles that can predict 
the noncentral cases from the central case.
2. A theory of motivation is required, since the noncentral subcategories are neither arbi-
trary nor predictable from the central subcategory.
3. A theory of the types of links between the central and noncentral subcategories is re-
quired.
4. [...] an adequate account of these links requires an experientialist theory of meaningful 
[sic] thought and reason. (Lakoff 1987: 379)
The fi rst three points will reappear in the subsequent discussion. Here, let us 
return to the problem with the notion “category”, as applied to a set of senses of 
a polysemic lexical item (this issue has a bearing on point 4.). As suggested, the 
problem is backgrounded (or fudged) by Langacker, when he says that complex 
categories “group together, and treat as equivalent for certain purposes, a variety 
of distinct and sometimes quite disparate elements” (1987: 369). The essential 
feature of categories – that they “treat as equivalent for certain purposes” a set of 
elements – may apply to sub-sets of a complex category (lexical items with one 
defi nition, clusters uniting closely related senses) but not to the whole, possibly 
with a single exception: all nodes of a semantic network are equivalent as tied to 
one phonological form.29 Langacker cannot claim that they are also equivalent 
as historically related (like members of a family), since he openly excludes this 
criterion. Still, historical relatedness would be enough to defi ne a lexical category 
only in extensional terms (by specifying a given “family-tree”). In intensional 
terms, one cannot provide a concept covering all members of a complex category 
by defi nition.30 Thus, as used by Langacker, a “complex category” is apparently 
a misnomer.
In standard use, Lakoff’s expression “natural categories of senses” would be 
probably understood diachronically as historically related families of senses (an 
extensional defi nition). However, since his declared goal is “psychological real-
ity”, the relatedness in question refers not to historical, but to psychological links. 
For Langacker, “cognitive reality” means something quite general: that a given 
model of linguistic usage should be in agreement with uncontroversial psychologi-
cal assumptions. Lakoff, however, invokes a speculative notion of “image sche-
ness of meanings (it is a case of “active zones”, as analysed by Croft and Cruse, see 0.4. above; a 
more general discussion is provided by Langacker 1991: ch. 7). Thus, it is prima facie baffl ing when 
Lakoff subsequently states that the notion “has been studied extensively in the domain of English 
prepositions”, since in the former case the relatedness is extensional, while in the latter it is an inten-
sional relation between lexical senses. Apparently, Lakoff does not distinguish referential vagueness 
(window) from polysemy.
29 If one discounts the issue of homonymy, i.e. the existence of a set of formally identical but 
historically unrelated words.
30 Additionally, as mentioned in 1.2.2., for Langacker a given conceptual delimitation of sub-sets 
(or “lexical items”) is more or less arbitrary: “the defi nition allows a single network to be divided into 
lexical items in multiple and mutually inconsistent ways” (1987: 388). Thus, also sub-sets cannot be 
taken as fi xed categories.
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ma”,31 which in his model serves the role of the central or prototypical schema (an 
abstract defi nition, a relatively unspecifi ed concept), while all nodes are related to 
it by various mental links. Thus, his model of linguistic usage is not supposed to 
be merely in agreement with some general psychological operations (e.g. abstrac-
tion, comparison); it is supposed to be a hypothesis about a real-life generation 
of meanings prior to language (linguistic convention merely provides labels for 
some results of independent psychological processes32). Thus, such categories are 
taken to be “natural” in the biological sense: as physiological processes which 
– at the level of the hypothetical “cognitive unconscious” – are transformed into 
spontaneously evolving semantic processes.
That account does not work either as a solution to the philosophical mind-body 
problem, or as a scientifi c hypothesis about independent semantic processes in the 
cognitive unconscious, or as an explanation of linguistic meaning in general. I 
will not pursue that point here (see e.g. McLure 1990; Pawelec 2005a; Zlatev 
2007b, c), since we are primarily interested in the nature of Lakoff’s model as a 
representation of polysemic senses of a lexeme – specifi cally, over. In this con-
text, Lakoff offers an abstract schema (prototype), which is subsequently speci-
fi ed along a number of dimensions. A set of resulting schemas (images, concepts) 
gives rise to further schemas via certain hypothetical mental transformations. 
Despite empirical rhetoric,33 Lakoff’s model is an ex post reconstruction based 
on a set of features (in that respect it is similar to the generativist approach) and 
mental transformations represented mostly in an imagistic way. Thus – in a strik-
ing opposition to Langacker’s account – it is focused on “the underlying reality of 
language”, rather than on its surface manifestations. 
1.3.1. A resume of Lakoff’s radial model of over
The model of over is “an extension and elaboration” of Claudia Brugman’s thesis 
(Lakoff 1987: ix). In the context of the following presentation, two basic notions 
used by Langacker to describe spatial relations should be introduced, namely “tra-
jector” (TR) and “landmark” (LM). A trajector is “the entity whose (trans)location 
31 Developed in some detail by Johnson (1987). Despite suggestions to the contrary by Lakoff 
and others, image schemas have a completely different function within his theory than Langacker’s 
schemas in his network model, cf. Tuggy (2007) on schemas, and Oakley (2007) on image schemas. 
Tuggy summarizes the aspects of image schemas which draw Lakoff’s attention: “their constant 
recurrence, their basis in bodily experience and thus their direct meaningfulness, their gestaltish 
nature (Lakoff 1987: 272), their ‘preconceptual structuring’ (292–293), their universality in human 
experience (302, 312), and their ubiquity in language use (272) [thus] for Lakoff, image schemas are 
‘central truths’ (296)” (Tuggy 2007: 85).
32 As expressed by Lakoff and Johnson: “A portion of the conceptual network of battle partially 
characterizes the concept of an argument, and the language follows suit” (1980: 7).
33 I speak of “empirical rhetoric”, because Lakoff never tries to explain how such processes 
could work. A number of researchers show that Lakoff’s hypotheses are unsubstantiated or wrong (in 
fact or in principle), e.g. Sandra, Rice (1995); Rakova (2002); Zlatev (2003).
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is of relevance”, while a landmark is “the reference entity in relation to which the 
location or the trajectory of motion of the trajector is specifi ed” (Zlatev 2007a: 8).
Lakoff (pp. 416–461) presents a radial model of twenty-two senses of over 
(primarily a preposition, but also a verb-particle and a verbal prefi x).34 The model 
represents spatial senses – additional “metaphorical” senses are discussed sepa-
rately. The prototypical sense is represented in (1): the trajector (TR – the plane) 
crosses the region above an implicit, unspecifi ed landmark (LM). The senses ex-
emplifi ed in sentences (2)–(7), in which the LM is specifi ed, are treated as sepa-
rate instances of the central sense.
(1) The plane fl ew over. (CENTRAL SCHEMA 1)
(2) The bird fl ew over the yard.
(3) The plane fl ew over the hill.
(4) The bird fl ew over the wall.
(5) Sam drove over the bridge.
(6) Sam walked over the hill.
(7) Sam climbed over the wall.
Lakoff claims that all these senses of over (exemplifying various types and 
confi gurations of TR and LM, according to three parameters: [+/– contact] be-
tween TR and LM as well as [+/– extendedness] and [+/– verticality] of the LM) 
should be represented in the model. He points out that there are two almost com-
pletely equivalent interpretations of these schemas: “on the minimal specifi cation 
interpretation, only schema 1 exists in the lexicon; the other [sub-] schemas all 
result from information added by the verb and direct object”; the full specifi cation 
interpretation, on the other hand, requires “a lexical representation for all these 
schemas; the more specifi c schemas are generated by schema 1 plus the general 
parameters we have discussed” (pp. 421–422). Lakoff opts for the full specifi ca-
tion interpretation since meanings (2)–(7) function in his theory as links to further 
meanings, which – as he believes – could not be derived directly from the proto-
type. For instance, the meanings in (8) and (9), where one focuses on the end point 
of the TR’s path, require an extended LM, as in (5) and (6) respectively.
(8) Sausalito is over the bridge. (by “end-point focus” from 5)
(9) Sam lives over the hill. (by “end-point focus” from 6)
Another group, exemplifi ed in (10) and (11), is close in meaning to above. 
According to Lakoff, these meanings are related to (1) – TR is above LM – but 
they differ in two respects: they are static and they do not permit contact between 
TR and LM. Lakoff describes the meaning in (11) as derived through an image-
34 Below, I generally follow Zlatev’s more succinct presentation of the case (Zlatev 2003: 449–
–451). I will not use Lakoff’s original abbreviations of spatial features, which make for a diffi cult 
reading.
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schema transformation between an extended path and a one-dimensional TR (in 
this case, the powerline).
(10) Hang the painting over the table. (ABOVE SCHEMA, from 1)
(11) The powerline stretches over the yard. (a transformational link from 2)
Another group, exemplifi ed in (12)–(19), expresses the notion of COVERING. 
This notion is claimed to be a variant of ABOVE SCHEMA, differing from it in 
two respects: the TR is at least two-dimensional (in ABOVE SCHEMA the dimen-
sionality of the TR is not specifi ed) and it need not be in contact with the LM (while 
ABOVE SCHEMA requires noncontact). Additionally, meanings (16)–(19), which 
require contact, are derived from meanings (12)–(15) through another image-sche-
ma transformation called “rotation” (TR is no longer vertically over LM).
(12) The board is over the hole. (COVERING SCHEMA, from ABOVE 
 SCHEMA)
(13) The city clouded over. (from 1)
(14) The guards were posted all over the hill. (from 12)
(15) I walked all over the hill. (from 14)
(16) There was a veil over her face. (by rotation from 12)
(17) The ice spread all over the windshield. (by rotation from 13)
(18) There were fl ies all over the ceiling. (by rotation from 14)
(19) The spider had crawled all over the ceiling. (by rotation from 15)
Finally, there are two groups of senses where over functions as a verb-particle 
and a verbal prefi x. In (20)–(21) the TR is described as “refl exive”, since it plays 
the role of the LM.
(20) Roll the log over. (REFLEXIVE SCHEMA, from 1)
(21) The fence fell over. (from 20)
The example (22) represents “excess”.
(22) The bathtub overfl owed. (EXCESS SCHEMA, from 1)
Additionally, Lakoff discusses several metaphorical senses of over. To give an 
example, the excess schema, as instantiated by (22), represents a regular correla-
tion in experience (the fl uid which exceeds the capacity of a container is spilled 
and wasted). According to Lakoff, the schema may be applied to human activities 
(e.g. “to overdo something”) on the basis of the metaphor AN ACTIVITY IS A 
CONTAINER.35
35 Conceptual metaphors are conventionally typed in capitals. Since they involve a transfer be-
tween two conceptual categories, this usage may be treated as an extension of our convention to 
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1.3.2. A critique
Since Langacker’s schematic model is very much an account “in principle” and 
his own examples are fragmentary, linguists and psychologists focused on La-
koff’s radial model of over, which has been subjected to thorough criticism. I 
will report below a response by Vandeloise (1990). Further responses, since they 
develop alternative models of this lexeme, will be discussed in the next chapter.
Vandeloise takes issue with Lakoff’s rejection of the “minimal specifi cation 
interpretation”. That rejection is given more emphasis in Lakoff’s subsequent 
case study of there constructions, where he claims that abstract characterizations 
of a linguistic category need not have “any psychological reality” or play “any 
role in the grammar of language”, hence “seeking common properties, as linguists 
are trained to do, does not always lead to the best analysis – even when one can 
fi nd such” (Lakoff 1987: 536–537). Vandeloise points out that a search for gener-
alizations is not “a professional distortion linguists should be careful about”, since 
common features revealed in such analyses give substance to the abstract charac-
terizations proposed for chosen categories – “substance, I believe, lacking from 
the image-schemata described by Lakoff” (1990: 417). Vandeloise states that both 
the minimal and full specifi cation interpretation are admissible (while the former 
is clearly more desirable): “each lexical category can be analysed at different 
abstraction levels ranging from example enumeration (therefore polysemic) to 
a search for common features [...] ideally leading to a unique rule” (1990: 416). 
The traditional opposition between polysemic and monosemic characterizations 
of lexical units is thus presented as a matter of one’s modelling strategy – presuma-
bly, chosen on the basis of one’s goals and to be evaluated in reference to them. 
Vandeloise believes, however, that the search for an abstract description gives 
better insight into the structure of a lexical category and allows one to profi tably 
reduce its polysemy. He treats Lakoff’s appeal to “psychological reality” basically 
as rhetoric, which serves to mask arbitrary theoretical choices.
Vandeloise’s analysis of the model’s arbitrariness is too detailed to be reported 
here fully.36 To give an example, Vandeloise questions the need to invoke in some 
cases the parameters (“features”) introduced by Lakoff in his “full specifi cation 
interpretation” (the examples repeated below for convenience):
(5) Sam drove over the bridge.
(6) Sam walked over the hill.
(7) Sam climbed over the wall.
(8) Sausalito is over the bridge. (by “end-point focus” from 5)
(9) Sam lives over the hill. (by “end-point focus” from 6)
capitalize categories/concepts. The same goes for image schemas, which are characterized as “pre-
conceptual”.
36 I offered a fuller presentation of Vandeloise’s objections in Pawelec (2005a: 123–130).
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“Verticality” of LM in (7) – contrasting with LM’s horizontal extension in (5) 
and horizontal/vertical extension in (6) – is not directly relevant for a success-
ful characterization, since it does not explain why (7) – as opposed to (5) and 
(6) – cannot be used for “end-point focus” derivation. Vandeloise points out that 
in such cases – when a trajectory is replaced by its extremity, as exemplifi ed by 
(8) and (9) – the physical path must allow the speaker the conceptualizaton of a 
continuous abstract movement towards the TR located behind/beyond the LM. 
Consequently, the crucial factor in (7) is not LM’s “verticality” but the fact that it 
blocks vision (p. 424).
Similarly, an image-schema transformation between an extended path and a 
one-dimensional TR – as in (2) and (11) – is based on inadequate parameters. 
As Vandeloise points out: “For an immobile TR to be used with over, it must be 
conceived as a path, either because it carries electricity or vehicles, or because it 
permits an abstract and often visual movement of the speaker”. Thus, TR’s “unidi-
mensionality” is not directly relevant. Additionally, LM’s extendedness (contrary 
to Lakoff’s description) may be not only horizontal, but also vertical and horizon-
tal / vertical, as in the following examples (Vandeloise pp. 425–426):
(23) The line stretches over the hill.
(24) The line stretches over the wall.
So far, Vandeloise replaces Lakoff’s spatial parameters with pragmatic restric-
tions. However, in the case of “no contact” he accepts the relevance of the pa-
rameter, while showing that it is justifi ed not by image-schematic considerations 
proposed by Lakoff but linguistically “by relations of co-occurrence existing be-
tween different prepositions”. Vandeloise points out that when a TR is higher than 
LM and in contact with it, the preposition on is normally used. Still, as shown by 
(6), over can also be used in such circumstances, when the TR is moving. The 
requirement of “no contact” in the extensions “TR -> trajectory” is justifi ed by 
the fact that when a moving entity is replaced by an immobile entity and there is 
“contact”, the preposition on imposes itself. Compare the sentences below (the 
fi rst one repeated here for convenience):
(11) The powerline stretches over the yard.
(25) The path stretches on the hill.
Vandeloise concludes: “The contrast contact/no contact therefore plays a de-
cisive role in the choice between the prepositions on and over; this constitutes a 
linguistic reason for distinguishing circumstances where TR and LM are in con-
tact from those in which they are not” (pp. 426–427).
To sum up, Vandeloise shows that the image-schematic model of over is based 
on several spatial parameters (features) which have no direct relevance for the 
characterization of the category. This leads to “the abusive multiplication” of 
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senses included in the model (p. 429). What is more, the model does not include 
crucial pragmatic and linguistic restrictions which can be detected when a theorist 
looks for a generalized description. It is ironical, perhaps, that a theory built un-
der the banner of “psychological reality” should disregard cognitive motivations 
apparently shaping the linguistic data (and which, as seems more likely, may be 
revealed when looking for a “unitary” representation). Vandeloise’s critique sub-
stantiates the claim that Lakoff focuses on some hypothetical “underlying reality 
of language” rather than on its surface manifestations (thus – among other things 
– he reverses the natural direction of the linguistic analysis).
1.4. Concluding remarks
As pointed out in 1.1., both models have a radically different status. Lakoff as-
sumes that his model captures conceptual structure in the cognitive unconscious. 
Thus, it is a “hypothesis” about the functioning of mind/brain. The central image 
schema is developmentally primary, arises in bodily interactions with environ-
ment and is unspecifi c, while the subsequent (sub)schemas specify it in some re-
spects, serve as links to further schemas and as a basis for mental transformations. 
That conceptual structure is then employed in various ways in semantic transfers 
(conceptual metaphor). Consequently, the model is potentially universalistic: its 
“English version” should be substantially correct for other languages, which can 
probably extend it at places (most likely in the latter part: conceptual metaphors 
are supposed to be shaped by culture as opposed to “bodily” image schemas). 
When discussing a network model of the Polish preposition za, I will try to show 
that such assumptions are wide of the mark (see 3.4.). 
At this level of discussion, the only novelty for a linguist (as noted wryly by 
Vandeloise) is the use of drawings. Since, however, each schema is provided with 
a description (necessarily so: a picture on its own could represent any number of 
meanings; additionally, some of Lakoff’s presumed meanings cannot be drawn37), 
that format might as well be translated into a standard “feature account” (of a rather 
shoddy kind38). This raises the question of its adequacy, since combinations of fea-
tures lead to rampant polysemy. The model does not provide criteria to establish 
“distinct senses” (apparently, this status is awarded to main “schemas”) and to 
distinguish them from more numerous sub-schemas. It is an unusual amalgam of 
“feature approach” and psychologically motivated rules.39
37 For instance, those which have disjunctive specifi cations: [+contact] or [-contact].
38 Once a set of features is proposed for a given lexeme, all combinations should be taken into ac-
count (if one invokes only some of them, a principled way of discounting others should be found).
39 The latter may be valid in some form. However, a contrastive analysis of several prepositions 
in one language and a subsequent cross-linguistic analysis would seem necessary for the study of un-
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Langacker offers a format for attested senses which is fl exible enough to cap-
ture any meanings. Since he aims at an adequate description of available linguis-
tic material, he is far from basing his account on any pre-linguistic structures, 
transformations or transfers (even though he does accept in general that concepts 
are prior to a linguistic expression and conventionalization). His “schemas” are 
constructed on the basis of actual lexical extensions as opposed to Lakoff’s im-
age-schemas, which are supposed to underlie such extensions.
As for the prototype, Lakoff’s model develops from the centre in various di-
rections (apparently, to reach attested senses). His choice of an unspecifi ed sche-
ma as the category prototype (irrespectively of his mentalistic claims) seems to 
be required by the format: it would be a much more demanding task (if not an 
impossible one) to derive a set of divergent meanings from a more specifi c sche-
ma. Langacker avoids the problem of the category prototype. In his format any 
schema motivating extensions is a prototype: categories have as many prototypes 
as proposed extensions.
As we have seen, Langacker offers some comments about the “global” pro-
totype (and the highest-level schema). The former is supposed to be important 
“because of its developmental priority and notable cognitive salience”. Its develop-
mental priority is supposed to defi ne “the center of gravity for the category”. Si-
multaneously, “not every complex category offers viable or unique candidates for 
the roles of prototype and schema at the ‘global’ level” (1987: 380–381). These 
remarks are based on the developmental just-so story, while the actual network 
models of lexemes display sets of clusters. If there is any centre, it is cognitively 
salient not because of its developmental priority (i.e. historical, following Lan-
gacker’s analogy), but because it seems to motivate more extensions than other 
prototypes from the contemporary vantage point. The present-day perception of 
its salience need not refl ect actual historical processes (the word form key brings 
fi rst to mind the tool for locking doors – once this function of KEY disappears for 
some reason, e.g. when we use our fi ngerprints to lock and unlock doors, some 
other sense may take over this central position40).
Langacker’s account may also be taken to mean (as long as one does not look 
at actual examples) that the “superschema”, mentioned above, is similar to a defi -
nition. Only on this assumption does the following comment on its status seem to 
be relevant: “it may well be only minimally entrenched and have very little cogni-
tive salience” (p. 381). Since we know now that such schemas are so general that 
they are totally uninformative (thus, a fortiori, not defi nitional), their detection is 
of no cognitive value.
derlying factors (to reduce the impact of linguistic contingencies, which are clearly most pronounced 
in the case of a single lexeme). Only from that general (as opposed to ethnocentric) perspective 
can one properly offer universalistic generalizations, as done by Zlatev (2003: 484ff.); cf. Zlatev 
(2007a).
40 Langacker’s jocular remark about “Apple logo” being, perhaps, the primary sense of “apple” 
for some language users goes in the same direction (1987: 376, note 7).
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Consequently, the search for an adequate format to represent complex lexical 
categories has little to do with defi ning categories41 (thus, it cannot provide argu-
ments against “classical” defi nitions), or with the psychological issue of categori-
zation (as, basically, a differential response in a situation). It is a properly linguistic 
task and should be treated as such (only when we have convincing representations 
of this kind, may they be shown to involve some psychological factors relevant 
for the issue of categorization). The widespread interest in network modelling 
suggests that the formats proposed by Langacker and Lakoff have a real potential 
to capture relevant linguistic factors at play in the extension of meaning (when 
placed against alternative accounts). I will try to identify this potential.
41 Complex categories are not conceptual categories (they can be defi ned referentially, as a set 
of uses of one word form). Once we see this (Langacker does), the issue of defi ning them cannot 
properly arise (or else one must think that both senses of game discussed above occupy the same 
place in some taxonomy).
I-lamanie POPRAWKI NANIESIONE IISek1:79   Sek1:79 2013-04-08   14:13:16
I-lamanie POPRAWKI NANIESIONE IISek1:80   Sek1:80 2013-04-08   14:13:16
CHAPTER 2. THE STORY OF OVER
2.0. Introductory remarks
Lakoff’s analysis of over has inspired several responses which aim at a better 
formulation of the model and/or of the assumptions underlying modelling of this 
type (in one variant or another). The fi rst one is more Lakoffi an in spirit that the 
original, i.e. it is based entirely on image schemas. The second one shows that an 
image schema linked to a word may get different interpretations within a phrase, 
thus it raises the issue of the infl uence of other words on the meaning expressed by 
a lexeme. The third one re-introduces into the discussion the distinction between 
semantics (senses of words in isolation) and pragmatics (rich construals in the 
context), which was questioned by Langacker. The analysis contains both Lakof-
fi an and Langackerian elements and provides the most complete representation of 
the lexeme. It instantiates a more general “principled approach” to prepositional 
polysemy. The fourth analysis is of an entirely different kind: it shows that the as-
sumption common to all previous attempts – i.e. that extensions are motivated by 
general cognitive factors1 – may be inadequate, thus a new approach to meaning 
extension could be required.
Let me add that I recount below only a few episodes of the story, which is sub-
stantially richer and still developing. My presentations are signifi cantly reduced 
(there is more internal dialogue between participants and the level of detail – and 
wealth of insight – defi es summary). My aim is to give some idea of the style of 
argument in particular cases and of the direction of the debate.
2.1. A consistently imagistic model
Dewell’s declared aim is to improve on the Brugman/Lakoff analysis “by relying 
more exclusively on image-schema transformations and eliminating some rem-
nants of feature analysis” (1994: 351). His approach is inspired by the criticism 
of Vandeloise, according to whom Lakoff’s model only “wants to be analogue”, 
1 The third analysis by Tyler and Evans (2003b) is a partial exception, since they invoke “prag-
matic”, or situational, factors in meaning extension.
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while ultimately “it must be replaced by an equivalent propositional representa-
tion” (Vandeloise 1990: 435). Dewell believes, conversely, that he can eliminate 
propositional content (specifi cally, features) from the model and offer an account 
in which all spatial variants of over “can be derived either directly or indirectly 
using nothing but natural, independently motivated image-schema transforma-
tions” (1994: 352). Dewell does not say why an imagistic representation should 
be preferred to a feature analysis. Apparently, he accepts Lakoff’s general position 
that words follow prior conceptual structuring (which is imagistic2 in nature) and 
is intent on removing some inconsistencies pointed out by Vandeloise. In this way, 
however, he does not face the more central point of Vandeloise’s critique: that an 
analogue representation (relying on images) must be translated into a linguistic 
description to make sense.3
Dewell proposes to treat as central the schema exemplifi ed by:
(1) The dog jumped over the fence.
Lakoff introduced it very late in his account, as “one of the most common 
instances” of his own central schema (1987: 433), in order to provide a link to 
“refl exive” and “excess” senses. Dewell argues that the “semicircular path” sense 
should be attributed central status, since it is a “recurring basic-level image sche-
ma grounded in experience”, as refl ected in common usage, e.g. “step over, jump 
over, throw over, climb over – all of which involve an arc-shaped path”. As op-
posed to it, the fl at-trajectory schema treated as central by Lakoff is exemplifi ed 
in everyday life by apparently less frequent events, primarily by “birds and planes 
fl ying over”; such events, additionally, presuppose a contact with land, “however 
backgrounded [it] may be” (1994: 353), and thus – a curved path.
2 To be sure, both Lakoff and Johnson repeatedly point out that image schemas are not images. 
However, the analysis of over makes it clear that the analyst thinks in terms of images (thus, Dewell’s 
attempt makes sense in this context).
3 This is based on the more general objection against empiricist “picture” theories of concepts 
(ultimately, versions of the “ostensive” defi nition, which assumes that an interlocutor already knows 
what meaning is pointed at). Since concepts may appear only in a fi eld of meanings – a single concept 
is impossible – a picture cannot serve as an equivalent of a concept unless one adds some commen-
tary. Consequently, one cannot rely on image schemas to explain the genesis of concepts.




Figure 3: After Dewell ( : 353)
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In his analysis, Dewell assumes two “highly general” imagistic operations in-
volving multiple TRs. The fi rst one is the “multiplex-mass transformation”, in 
which a “multiplex TR” (one made up of many individuals) is treated as mass 
(following Lakoff 1987: 428). The other one involves “a construction with a sin-
gle predicate to describe multiple events with multiple TRs”, e.g. “sheep jumping 
single fi le over a fence” or even “a swarm of fl eas jumping over a LM in myriad 
directions simultaneously”. Additionally, Dewell invokes specifi c “profi ling” 
transformations which specify segments of the path in the central schema. Such 
segments, in order to be recognized as belonging to the schema, “must include the 
characteristic peak point of the arc” (1994: 354–355).
Dewell proposes four instances of this kind. The fi rst one profi les the central 
region at the peak level, as exemplifi ed by:
(2) The plane fl ew over the hill.
Another one profi les the downward trajectory, from the peak to the endpoint:
(3) Sam fell over the cliff.
The complementary upward segment is exemplifi ed by:
(4) The plane climbed high over the city.
Finally, Dewell describes the “freeze-frame” at the peak, as in:
(5) The plane should be over Baltimore by now.
Apart from segments of the path, there are also “resulting-state” variants, in 
which the entire trajectory is present in the background. Dewell proposes two 
such cases. The fi rst one is exemplifi ed by:
(6) Sam went over the bridge now.
The endpoint of TR’s path is profi led here; it becomes a separate sense, when 
the construal is not coded by a resultative construction, as in: 
(7) Sam is over the bridge now.
This instance is to be distinguished from a closely related one, in which the 
path is not actually traversed by the TR but allows “subjective motion”, i.e. an 
interpreter’s “imagined movement along a path from a reference point to a loca-
tion” (cf. Langacker 1991: 315–342), as in:
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(8) Sam lives over the bridge. 
The next group of senses is derived from the schema of “an extending TR, part 
of which remains at the starting location”, e.g.:
(9) She threw the rope over the limb.
This type – in which the overall shape of the TR corresponds to the path taken 
by its leading point – is also subject to profi ling, as for instance in:
(10) We dropped the rope down over the edge. (downward arc)
The “resulting state” variants are analogous to those discussed before:
(11) The rope is hanging over the edge. (downward arc)
(12) That road leads over the mountains. (“subjective motion”)
The subsequent discussion is based on the assumption that the scene may be 
conceived not only from the side (the canonical two-dimensional perspective) 
but also from other vantage points. As a result, the distinctive elements of the arc 
schema (the semicircular path, vertical orientation) may disappear from view and 
new aspects may become prominent. Consider the sentence:
(13) A line of soldiers marched over the ridge.
When one views the scene from above, the separate arcs traced by marching 
soldiers are not visible, while the TRs – converted into one multiple TR and ap-
pearing as a plane via the multiplex-mass transformation (the “highly general” 
operations mentioned before) – reveal the shape of an edge extending horizon-
tally. If a part of the planar TR remains at the starting location, we get an analogue 
of (9), as in:
(14) He draped the sheet over the clothesline.
TRs with leading edges may also move in several directions simultaneously, 
as with a fl uid moving outward on a surface:
(15) She poured the syrup out over the pancakes.
In the “refl exive” sense, as in roll over or fall over, the immobile part of an 
extended TR functions as the LM, while the points on the moving part may be 
viewed as tracing a sequence of arcs reaching the rest position. When the semicir-
cular path is backgrounded, the “covering” sense may become prominent, as in:
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(16) They laid a board down over the hole.
This sense becomes independent, when the schema no longer includes the 
vertical axis implied by the canonical side-view but is oriented only in relation to 
the LM’s surface:
(17) They hung a curtain over the picture.
According to Dewell, the vertical axis is still present in the background in the 
“covering path” senses, as in:
(18) He rode his bike over the border.
In this example, Dewell postulates “the notion of laying down an extended 
linear path with salient rolling wheels or stepping motions” (1994: 369). In other 
words, the central semicircular schema is present in the sub-movements of the TR 
(either the bike or the cyclist, or both) and not in its movement relative to the LM.
2.2. A three-level account
In his analysis, Kreitzer (1997: 292–293) points out some limitations of previous 
image-schematic models. He notes that there is “little principled constraint” in the 
derivation of postulated extensions (similarity links, instance links, transforma-
tional links). There is also little “independent motivation” for the image schema 
transformations proposed by Dewell, since one would have to show that they ap-
ply to a variety of prepositions in the language and – more importantly – that there 
is cross-linguistic evidence for their operation.
Kreitzer believes that a more constrained analysis is possible when one distin-
guishes different levels of schematization inherent in the linguistic expression of 
spatial scenes.4 On the lowest conceptual level, he postulates nondecomposable 
“component level schemata”, e.g. surfaces, lines, points (according to Kreitzer, 
image schema transformations occur at this level). The next level represents spa-
tial relations expressed by prepositions which may be decomposed at least into the 
following elements: TR, LM, and also PATH, when the relation is a dynamic one. 
Such “relational level schemata” are subsequently integrated at the third level 
– the linguistic “phrasal level” – to produce “integrative level schemata” (pp. 
293–294, 301).
4 Kreitzer follows Talmy; cf. Talmy (2000: 177–254).
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The crucial constraint results from the assumption that it is the relational 
level schemas which represent the “senses” of a preposition – and thus, the basic 
level of “granularity” of the prepositional model. As a result, the polysemy of 
over may be drastically reduced. While Lakoff treated the uses of over derived 
by image schema transformations as separate senses of the word, Kreitzer takes 
them to be merely extensions of “the application of one particular sense”. The 
interpretation of over in utterances is supposed to occur “via conceptual trans-
formations of the components of spatial scenes (image schema transformations), 
and via the integration of multiple relational and component level schemas [sic]5 
(image schema integration)” (pp. 295–296).
Kreitzer’s approach may be illustrated with an example taken from Dewell:
(1) The plane climbed high over the city.
For Dewell, this use of over profi les the upward segment of the TR’s trajec-
tory (cf. 2.1.(4)). Kreitzer argues, on the contrary, that the dynamic path schema 
is coded by the verb, while the relational schema for over is static. Additionally, 
there are two possible construals of this scene on the integrative level:
5 The problem with alternate spelling of the plural is noted by Tuggy (2007: 111, note 1). This 
is actually a more general problem of the shifting boundary between American and non-American 
English (as also exemplifi ed in the present work).











Figure 4: After Kreitzer (1997: 299)
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In the fi rst construal, the whole action takes place at a static location within 
the boundaries of the LM. In the second one, it is only the endpoint of the path 
schema which stands in the static relation coded by over.
The difference between the static and the dynamic sense of over is illustrated 
by two construals of the following sentence:
(2) The clouds moved over the city.
In the fi rst construal, the path is a component of a dynamic relational schema 
– it is the path schema which stands in relation to the LM. In the second one, the 
relational schema is static (p. 305).
LM
TR
“The clouds moved over the city” : construal 1
Figure 6: Based on Kreitzer (1997: 305)
LM
“The clouds moved over the city” : construal 2
Figure 7: Based on Kreitzer (1997: 305)
TR
Figure 6: After Kreitzer (1997: 305)
Figure 5: After Kreitzer (1997: 299)
Figure 7: After Kreitzer (1997: 305)
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Apart from the static and dynamic relational schema for over, Kreitzer postu-
lates one more sense, as exemplifi ed by:
(3) The clouds are over the sun.
This static relational schema consists of two component level schemas: the TR 
occludes the LM, as viewed from a deictic centre (p. 313). The schematic relation 
coded by over3 is represented below:
To sum up, Kreitzer proposes three distinct senses – or relational level schemas 
– for over: a static one defi ned on the vertical axis (over1), a dynamic one defi ned 
on both the vertical and horizontal axes (over2), and a static one defi ned egocen-
trically (over3). Kreitzer believes that over1 is historically central and speculates 
that over2 could be derived “in a process of conventionalization, whereby an inte-
grative level schema consisting of a static relational level schema and a dynamic 
path schema is reanalyzed as a relational level schema” (p. 323). He does not 
propose a hypothetical derivation for over3.
2.3. A principled polysemy framework
Evans and Tyler, in a book (Tyler, Evans 2003a) and a series of articles (Tyler, 
Evans 2003b; 2004a, b, c), developed a prototype approach to polysemy of Eng-





Figure 8: Based on Kreitzer (1997: 314)Figure 8: After Kreitzer (1997: 305)
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that previous attempts to model polysemy of such items failed “to distinguish 
what is coded by a lexical expression and the information that must be derived 
from context, background knowledge of the world, and spatial relations in gen-
eral” (2003b: 97). The charge is based on the assumption that formal linguistic 
expression underspecifi es for meaning, hence the recovery of a message – as pos-
tulated by cognitive researchers (e.g. Fauconnier 1994, 1997; Fauconnier, Turner 
2003) – requires “conceptual integration of linguistic and nonlinguistic prompts, 
guided by various global cognitive principles” (Tyler, Evans 2003b: 97). To use 
general labels discussed before, Evans and Tyler criticise previous analyses for 
disregarding the boundaries between linguistic and encyclopedic meaning and 
between semantics and pragmatics. They also notice that their predecessors have 
not pointed out convincing criteria for “distinguishing between distinct senses 
within a network versus interpretations produced on-line” and for “determining 
the primary sense associated with a preposition” (p. 98). Their declared aim is to 
propose “principled” solutions.
With this goal in mind, Evans and Tyler attempt to improve on previous analy-
ses of over. They begin by criticising Lakoff’s “full-specifi cation” model along 
the lines developed by Vandeloise (1990) and Sandra, Rice (1995).6 Subsequent-
ly, they discuss Kreitzer’s analysis, which they call a “partial-specifi cation” ap-
proach.7 As they say, Kreitzer assumes that a linguistic articulation of a spatial 
scene requires three distinct levels of schematization: the component level, the 
relational level, and the integrative level. The component level contains such con-
ceptual primitives as LM, TR, path, verticality, extendedness of LM or contact 
between TR and LM.8 The components combine to produce schemas at the rela-
tional level, which Kreitzer takes to be “the basic level of ‘granularity’ represent-
ing a sense of a preposition” (p. 100).
Evans and Tyler point out some problems with this account. Since Lakoff’s 
radial representation has been abandoned, the senses do not share a common TR
/LM confi guration. Specifi cally, over3 is unrelated to the other senses.9 What is 
more, Kreitzer only partially addresses the contribution of sentential context and 
background knowledge. For instance, following his assumption that over has both 
a static and a dynamic sense, he proposes two construals of the following sentence 
(cf. 2.2. (2)):
6 This article develops the issue of arbitrariness of network models (in the context of their “psy-
chological reality”), as signalled by its title: “Network analyses of prepositional meaning: Mirroring 
whose mind – the linguist’s or the language user’s?”.
7 A strange label, since Kreitzer’s analysis is by far the least polysemic (3 senses as opposed to 
14 identifi ed by Evans and Tyler and 22 by Lakoff).
8 Strictly speaking, contrary to this exposition LM and TR are not “primitives”, since they make 
sense only on the relational level. Kreitzer talks about “surfaces, lines, and points” (1997: 301).
9 Actually, Kreitzer admits both points. He says: “There does not seem to be a single common 
schema that could account, in a constrained way, for the application of over in various contexts”; 
and he states that over3 is defi ned in egocentric rather than absolute terms, as opposed to over1 and 
over2 (1997: 323).
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(1) The clouds moved over the city.
As we have seen (cf. Fig.6 and 7 in 2.2.), in the fi rst construal the clouds origi-
nated outside the city, moved over it and beyond. In the second one, they were 
outside, moved directly over the city and stayed there. According to Kreitzer, the 
fi rst construal results from over2, while the second one represents an integration 
of the verb move (containing “path” as a component) and over1. However, Evans 
and Tyler describe yet another construal: the clouds move only within the city 
boundaries:
Following Kreitzer’s account, this sense should be represented as an integra-
tion of move and over1. As a result, there are now two construals with the same 
image-schematic representation. Since Kreitzer’s model provides no means to 
distinguish between them, Evans and Tyler conclude that the problem results from 
the assumption (shared by Kreitzer and Lakoff10) that the fi nal construal of spatial 
scenes is coded entirely by formal linguistic expression. To fi x it, they postulate 
a higher level of integration – which they call a “conceptual” one – at which we 
are able to interpret ambiguous linguistic cues thanks to our knowledge about the 
world (the process they call “complex conceptualization”). The fi nal problem is 
that neither Kreitzer nor Lakoff explain how they determined the primary sense 
of over.
Evans and Tyler attempt to fi nd principled solutions. First, they propose two 
criteria for distinguishing senses of prepositions. In order to be recognized as a 
distinct sense, a given instance must involve a meaning which is either not purely 
spatial (following the assumption that the primary sense of prepositions is nor-
mally spatial), or based on a spatial confi guration different from other senses in 
the network. Additionally, one must be able to locate instances of the sense which 
are context-independent, i.e. cases in which one could not infer the sense from 
another sense and the context. Consider the following sentences:
(2) Joan nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling.
(3) Joan nailed a board over the hole in the wall.
10 Dewell also acts on this assumption.
“The clouds moved over the city” : construal 3
Figure 9: Based on Tyler, Evans (2003b: 103)Figur  : Aft r Tyler, Evans (20 3b: 103)
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In both cases, the spatial relation between the TR and LM is different from the 
“above” meaning. Apart from that, there is a (partly) nonspatial sense – that of 
“covering” or “obscuring from view” (the fi rst criterion). Evans and Tyler argue 
that this sense cannot be always derived from the context and the “above” sense 
(the second criterion). Consider the following sentence:
(4) The tablecloth is over the table.
In this scene, the TR is higher than the LM. Viewing the scene from the stan-
dard vantage point, one can infer that the table is covered and partly obscured from 
view. Evans and Tyler believe that such inferences are not possible in (2) and 
(3), since the relations between the TR and LM do not correspond to the “above” 
meaning. They point out that in (2) the spatial relation would be typically coded 
by below, while in (3) by next to. They conclude: “unless we already know that 
over has a covering/obscuring meaning associated with it, there is no ready con-
textual means of deriving this meaning” in sentences (2) and (3) (p. 106).
Next, Evans and Tyler try to tackle the problem of the primary sense. They 
note that Lakoff and Kreitzer proposed different primary senses: Lakoff opted 
for the dynamic “above and across” sense,11 while Kreitzer for the static “above” 
sense. Evans and Tyler argue – while claiming to build on Langacker’s sugges-
tions (cf. Langacker 1987: 37612) – that “there are at least four types of linguistic 
evidence that can be used to narrow the arbitrariness of the selection of a primary 
sense [...]. The evidence includes (i) earliest attested meaning; (ii) predominance 
in the semantic network; (iii) relations to other prepositions; (iv) and grammati-
cal predictions” (p. 108). It is important to underline at this point that a primary 
sense is what Langacker calls “the sanctioning sense” (Langacker 1987: 157), i.e. 
the sense serving as the basis for extensions. That explains the following care-
ful formulation by Evans and Tyler concerning point (i): “Given the very stable 
nature of the conceptualization of spatial relations within a language, one likely 
candidate for the primary sense is the historically earliest sense” (p. 108). In other 
words, the search is for the earliest sense perceived to be conceptually alive, i.e. 
still motivating other senses. In the case of over it is, according to Evans and 
Tyler, “higher” (from Sanskrit upan) and “above” (from Old Teutonic ufa), i.e. 
the confi guration in which the TR is above the LM. As concerns the second cri-
terion, “predominance” applies to the sense whose meaning components occur 
most frequently in the network. Evans and Tyler point out that among 14 distinct 
senses of over they identifi ed, 8 directly involve the TR being located higher than 
LM. As for the relations with other prepositions, the sense which distinguishes 
11 At a more specifi c level, Lakoff’s “central schema” differs also from Brugman’s choice – La-
koff’s dynamic confi guration does not contain an extended LM (the LM is implied); cf. Vandeloise 
(1990: 436, note 7).
12 As we have seen, Langacker does not consider diachronic evidence relevant for the structure 
of the network. Still, his developmental story does strongly suggest the possibility of a diachronic 
interpretation of his model.
I-lamanie POPRAWKI NANIESIONE IISek1:91   Sek1:91 2013-04-08   14:13:17
92
over from above, under, and below “involves the notion of a TR being located 
higher than but potentially within reach of the LM”. As concerns point (iv), since 
the primary sense gives rise to a chain of extensions, for any of them “we should 
be able to fi nd sentences whose context provides the implicature that gives rise 
to the additional meaning associated with the distinct sense”, as already shown in 
reference to examples (2)–(4) above. Sentence (4) is taken to provide grammatical 
evidence for the claim that the sense involving the confi guration “the TR higher 
than the LM” is likely to be primary, since it allows to infer the “covering” sense 
in a suitable context (p. 109).
In Evans and Tyler’s conception the primary sense takes the form of a “proto-
scene” – “an idealized spatio-functional confi guration”. It is derived by abstract-
ing away “rich detail” from individual conceptualizations of spatial scenes. The 
protoscene for over is described in the following way: “It consists of a schematic 
TR, which is the locand (the element located, and in focus), and is typically small-
er and movable; a schematic LM, which is the locator (the element with respect to 
which the TR is located, and in background), and is typically larger and immov-
able, and a conceptual confi gurational-functional relation which mediates the TR 
and the LM. In the case of over, the TR is conceptualized as being proximate to 
the LM, so that under certain circumstances, the TR could come into contact with 
the LM. The functional aspect resulting from this particular spatial confi guration 
is that the LM (or the TR) is conceptualized as being within the sphere of infl u-
ence of the TR (or the LM)” (p. 110).
The dot stands for the TR, the bold line portrays the LM, while the dashed 
line signals the proximal part of the scene to show that the TR is within potential 
contact with the LM. In this way Evans and Tyler represent the contrast with the 
preposition above (the TR not within the reach of the LM).
The protoscene for over
Figure 10: Based on Tyler, Evans (2003b: 111)Figure 10: After Tyler, Evans (2003b: 111) 
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The semantic network for over, proposed by Tyler and Evans, contains 14 
distinct senses (including the protoscene):
Each distinct sense is represented as a black dot, with the protoscene occupy-
ing the central place. In some cases, there is a chain of senses: a conventionalized 
sense gives rise to another one (4.–4.A, 6.–6.A). There are also two “clusters of 
senses” in the network (marked by a circle). They arise when a complex concep-
tualization (as opposed to a conventionalized sense) is submitted to “multiple 





































The semantic network for over
Figure 11: Based on Tyler, Evans (2003b: 125)
Figure 11: Based on Tyler, Evans (2003b: 125) 
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The fi rst such cluster is derived from the arc schema which Dewell took to be 
the central sense of over (cf. Fig. 3 in 2.1.). In the present analysis, over does not 
code dynamic senses. The arc schema is treated as a representation of the scene 
expressed by sentences of the type:
(5) The cat jumped over the wall.
According to Evans and Tyler, over codes only the TR/LM confi guration at 
point B, while the trajectory is the result of a complex conceptualization prompted 
by the verb and fl eshed out by our knowledge of the world, e.g. that the LM is an 
obstacle and the TR cannot hover. In the A–B–C trajectory cluster, all four senses 
involve such TRs and LMs. The authors speculate that the “on-the-other-side-of” 
sense (2.A) results from a reanalysis of the schematization presented in Fig.12: 
the consequence of the jump (point C) is privileged. They argue that the A–B–C 
trajectory conceptualization involves a shift of the vantage point from default 
offstage in the protoscene to the vicinity of point A. This vantage point is evident 
in sentences exemplifying sense 2.A, e.g.
(6) The cat is over the wall.
Tyler and Evans do not comment on the fact that a complex conceptualiza-
tion of sentence (5) may involve almost any vantage point: located close either 
to A or C, or even B for someone standing on the wall. They merely state that the 
“experiential correlation” required for sense 2.A (privileging of point C in the 
trajectory – locating the TR there) cannot be construed without a vantage point 
close to point A. They speculate that “through the use of over in contexts where 
on-the-other-side-of is implicated, this meaning has come to be conventionally 




Schematization of sentences of the type:
The cat jumped over the wall
Figure 12: Based on Tyler, Evans (2003b: 114)
Figure 12: After Tyler, Evans (2003b: 114) 
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The next sense of the cluster is exemplifi ed by:
(7) The arrow fl ew over the target and landed in the woods.
This “above-and-beyond” sense (2.B) is derived from general knowledge 
about aiming at a target. The spatial confi guration is the same as in the protoscene 
but the LM is construed as the target. When the TR misses the LM, it goes above 
and beyond it, or too far. This reanalysis of the A–B–C trajectory produces the 
“excess” sense. Since Tyler and Evans fi nd an alternative route to this sense in the 
network (cf. 5.A.1), 2.B is named “excess I”.
Another reanalysis of the A–B–C trajectory takes its endpoint C as represent-
ing the completion (2.C), while the path is backgrounded:
(8) The cat’s jump is over.
Tyler and Evans argue that the TR’s location is reanalysed in such a way that 
it does not represent a spatial relation (as in (6)) but an aspect of the process (mo-
tion). This is refl ected syntactically: over is not a preposition here (which medi-
ates a TR/LM relation) but an “adprep” (profi ling some aspect of a process).
The fi nal sense in the cluster is exemplifi ed by:
(9) Sally turned the keys to the offi ce over to the janitor.
This “transfer” sense (2.D) results from reanalysing A–B–C trajectory (move-
ment) as a process of transfer (hence over is an adprep, again).
The “covering” sense (3.) is exemplifi ed by:
(10) Frank quickly put the tablecloth over the table.
In (10) the TR is not only above the LM, but it also covers it as a result of two 
changes relative to the protoscene: the TR is untypically large, while the vantage 





Figure 13: Based on Tyler, Evans (2003b: 133)Figure 13: Based on Tyler, Evans (2 03b: 1 3) 
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This is a distinct sense since the TR, as we have already seen, need not be 
located higher than the LM (cf. examples (2) and (3) above).
The next two senses also require a shift of the default vantage point. In scenes 
involving the “examining” sense (4.) the vantage point is that of the TR, whose 
line of vision is directed at the LM, as in:
(11) Mary looked over the manuscript quite carefully.
The examining sense gives rise to the “focus-of-attention” sense (4.A), as in:
(12) The little boy cried over his broken toy.
According to Tyler and Evans, the meaning of over in (12) could be para-
phrased by about.
The “up” cluster (5.) contains four senses. All of them arise from construing a 
TR as being vertically elevated, or up, relative to the LM, as represented below:
As for the motivation of this extension, Tyler and Evans point out that in eve-
ryday life the use of over often involves situations in which the TR moves up. 
Additionally, an upward orientation is treated as positive and superior in human 
experience (cf. Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 14–21).
The “more” sense (5.A) results from an experiential correlation of vertical 
elevation and quantity, as exemplifi ed by:
(13) Jerome found over 40 kinds of shells on the beach.
The number mentioned in (13) constitutes the LM, which is exceeded by the 
actual number (the unmentioned TR).
The “more” sense gives rise to the “over-and-above” sense or “excess II” 
(5.A.1), when the “more” construal is interpreted as “too much”. The authors 
think that this sense may result from a reanalysis of scenes involving containment, 
as in:
The up cluster
Figure 14: Based on Tyler, Evans (2003b: 137)Figure 14: After Tyler, Evans (2003b: 137) 
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(14) The heavy rains caused the river to fl ow over its banks.
When the TR (the level of water) moves up, it exceeds the capacity of the LM 
(the banks). The “excess II” sense seems to be linked with the idea of a “natural 
capacity” as opposed to the notion of “missing the target”, which grounds “excess 
I”. Evans and Tyler point out that it is often diffi cult to ascertain which of them is 
involved in a complex conceptualization. They make a more general remark con-
cerning this point: “our network should be thought of as a semantic continuum, 
in which complex conceptualizations can draw on meanings from distinct nodes 
as well as the range of points between nodes, which provide nuanced semantic 
values” (p. 153, note 31).
The “control” sense (5.B) is exemplifi ed by:
(15) She has a strange power over me.
Evans and Tyler derive it from an experiential correlation between physical 
control and the “up” position (the winner is standing, while the loser ends up on 
the ground) and also the relative size of the controller (who is, usually, physically 
bigger than the controlled).
The “preference” sense (5.C) results from construing that which is higher as 
more preferable. It is exemplifi ed by:
(16) I would prefer tea over coffee.
The authors attribute it to a correlation in experience between “up” and greater 
quantity – conventionally preferred to a lesser quantity. Alternatively, being up 
implies positive states, which are preferable to those implied by being down.
The “refl exive” sense (6.) results from a reanalysis of a process in which two 
salient positions occupied by a single entity are integrated (via summary scan-
ning) into a TR – LM confi guration, as in:
(17) The fence fell over.
Since over profi les a process, it is coded as an adprep.
Finally, the “repetition” sense (6.A) adds an iterative component to the mean-
ing of over, as in:
(18) After the false start, they started the race over.
Evans and Tyler speculate that the repetition sense may result from iterative 
application of the refl exive sense. However, as they pointed out earlier, while dis-
cussing “excess I” and “excess II” senses of over, one could imagine alternative 
routes of motivation (e.g. an iterative application of the A–B–C trajectory).
I-lamanie POPRAWKI NANIESIONE IISek1:97   Sek1:97 2013-04-08   14:13:17
98
2.4. The case of (all) over
The analysis carried out by Queller (2001, 2008) and taken up by Taylor (2006) 
differs from previous accounts. Both authors focus primarily on the meaning of 
the phrase all over to argue for a highly “granular” approach to the polysemy of 
over – an approach of a radically different kind than Lakoff’s (and those presented 
above).
Queller refers back to Lakoff’s discussion of all over, who posited two sub-
schemas for it:
(1) There were fl ies all over the ceiling. (multiplex covering)
(2) The spider had crawled all over the ceiling. (multiplex covering path)
Lakoff derived the fi rst sense from the basic image schema for “covering” 
via a mass-multiplex transformation: the TR is to be conceived not as a single, 
continuous entity covering the LM, but rather as a group of individual entities 
which are distributed over the LM conceived as a set of small regions containing 
at least one entity each (Queller dubs this notion “sectoral coverage” – 2008: 5). 
The multiplex covering schema, in turn, gives rise to the multiplex covering path 
schema, “in which the points representing the multiplex entity [...] are joined to 
form a path [...] which ‘covers’ the LM” (Lakoff 1987: 428–429).
Queller shows that subsequent researchers tended to eliminate the subschemas 
postulated by Lakoff from their models. As we have seen, Kreitzer (1997) postu-
lates that distinct senses of over should be sought on the “relational” level, while 
image schema transformations (like the ones instantiated in examples (1) and (2)) 
infl uence only construal operations on components of a full relational schema. 
For Tyler and Evans (2003b), these subschemas do not represent distinct lexical 
senses, “but rather a contextual implicature based on real-world knowledge of 
what ‘covering’ of a surface by less typical sorts of TRs like a swarm of fl ies or a 
spider’s path would look like” (Queller 2008: 7).
Contrary to those accounts, Queller argues that the “multiplex covering” sche-
mas do represent distinct senses. He points out that (all) over is frequently 
used with various verbs to denote “chaotic dispersal”: “daub/dribble/drip/
dump/pour/scatter/smear/spatter/spill/splash/splatter/spread/sprinkle TR (all) 
over LM” (p. 8). It seems clear that in such collocations the sense in question is 
prompted by the verbs. However, the same sense can be expressed by stative/
resultative constructions with all over, in which there is no overt reference to an 
action:
(3) There are crumbs all over the fl oor.
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The “chaotic dispersal” sense of all over becomes all the more evident when 
“crumbs” in (3) are replaced with a TR normally forming a regular design, as in:
(4) ? There are tiles all over the fl oor.
This sentence could be felicitous only on the assumption that the tiles do not 
cover the fl oor as its design, but are rather scattered randomly over its surface. 
Such examples suggest that “covering” may be not at issue here. Queller points 
out that it would take a relatively few crumbs to justify (3). What is more, the 
“sectoral coverage” of the LM need not be the case: the crumbs could be placed 
only on a small portion of the fl oor’s surface and possibly elsewhere. Queller 
concludes that the notion of “chaotic dispersal” best captures the data in ques-
tion: “in typical uses of all over the distribution of the TR has little regard for the 
boundaries of the LM surface”; additionally, it “also captures the non-topological, 
subjective sense of a loss of control that results in things ending up where they 
don’t belong, creating a ‘mess’” (p. 9).
A similar argumentation may be invoked for some idiomatic uses of all over, 
e.g.:
(5) George has guilt written all over his face.
If one construes the meaning of the phrase as involving “covering”, analogous 
uses based on this construal should be fully acceptable. However, this is not the 
case. Queller states that native speakers fi nd the variants in (6) decidedly odd, 
compared with “prototypical instantiations involving words like guilt” (p. 10):
(6) ? He had rage/amazement/indifference written all over his face.
This fact becomes understandable when we construe the emotion to be ex-
pressed as “chaotically dispersed” across the face. Guilt serves as the best exam-
ple because we typically try to hide it behind a facade. When it nevertheless gets 
through, we attribute that to a loss of control leading to a messy situation. The 
emotions mentioned in (6) are not typically construed in that manner, since they 
normally cannot (rage) or need not (amazement, indifference) be contained.
The “chaotic dispersal” sense of all over is evident in the following idioms:
(7) This paper is all over the place.
(8) The data are all over the map.
What is more, the “coverage” interpretation of such sentences would be posi-
tively misleading. An interpretation of all over in (7) as implying an exhausting 
presentation of a subject would be opposite to the real meaning: that the paper is 
chaotic to the point of incoherence. Similarly, (8) does not express “full coverage” 
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but a lack of structure in the presentation of the data. Both examples represent “a 
schema involving the evaluation of a summarily scanned path as chaotically dis-
persed” (p. 11) (cf. “multiplex covering path” schema in Lakoff’s model).
In his discussion of all over, Taylor (who consistently quotes corpus data or 
results of google searches) focuses fi rst on the contribution of all to the mean-
ing of the phrase. As we have seen in (7) and (8), all does not seem to have a 
quantifi cational sense there (consistent with the compositionality principle) which 
would suggest that the coverage is in some way total.13 Taylor provides additional 
evidence against the quantifi cational interpretation of all. First, it can often not be 
dropped from the phrase, suggesting that all over functions as a unit, e.g.:
(9) ? Oh, God, I thought, she can see the lipstick over me.
Second, it cannot be added to quantify some sentences with over:
(10) ? I held my hand all over my face for a few moments before speaking.
Such a use would not be felicitous even if a physical covering of the face took 
place (when we replace “my hand” with “both my hands”). Third, all does not 
readily contrast with other quantifi ers, e.g.:
(11) ?  Oh, God, I thought, she can see the lipstick [half, partly, somewhat, mostly] 
over me.
Taylor points out that such phrases with over are possible and they do seem to 
involve some quantifi cation, as in:
(12)  She pulled the sheet half over her head, to be ready to jump out, and she 
waited.
Finally, following Lakoff’s characterization of the covering sense of over, 
which involves a TR extending across the boundaries of the LM (1987: 426), all 
in its quantifying sense would be redundant, since the coverage is (in one way 
or another) full by defi nition. But of course, as shown by Queller, the notion of 
“covering” does not provide an adequate interpretation of all over.14
13 Contrary to Lakoff’s characterization which invokes the idea of “sectoral coverage”, i.e. sec-
torally distributed full coverage (1987: 428).
14 It is curious, perhaps, that Taylor does not follow the question of all’s contribution to the 
phrase (he seems satisfi ed with the conclusion that all over functions as a unit not with the compo-
sitionally predictable sense of “complete covering”, but rather with the “chaotic dispersal” sense). 
But if it is not quantifi cation, what is it? Perhaps a comment by Dewell could serve as a promising 
point of departure. He noticed that in “There is paint all over the wall”, the TR “would be considered 
a continuous covering layer without all, which suggests scattered splotches” (1994: 373). Thus, in 
this minimal pair, all introduces the sense of discontinuity. If over suggests “continuous coverage” 
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Subsequently, Taylor suggests that all over treated as a unit has a particular 
distribution of uses (to be determined by further studies). He notices that several 
examples – as (9)–(12) above – contain references to human body (either as a TR 
or a LM). In other cases, all over occurs with some geopolitical entity as a LM (e.g. 
“all over the country/the world/Britain/Europe”). These properties, he suggests,
 contribute to the “semantic profi le” of the expression.
All over not only has a distinctive pattern of uses but it may “combine with 
other items to produce expressions which also have their distinctive values” (Tay-
lor 2006: 68). Thus, the process of “idiomaticization” is recursive, as exemplifi ed 
by sentences with all over the place:
(13)  Why somebody’s left an old choc-ice on the fl oor, and it’s run all over the 
place.
(14)  There is no way that a farrier can shoe a horse that is so angry or frightened 
that it is rearing and leaping all over the place.
While in (13) the phrase designates a contextually defi ned region (and could 
be replaced by everywhere), in (14) it carries the idea that the action of the horse is 
impossible to predict (which makes the substitution inadequate). As we have seen, 
this notion of randomness, lack of pattern or structure was present in (7) above, 
discussed by Queller.
Taylor points out that a new idiom like all over the place can be creatively 
extended. In this case, the “slot” provided by place can be fi lled by other lexical 
items. We have already seen all over the map in (8) above. Additionally, Taylor 
quotes examples with all over the show, all over the shop and all over the paddock 
(an Australasian variant), which may all carry the ideas of randomness, unpredict-
ability or dispersal.
Finally, Taylor provides some evidence to show that Queller’s interpretation of 
written all over (one’s face), as exemplifi ed in (5)–(6), is not waterproof.15 Some 
corpus examples do not conform to the idea that a subject is unable to contain 
emotions which are visible all over his face:
(15) As William and Harry boarded the 10.30am BA fl ight, excitement was written 
 all over their faces.
(16) The Conductor was sitting with satisfaction clearly visible all over his face.
Taylor suggests that a more general interpretation based on the notion of THE 
FACE AS INTERFACE (where emotions are made manifest and can be “read”) 
would be more adequate. 
of some kind (a big splash?), perhaps all distributes this effort on the whole area? This contribution 
would involve quantifi cation.
15 Actually, Queller admits as much: “An internet search for phrases like pleasure (was) written 
all over his face will yield exceptions to the generalizations outlined here” (2001: 80, note 2).
I-lamanie POPRAWKI NANIESIONE IISek1:101   Sek1:101 2013-04-08   14:13:17
102
2.5. A discussion
Dewell’s account is most Lakoffi an in spirit. His discussion may be used to point 
out an essential arbitrariness of the imagistic analysis. Dewell intuitively posits a 
curved path as the central image schema/meaning of over. He says that this im-
age is “maximally distinct” from schemas for above and across (invoked jointly 
by Lakoff to characterize his central sense). Dewell is subsequently at pains to 
see an arc in prima facie fl at trajectories. Thus, planes have to land at some point 
(and the horizon is oval, anyway), while the clothesline stretching across the yard 
is attached to poles at each end (1994: 355–356, 359). Since most of the uses of 
over do not involve actual paths, Dewell invokes mental scanning (“subjective 
motion”) in his proposed shape. Thus, when a plank is over a hole in the fl oor, its 
leading edge is imagined as having traversed a curved path. The most ingenious of 
all is, perhaps, the proposed image for crossing the border on a bike (the semicir-
cular path is traced by “salient rolling wheels or stepping motions” (p. 369)).
Dewell does not notice that his account assumes what it sets out to prove. One 
can always imagine arcs, if one needs them. Whether Sam lives across the bridge 
or over the bridge, one can represent the hypothetical mental trajectory either as 
fl at or semicircular, depending on one’s assumptions. When an actual curved path 
is expressed by the “wrong” preposition – “Sam walked across an arched bridge” 
– one can always say that the physical arc is less important than the mental “fl at 
trajectory”. Once one realizes that a given expression can be imagined to repre-
sent an infi nite number of confi gurations within some general constraints, then it 
becomes clear that the focus of an analyst should be on those constraints.16
Kreitzer accepts Lakoff’s image-schematic approach, while his declared aim is 
to reduce the rampant polysemy of the model by suggesting that “distinct senses” 
appear on the “relational” rather than “component” level of analysis. That solu-
tion merely shifts the problem. The question remains: why should one accept the 
three spatial relations pointed out by Kreitzer rather than the twenty-two pointed 
out by Lakoff?17 The issue of the “division of semantic labour” among various ele-
ments of the sentence (primarily, between over and the verb), which is supposed 
16 In particular cases, Dewell notes constraints on the use of over which, however, are not visual. 
For instance, Lakoff’s argument (1987: 423–424) that “end-point focus” is possible only for ex-
tended LMs was questioned by Vandeloise (1990: 424), who pointed out that what really counts 
is whether the LM blocks vision or not (thus, “Sam lives over the wall” is impossible, because the 
wall blocks vision). Dewell (citing Brugman) noticed that the only relevant restriction is pragmatic: 
whether one can actually take the route (1994: 358). Thus, the sentence is felicitous, if the LM is the 
Berlin Wall or a prison wall which can be traversed. We will see in Vandeloise’s account of “length/
width” (4.2.) that pragmatic explanations take precedence over perceptual or objective explanations 
(Lakoff’s features). In hermeneutical terms, they are more “originary”.
17 Or fourteen, as identifi ed by Tyler and Evans. Or one, as suggested by Szwedek: prepositions 
“have a single, schematic meaning” (2007: 256). The basic question concerns what is “in” a word out 
of context, or the nature of the semantic perspective.
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to take place on the “integrative” level (and which Kreitzer is the fi rst to raise), is 
potentially more important. In this context, Kreitzer suggests that when the verb 
codes ascension (climb), over is apparently static (i.e. it codes the relation “TR 
above LM”). When the verb is general in meaning (move), over may be either stat-
ic or dynamic, depending on the construal: if the TR crosses the boundaries of the 
LM, over is dynamic; if it moves to stay within LM’s boundaries, over is static. 
Like Dewell, Kreitzer does not notice that a possibility to imagine some spatial 
confi guration is not relevant in a linguistic analysis, unless it is linked to some 
constraints on the use of a lexeme. The distinction between the static and dynamic 
sense of over is gratuitous, if one does not try to show its formal relevance. 
Evans and Tyler offer the fullest account, combining several elements from 
previous models and taking a position on most issues raised before. As concerns 
their method, the crucial question to be asked is whether their approach offers 
genuine insight, actually solving some vexing problems (as the label “principled 
polysemy framework” promises), or whether it is syncretic. They begin their analy-
sis by pointing out that Kreitzer’s scenario mentioned above may also include 
the TR actually moving within the boundaries of the LM, thus his model has 
no means to distinguish two dynamic construals. On this basis, they advocate a 
further level of integration, which fuses the semantic structure provided by words 
with general knowledge.18 This is a curious argument: Evans and Tyler’s “concep-
tual” level of integration also does not allow to distinguish all possible construals 
unless one knows what could be actually meant. If in the sentence “The clouds 
moved over the city” we replace “clouds” with a TR adopting any trajectory (e.g. 
a fi gh-ter jet), then the physical relation could be plausibly construed in several 
other ways. Without any context, one can more or less specify possible trajecto-
ries of clouds in relation to the city (thus, general knowledge seems useful), while 
one cannot really know how a jet could behave. To be sure, we can all imagine 
several possible trajectories (having seen war fi lms etc.), but since none is more 
likely that others,19 we normally would not have any preferences. Thus, it is ir-
relevant in the context of a linguistic description of a lexeme what scenario one 
actually imagines or can imagine as long as such alternatives do no have formal 
consequences.20
When Evans and Tyler distinguish “lexical concepts” from “cognitive mod-
els”, we seemingly return to the structuralist distinction between the dictionary 
and encyclopedia (or properly linguistic and extra-linguistic knowledge) rejected 
18 Evans develops this approach, which he calls now “LCCM theory”, i.e. “theory of lexical 
concepts and cognitive models”, e.g. 2007. I will treat both accounts as sketches of the same model.
19 As opposed to the clouds scenarios: Evans and Tyler’s case is clearly the least likely, since 
clouds do not respect city boundaries, and one cannot really know, if the boundaries have been 
crossed. In general terms, a “cognitive model” cannot solve the problem of the background – one 
cannot translate a life-world into conceptual structure. Cf. e.g. Searle (1999), Dreyfus (1992).
20 The “imagistic” interpretation of language had been repeatedly criticised before the advent of 
CL. Cf. Richards’ argument against T.E. Hulme’s “imagism” (1965: 129–132) or Jonas’ criticism of 
Arnheim’s account of “visual thinking” (1974).
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by Langacker. However, the account remains Langackerian, since both elements 
are integrated at the “conceptual” level and cognitive models defi ne the “semantic 
potential” of a lexeme.21
One wonders what Tyler and Evans actually mean at some other junctures. For 
instance, they propose a unitary “protoscene” for over, thus their model seems 
monosemic; cf. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2007: 153). At the same time they 
claim that “this representation alone is inadequate” (2003b: 112), and they offer 
a radial model with fourteen senses. Subsequently they add that “our network 
should be thought of as a semantic continuum, in which complex conceptualiza-
tions can draw on meanings from distinct nodes as well as the range of points 
between nodes, which provide nuanced semantic values” (p. 153, note 31). This 
may be a realistic characterization of phenomena but in a “principled approach” 
one would expect a theoretical defence.
In their account of how to identify the central sense of over, Tyler and Evans 
offer four principles. The fi rst two (“etymological priority” and “frequency of 
occurrence”) are formulated at such a level of generality that they seem hardly 
useful (the authors do not raise the question of their arbitrariness). According to 
the third one, the central sense should be clearly different from related preposi-
tions. Evans and Tyler propose “the notion of a TR being located higher than but 
potentially within reach of the LM” (p. 109). Why not Dewell’s arc? They assume 
that over is static, thus they make the arc (A–B–C trajectory) the basis for cluster 
2. One may wonder in what way this choice is “principled”. The fi nal principle 
concerns “grammatical predictions”. In their formulation: since the primary sense 
gives rise to a chain of extensions, for any of them “we should be able to fi nd 
sentences whose context provides the implicature that gives rise to the additional 
meaning associated with the distinct sense” (p. 109). But these are not grammati-
cal predictions in any formal sense – this is their “method” of deriving “distinct 
senses”. Thus, one may ask if the sum of four apparently arbitrary principles (at 
least, at the present stage of formulation) is any less arbitrary?
The last – highly granular – approach actually provides some answers to is-
sues which were raised in the previous accounts (but not followed) and radically 
changes the perspective. The question of “granularity” looks very different when 
is it transferred from the general level – how many senses does a word have? – to 
the more specifi c level of the meaning of a word in various phrases. Thus, in the 
sequence: over, all over, all over the place the meaning of a given unit at each 
subsequent level of complexity need not be fully compositional (i.e. not predict-
able from the senses at a lower level). Since this process is recursive (cf. Harder 
2006), as Taylor points out, a specifi cation of senses at the word level seems pre-
mature and not instructive (certainly so in the cases when phrasal meanings are 
not predictable – “idiomatic”).
21 Cf. Evans (2007: 21ff.). A real opposition to Langacker’s view appears possibly at the next 
stage: when the semantic potential becomes actual “meaning” (the semantics – pragmatics distinc-
tion), pp. 27ff.
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In this way, the issue of the “contribution” of particular elements to the mean-
ing of the whole gets in focus. As we have seen with all over, no clear-cut answer 
is provided, since the “emergent” sense is explained not on the basis of global 
cognitive principles (which perhaps could make such attribution possible) but 
rather situational logic – “situated rationality”. If we accept Queller’s pragmatic 
account based on “reanalysis and extension” (or “abduction”, cf. Itkonen 2002), 
then all over is reinterpreted as a whole: the “covering” sense of the phrase is re-
placed by the “chaotic dispersal” sense due to a situational change of perspective. 
As noticed, an alternative explanation is suggested by Dewell. In the contrastive 
context: “There is paint over the wall” (a continuous splotch) vs. “There is paint 
all over the wall” (many smaller splotches) all seems to introduce discontinuity. 
According to a partly compositional interpretation, since all could not introduce 
in this context the standard sense of “complete” covering (splotching does not 
normally allow of such a possibility), it distributed the effort22 inherent in splotch-
ing across the LM. However, one can safely assume that some other situational 
scenarios motivating this extension could be presented. This example is conso-
nant with Saussurean view that form and meaning should be treated as units – that 
they cannot be decomposed (cf. 4.1.). Contrary to Saussure’s methodological ap-
proach, it reveals the signifi cance of pragmatic, situational factors. 
22 I suspect that Dewell’s arc primarily expresses a surmounting of an obstacle. Thus, the proto-
typical sense (chronologically) would be dynamic. This guess follows Werner and Kaplan’s “physi-
ognomic” conception of language (1963), emphasizing correlations between body postures and lin-
guistic senses. And it accords well with the hermeneutical view that pragmatic explanations are more 
“originary” than perceptual or objective ones, as confi rmed by Vandeloise’s analysis presented in 
4.2.
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CHAPTER 3. THE STORY OF ZA(-)
3.0. Introductory remarks
The Polish za(-)1 will be analysed below primarily in two roles: as a preposition 
and a verbal prefi x – and also cursorily as an adjectival or adverbial modifi er 
– since all those cases are described as belonging to “the same extended net-
work of senses”.2 Such is the claim put forward in the most comprehensive cogni-
tive analysis of za(-) known to me, which was presented by Tabakowska (2003: 
158). Tabakowska (to appear) extended that account, answering some objections 
to her fi rst article raised in an earlier version of this chapter. The most detailed 
network model of the preposition can be found in Przybylska (2002: 339–387).3 
Dąbrowska discusses the verbal prefi x (1996: 482–489), while Bacz focuses on 
the za + GEN uses of the preposition (2004: 441–448).
The choice of za(-) is motivated by several factors. First, in a range of its us-
age it is an equivalent of over, thus it may potentially provide cross-linguistic 
evidence of some kind. Second, as a preposition it enters into valence relations 
with various nominal cases, thus raising with greater force the question of a se-
mantic “contribution” of particular lexical items or their mutual interaction in the 
grammatical co-text and referential context (cf. Halliday, Hasan 1976). Finally, as 
a verbal prefi x it played a part in the development of the Polish system of verbal 
aspect. Since network models are usually synchronic,4 while their diachronic con-
fi rmation is sometimes postulated,5 za- may provide interesting evidence in that 
respect. Both issues clearly require that cognitive investigations be placed against 
more traditional linguistic approaches.
1 A more convenient alternative version of spelling would be “ZA” in capitals – the convention 
used for categories or concepts, cf. Tabakowska (to appear).
2 It may also function as a “derivative formant”, but this role will not be exemplifi ed in the net-
work, cf. Tabakowska (to appear: 1).
3 She also published an extensive treatment of Polish verbal prefi xes (not including za-), see 
Przybylska 2006.
4 As mentioned (1.2.2.), Tabakowska presented a diachronic application of Langacker’s network 
model for the Polish lexeme klucz (“key”) and related words (1995: 50–51). The issue of the status of 
network models in the context of the synchrony/diachrony distinction will be raised in chapter 4.
5 E.g. Tyler and Evans (2003b) in their search for criteria allowing to identify the prototypical 
sense. In the present case, Tabakowska states: “A necessary prerequisite [...] of a more comprehen-
sive study would involve the diachronic development of prefi xed forms” (2003: 158).
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Tabakowska mentions two traditional approaches to prepositional semantics.6 
The co-textual (descriptive) approach which focuses “either on the semantics of 
nominals within prepositional phrases (PP) or on the features of verbs in adver-
bal prepositional complements” and the structuralist approach which looks for 
“an overall system of semantic oppositions” (2003: 156). On the one hand, she 
points out that the cognitive approach is close to the structuralist polysemic inter-
pretation7 of particular prepositions; on the other hand, she opts for a co-textual 
analysis which shows that “semantic differences arise from the interaction of the 
meaning of the preposition itself with that of the case marking on the PP nominal 
and the semantics of the verb, whenever the PP functions as an adverbal preposi-
tional object” (pp. 156, 159). In the cognitive framework, the latter approach takes 
a “conceptualist” form: it is the conceptualizations prompted by relevant features 
of the verb and the noun in the PP (or LM) which infl uence the meaning of the 
preposition. In our specifi c context, “it is precisely the semantic and pragmatic 
properties of LM that are decisive of individual senses of za” (p. 159).
Tabakowska does not comment on an apparent divergence between the de-
scriptive and the structuralist method: the latter searches (ideally) for a single 
abstract representation of an item within a system of postulated oppositions, while 
the former accepts all intuitively distinct senses (e.g. as listed in dictionaries).8 
She notices, though, that when constructing a semantic network of senses for a 
given preposition, individual components of meaning should be carefully kept 
apart, and mentions the problem “as to which particular senses should indeed be 
considered as ‘distinct’” (p. 159). This complex of methodological issues must be 
kept in mind.
3.1. A network model of the preposition za
Tabakowska starts her analysis (2003: 159–161) by presenting four uses of za 
listed as separate entries (“homophones”) in dictionaries:
6 I will treat Tabakowska’s articles (2003, to appear) as the framework for the following presen-
tation, while referring to Przybylska (2002), Bacz (2004), and Dąbrowska (1996) when appropriate.
7 As repeatedly mentioned, the monosemic interpretation is the standard goal of structuralist 
models, while some analysts allow that a lexeme may have more senses (see the next note). 
8 Cf. Vandeloise’s statement concerning the relationship between these two approaches: “As far 
as polysemy is concerned, I believe that each lexical category can be analysed at different abstraction 
levels ranging from example enumeration (therefore polysemic) to a search for common features in 
circumstances allowing the use of the preposition, ideally leading to a unique rule”. He adds that he 
reached this goal in his analysis of French prepositions “except for devant for which I would rather 
suggest two rules” (1990: 416).
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(1) a. (siedzieć) za  drzewem
  (to sit)  behind  tree-INST
  “to sit behind the tree”
 b. (iść)  za  drzewo
  (to go)  beyond  tree-ACC
  “to walk beyond the tree”
(2)  za dnia
  by day-GEN
  “by daytime, during the day”
(3)  za duży dom
  too big house
The last case is a lexeme traditionally classifi ed as a modifi er (adjectival or 
adverbial), which expresses the notion of excess. It is convenient to deal with it 
fi rst because it is conceptually simplest (and does not formally belong to the class 
under investigation).
In this context, Tabakowska refers to Weinsberg’s structuralist study of spatial 
prepositions.9 That author defi nes two semantic oppositions he takes to be valid 
for all instantiations of the preposition za: (1) the location of TR (in his terminol-
ogy: “the entity that is localized”) outside the LM region, and (2) the (spatial) 
foregrounding of LM with the simultaneous backgrounding of TR (p. 161). Taba-
kowska notices that the fi rst feature – the TR is situated outside the LM – is too 
powerful to be useful, since it characterizes several other Polish prepositions.10 It 
fi ts, however, the more general meaning of the compound preposition poza (po + 
za: “(all) over-and-beyond”),11 as below:
(4) (przebywać)  poza   domem
 (live / stay) (all) over-and-beyond house-INSTR
 “(stay) beyond the house, out of the house”
It also accounts for the meaning of the modifi er za: “the LM is conceptualized 
as a certain pragmatic norm (which is left unspecifi ed), which the TR is consid-
ered to have metaphorically gone beyond” (p. 161). In our example (3), the house 
(TR) is described as having crossed the acceptable limit of size (LM).12 
9 Weinsberg (1973). Cf. Przybylska’s discussion of his account (2002: 78–81).
10 E.g. przed: “in front of”, przy: “near(by)”, nad: “above”, pod: “below”, etc. However, the 
force of Tabakowska’s objection is unclear, since it is the conjunction of features which serves as a 
characterization of a particular item in the structuralist analysis.
11 For an analysis of po(-), see Tabakowska (1999).
12 Bacz (2004: 447) points out that “Tabakowska’s discussion and her semantic networks of the 
Polish za(-) do not include the use of za in emphatic expressions with the particle co (what) and a 
nominal in the nominative case, as in: Co za dzień! – NOM (What a day!), Co za gospodyni – NOM 
(What a hostess). It could be speculated that the presence of za in these phrases is motivated by their 
emphatic character. Emphasis implies excess, and the notion of excess, which can be visualized as 
going over (beyond/behind) a limit, has been well shown [by Tabakowska] to be inherent in the 
meaning of za(-)”. In her new discussion, Tabakowska mentions the axiological character of such 
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Tabakowska postulates that the area where the TR is to be located (its search 
domain) must be limited to the zone situated behind or beyond the LM. In the 
examples (1) a., b. this schema (in the default readings) involves spatial orienta-
tion relative to the observer: 13 the arrangement between the “proximal” LM and 
the “distal” TR is established from the vantage point of the speaker. Tabakowska 
states that this particular instantiation of Weinsberg’s second feature is “the sim-
plest conceptually” and exemplifi es “the category prototype” (p. 162). The differ-
ence between the two variants (za + INST; za + ACC) is that between the static 
and the dynamic senses: the former is used to locate a TR behind or beyond a LM, 
while the latter expresses the movement of a TR to a location behind or beyond a 
LM (in simpler terms, the former phrase is an answer to the question “Where?”, 
while the latter one to the question “Where to?”).
Tabakowska points out that the static/dynamic opposition is exhibited by 
other Polish prepositions and apparently results mainly from the meaning of the 
verb (the ACC marker co-occurs with verbs of motion). She draws the following 
conclusion: “In view of its systematic character, this general opposition is not 
directly relevant when distinguishing between the individual senses of za, and it 
becomes signifi cant only in the cases of structural gaps” (p. 160). Let us notice, at 
this stage, that the question whether the static or the dynamic senses of preposi-
tions are cognitively primary looms large in other cognitive analyses.14
The remaining PP – za + GEN as in (2) – expresses the notion of duration and, 
according to Tabakowska, “constitutes one of the category-peripheral extensions” 
of za (p. 165). I will return to her interpretation in due course.
The sense of (1) a., b. is one of the two schemas considered prototypical for za 
by Tabakowska. In the other one, the spatial orientation along the proximal-distal 
axis (Weinsberg’s second feature) is conceptualized not in relation to the location 
of the observer but relative to the LM, which may be “conventionally seen as hav-
ing an inherent ‘front’ and an inherent ‘back’” (p. 162):
(5) a. (drzewo)  za  Jasiem
  (tree)   behind  John-INSTR
  “the tree behind John”
 b. (przesunąć się)  za  Jasia
  (move over)  behind  John-ACC
  “(move over and stand) behind John”
uses (to appear: 3). In CL, the axiological aspect was taken into account by e.g. Krzeszowski 1993, 
1997.
13 “Egocentric” orientation in Kreitzer’s analysis (2.2.).
14 E.g. Przybylska (2002: 576–577). Tabakowska’s conclusion is shared by Szwedek: “we 
can only say that prepositions are open to static/dynamic, and possibly other interpretations, in the 
sense that they can appear in such contexts” (2007: 259; emphasis in the text). Szwedek, as noticed, 
expressly rejects polysemic interpretations of prepositions of the type exemplifi ed in Lakoff (1987): 
“[such explications] are in reality paraphrases of the context contributing nothing to our understand-
ing of the preposition over” (Szwedek 2007: 260).
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The LM may also be “conceived as having an ad hoc ‘front’ and ‘back’” (p. 
162) due to the sequential scanning of the elements placed along a line, irrespec-
tive of the overall orientation of the relevant space”:
(5) c. (krok)  za  krokiem
  (step)  after  step-INSTR
  “step by step”
The scanning may be performed over physical or abstract motion: “TR and/or 
LM are conceptualized as moving along a line marked by their spatial ordering” 
(p. 162):
(5) d. (iść)  za radą
  (go)  after advice-INSTR
  “follow advice”
In metaphorical extensions of the use exemplifi ed in (5) d. “what precedes is 
conceptualized as the cause of what follows” (p. 163), e.g.:
(5) e. (czuć) ból za najlżejszym  poruszeniem
  (feel) pain after slightest-INSTR  movement-INSTR
  “feel pain at the slightest movement”
According to Tabakowska’ account, the observer-oriented prototypical schema 
exemplifi ed in (1) a., b. gives rise to two most frequent extensions, as evidenced 
by dictionary uses. One is defi ned by Weinsberg as “passability”: the LM, concep-
tualized as a boundary separating TR from the observer, “may be crossed by [the 
TR] moving ahead over its upper surface” (p. 164):
(6) a. (mieszkać) za granicą
  (live)  over border-INSTR
  “live abroad”
 b. (wyjechać) za granicę
  (go)  over border-ACC
  “go abroad”
In the other one – called by Weinsberg “the sense of a curtain” – the LM 
“blocks the view of an area so that it cannot be seen by the observer” (p. 164):15
(7) a. (schować coś)  za  murem
  (hide something) behind  wall-INSTR
  “(hide something) behind the wall”
15 This and previous quote from Weinsberg (1973: 57) in Tabakowska’s translation.
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 b. (schować się)  za  mur
  (hide oneself)  behind  wall-ACC
  “hide behind the wall”
If “the view” is extended to cover metaphorical “seeing”, it may mean lack of 
access (p. 165):
(7) c. tęsknić  za dziewczyną
  pine  after girl-INSTR
  “miss the girl”
In this example “some unspecifi ed secondary LM blocks the TR’s metaphori-
cal access to the specifi ed primary LM (girl)”.
Tabakowska argues that since time is conventionally conceptualized as a lin-
ear sequence of units, it is “natural to think of an entity (TR) as an object ‘getting 
over’ one or more such units (LM) along the time axis” (165) (a temporal exten-
tion of the “passability” sense as in (6)):
(8) (Jan przyjdzie) za  dwie godziny
 (John will come) behind  two hours-ACC
 “John will come in two hours’ time”
John (TR) moves metaphorically over two hours (LM) to fi nally fi nd himself 
on the other side of (= behind) it (the ACC rather than the INSTR case is ex-
plained by the “dynamic component”).
The exclusively temporal za + GEN structure, exemplifi ed earlier in (2), is 
explained in the following way: “The (temporal) search domain for the TR is 
defi ned by the (temporal) extension of the LM; the relation is conceptualized as 
holding only for as long as the TR remains ‘hidden behind’ the LM. As its subse-
quent emergence is implied by the underlying conception of the passing time, the 
‘curtain’ is only temporarily drawn – the partiality that might possibly explain the 
use of the GEN marker on the LM nominal” (p. 165).
In her analysis, Bacz offers an alternative account (2004: 445–446). She points 
out that in Tabakowska’s explanation of (2) the observer must be located outside 
the line of passing time (“as if he were watching a passing train”), if he is to con-
ceptualize the required arrangement: an unspecifi ed TR event as temporarily hid-
den behind the temporal LM (a day – a unit of the passing time). Thus, the schema 
proposed for (2) differs from the one postulated for time expressions with za as 
exemplifi ed by (8), in which the speaker/viewer is located on the time line. In the 
interpretation put forward by Bacz, “the barrier separating the speaker/observer 
from the TR event is not the time period evoked by the GEN nominal, but the end 
limit (the fi nal moment) of that period”. In other words, the end limit of a primary 
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LM1 period (from the vantage point of someone located on the time line) serves 
as a secondary LM2.
In her rejoinder, Tabakowska admits that both interpretations are equally plau-
sible (or “equally implausible”), while claiming that in most uses of the za + GEN 
construc-tion the “end limit barrier” is not really relevant, e.g. “Za dnia policjant, 
wieczorem kulturysta” (“By day a policeman, by night a body-builder”) (to ap-
pear: 8–9).
Bacz also questions Tabakowska’s hypothetical explanation of the GEN mark-
er. She points out that limited duration (“partiality” underlying some uses of GEN) 
can be also seen in (8), in which the ACC marker is used. Consequently, she pro-
poses that the za + GEN construction can be explained by the case’s potential to 
express reference points, as with Polish “dates in non-prepositional GEN expres-
sions, such as piątego maja-GEN (on the fi fth of May)” (Bacz 2004: 444, 446).
As suggested by Tabakowska (to appear: 9) – the za + GEN construction could 
be then explained as a metonymy, signifying the full structure “za początkiem/
przed końcem dnia (‘za beginning-INSTR before end-INSTR day-GEN’)”.
It should be noticed that the amount of attention given to za + GEN construc-
tion partly results from the fact that the case is prima facie awkward for linguists 
of cognitive persuasion, since it is exemplifi ed only by temporal uses, which are 
treated as extensions of more basic spatial uses within the cognitivist paradigm. 
That specifi c problem is mentioned by Przybylska, who treats za + GEN as “a 
separate category, unrelated by any semantic links to contemporary categories set 
up by za + ACC and za + INSTR” (2002: 386). The problem resurfaces in general 
cognitive treatments of prepositions because some of them do not seem to have 
spatial senses, cf. Tyler, Evans (2003a).
The fi nal category-peripheral extension mentioned by Tabakowska also in-
volves a reference point interpretation:
(9) (kupić) dom za milion
 (buy) house for million-INSTR
 “to buy the house for a million”
(10) (wziąć) dziewczynę za rękę
 (take) girl  by hand-INSTR
 “take the girl by the hand”
In both cases the primary LM1 in the PP serves as a reference point, which al-
lows access to an entity (the secondary LM2 – the direct object): in (9) the object 
of purchase is available only after the obstacle has been removed (i.e. the money 
paid); in (10) “the girl becomes accessible via her body part” (2003: 166).
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3.2. A network model of the verbal prefi x za-
Tabakowska assumes that “general principles of verbal prefi xation may be re-
vealed through a systematic comparison of the semantics of the category of verbal 
prefi xes with that of prepositions, following the assumption that verbal prefi xes 
originally developed from adnominal elements, which then later turned into lex-
emes defi ned as prepositions” (2003: 157). More specifi cally, her aim is to sub-
stantiate the hypothesis that individual senses of the za- perfectives16 constitute a 
network of interrelated nodes, which fi nd their counterparts in category nodes de-
scribed for za (p. 166). Thus, this attempt seems based on a diachronic hypothesis 
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that the evolution of verbal prefi xes and prepositions from adnominal elements 
preserves some basic senses of za and / or runs in parallel.
Tabakowska points out that an analysis of prefi xes adds a new level of com-
plexity: “teasing apart the individual components of the overall meaning of [...] 
clauses proves diffi cult because of the complexity of interactions between the 
meaning of the prefi x, verbal semantics and the semantic features of LM” (p. 
166).
In Tabakowska’s account the category za- develops around the “dynamic” pro-
totypes exemplifi ed in (1) b. and – when the space is oriented relative to LM – (5) 
b., as in the following example:
(11) zaskoczyć  kogoś
 za-jump  somebody-ACC
 “surprise somebody”
Originally, she explains, the phrase meant “to steal from behind (the LM)”, 
thus implying that the LM has a “back” and a “front”.
In most cases of the prototypical use the vantage point of the observer is adopted 
and transitive verbs are used. In the example below the primary LM1 (direct object) 
is made to “go round” an unspecifi ed secondary LM2 (a potential oblique object):
(12) zagiąć  drut
 za-bend  wire-ACC
 “bend the wire (over something)”
The sense described earlier as “passability” (exemplifi ed in (6) a., b.) is taken 
to be one of the main two extensions from the prototype. The notion of a pass-
able boundary extends to “an abstract boundary separating non-being from being” 
which is supposed to explain the occurrence of za- with intransitive inchoative 
verbs:
(13) a. zapłonąć,  zakwitnąć,  zaśpiewać, etc.
  za-burn (to begin za-blossom (to begin za-sing (to begin
  burning)  blossoming)  singing)
In this context, Tabakowska comments on the seeming paradox (remarked on 
by other authors) that the inchoative sense co-occurs with the sense of comple-
tion. She suggests that “the paradox can be resolved if the analysis includes the 
semantic contribution from primary or secondary LM”, as in:
(13) b. zajechać (aż)  do wsi
  za-go  (Intens.PART) to village
  “go into the village”
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The sense of completion is to be interpreted as the crossing by the TR of the 
boundary between “non-village” and “village” (LM conceptualized as a bounded 
region).
The sense of “going beyond a boundary” is extended to cover the sense of 
“exceeding a norm” (cf. (3) above), which is to be evident in both intransitive and 
transitive verbs with za-:
(13) c. zaspać
  za-sleep
  “oversleep, sleep too long”
 d. zaczytać książkę
  za-read  book-ACC
  “wear the book down by reading”
The other main extension from the prototype involves the sense of “curtain” 
(cf. (7) a., b.) which is relevant when the TR (the agent) is conceptualized as plac-
ing a barrier (a LM2 which may be left unspecifi ed) so that it blocks access to an 
entity (the primary LM1 – direct object):
(14) a. zastawić stół  (szafą)
  za-stand  table-ACC (wardrobe-INSTR)
  “to block access to the table with a wardrobe”
The “curtain” may be literal, as above, or metaphorical, as below:
(14) b. zabronić palenia
  za-forbid smoking-GEN
  “to forbid smoking”
Tabakowska follows Dąbrowska’s suggestion (1996: 483) that “blocking ac-
cess” implies “protection”, which further implies “securing for future use”, as in:
(14) c. zapisać,  zachować, zapamiętać, etc.
  za-write, za-store, za-remember
  “write down” “store away” “store in memory”
The notion of “curtain” is taken to be compatible with that of “covering”: 
something (the specifi ed LM1) is covered with something else (a secondary LM2 
which need not be specifi ed), so that it cannot be seen (accessed, etc.):
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(14) d. zamalować ścianę  (farbą)
  za-paint  wall-ACC paint-INSTR
  “to cover the wall with paint”
If the primary LM1 is conceived as a container, then the notion of “covering” 
implies fi lling in:
(14) e. zapełnić  koszyk  jabłkami
  za-fi ll  basket-ACC apples-INSTR
  “to fi ll the basket with apples”
By a further extension, what cannot be seen any more, does not exist any 
longer; hence, it makes room for something else (a use reminiscent of (9) above, 
“where the thing metaphorically covered with something else makes room for it 
and ultimately becomes replaced with it”):
(15) zastąpić masło  margaryną
 za-step butter-ACC margarine-INSTR
 “to replace butter with margarine”
The fi nal extension (considered analogous to (8)) evokes the image of an en-
tity moving metaphorically over a LM (possibly unspecifi ed) and “fi nding itself 
on the other side of it”. Since many linguists take this schema to be defi nitional 
for the “pure perfective”, the semantic contribution of the prefi x may be seen as 
being limited to its grammatical meaning, i.e. “a natural end of a process”. With 
transitive verbs, the “natural end” is imposed by the contours of the LM:
(16) a. zaśpiewać piosenkę
  za-sing  song-ACC
  “sing (up) a song”
With intransitive verbs, the temporal limit of the action results from a limited 
duration of a particular action type:
(16) b. zaszczekać, zażartować,  zasalutować, etc.
  za-bark  za-joke   za-salute
  “to give a bark” “to crack a joke”  “to give a salute”
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3.3. Some diachronic observations on the verbal prefi x 
za-
As noticed in the previous section, Tabakowska assumes that “general principles 
of verbal prefi xation may be revealed through a systematic comparison of the 
semantics of [verbal prefi xes and prepositions], following the assumption that 
verbal prefi xes developed from adnominal elements, which have later turned into 
lexemes defi ned as prepositions” (2003: 157). More specifi cally, her aim is to 
substantiate the claim that “the distinct senses of the za- perfectives [...] consti-
tute a network of interrelated category nodes which correlate with the category 
nodes described for the preposition za” (p. 166)”. I concluded that, prima facie, 
her attempt is based on “a diachronic hypothesis that the evolution of verbal pre-
fi xes and prepositions from adnominal elements preserves some basic senses of 
za and/or runs in parallel”. In this section, I will show that this interpretation is 
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of one selected vantage point; 
observer onthe same 








 (11)  (12)
 (16a-b)  (14a-c)
...
 (13a)
 (13c-d), (14d)  (15) (14e) (13b)
Figure 16: Based on Tabakowska (2003: 172) 
 t
I-lamanie POPRAWKI NANIESIONE IISek1:118   Sek1:118 2013-04-08   14:13:18
119
not tenable.17 I will compare Tabakowska’s readings with some of the historical 
meanings of verbs with the prefi x za- from Słownik Staropolski (“The dictionary 
of Old Polish”) as chosen and interpreted by Janowska, Pastuchowa (2005).18 The 
discussion below will mostly take the form of a running commentary to Taba-
kowska’s presentation as reported in 3.2., while I will group her examples accord-
ing to my proposed readings.
In the example (11) above – “zaskoczyć kogoś” – an unmentioned TR is sup-
posed “to steal from behind (of LM)” (in the literal sense of physical movement). 
The Old Polish verb carries a more general sense, which is also standard in modern 
use: “to cause (in most cases) an undesirable situation by a premature or unexpect-
ed action” (Janowska, Pastuchowa 2005: 190). If we look for the hypothetically 
original physical sense pointed out by Tabakowska, we should probably place it 
in the context of other verbs of movement with za-, in which the prefi x had the 
meaning “to move towards someone (possibly with bad intentions), block some-
one’s passage”, e.g. “Zastąpić: 1. To stand (on a public road) blocking someone’s 
passage; metaphorically: 2. To ambush” (p. 191; my emphasis). Consequently, the 
original meaning of “zaskoczyć” would be that of a TR unexpectedly blocking a 
LM’s passage from any direction rather than moving from the LM’s behind.19
The verb “zajechać”, which appears in (13) b.: “zajechać (aż) do wsi”, is per-
haps another example of this type. Tabakowska explains its meaning in reference 
to the notion of passability (“to go so far that one crosses the boundary” of the vil-
lage). In Old Polish, its fi rst meaning was “to ride on a public road towards some-
one to block the passage” (Janowska, Pastuchowa 2005: 184). In this respect, it 
was similar to e.g. “zajść” (“za-go”), “zabiec” (“za-run”) (p. 175). The original 
meaning of this verbal group (“to move in some fashion as to stand in the way of 
someone”) is evident in present day uses of “zajechać”, e.g.
(17) a. zajechać komuś   drogę
  za-drive  someone-DAT  way-ACC
  “to cut someone off on the road”
17 In her rejoinder, Tabakowska says that “the analyst’s adherence to a diachronic interpretation 
might in fact be an imputation on the part of the critic”. She seems to vacillate, however, between 
searching for a legitimate place for diachronic data in network models and relying exclusively on 
synchronic criteria (e.g. statistical distribution). Importantly, the status of “general principles of hu-
man cognition” is uncertain in that dichotomy. Since they are taken to infl uence the directionality of 
development – Sweetser (1990) remains the most important statement of this position – Tabakowska 
mentions “cognitive chronology” (to appear: 3). The issue of the cognitive “diachrony within syn-
chrony” will be taken up in chapter 4. 
18 Additionally, Janowska (2007a, b).
19 In her rejoinder, Tabakowska points out that the physical sense of movement “might have dis-
appeared before the historical stage in the development of Polish to which [Janowska and Pastuchowa] 
refer” (to appear: 8). She does not take up, though, the issue of the directionality of movement, which 
remains in question. Thus, we face a clear-cut divergence between a “hypothetical reconstruction [...] 
based – intuitively – on the attested regularity in category development” (Tabakowska, to appear: 8) 
and a hypothetical reconstruction based on an interpretation of the actual historical material.
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The example above refers to dangerous overtaking: a TR moves ahead of a 
LM2 to block its passage (LM1).20 One can feel that the original meaning still 
reverberates in (17) b. (in which there is no obvious boundary to cross), especially 
when placed against (17) c.:
(17) b. zajechać pod  dom
  za-drive  under  house-ACC
  “to stop at the house” (in a vehicle)
 c. podjechać pod  dom
  pod-drive under  house-ACC
  “to stop by the house” (in a vehicle)
“Zajechać” suggests a more ostentatious arrival – possibly related to the origi-
nal notion of blocking the passage. If this interpretation of (17) b. is correct, then 
the idea of crossing a boundary evident in (13) b. results from the meaning of the 
preposition “do” (“(in)to”).
The sense of verbs of movement presented above probably gave rise to a more 
general sense: “to forbid something by some action”, e.g. “zapierać” (“za-push”) 
– “to forbid entry”. This meaning is present in verba dicendi, e.g. “zapowiedzieć” 
(“za-tell”), “zakazać” (“za-order”). It is possible that also “zabronić” (cf. (14) b. 
above) followed this pattern (cf. p. 176 – the authors say, though, that one cannot 
state with certainty whether “zabronić” followed or initiated that pattern). Let 
us notice that the notion of placing a barrier (the sense of “curtain”) is present 
already in the verb “bronić” (“to forbid” in Old Polish). Consequently, the prefi x 
za- is pleonastic: it puts an additional emphasis on the meaning of the stem.21
If this chain of development is correct, we get a different picture of meaning 
extension from the network model presented above. The starting point is not an 
abstract spatial schema “a TR behind/beyond a LM” but a concrete (and dynam-
ic) notion of “a TR moving in order to block a LM”. The “blocking movement” 
is extended to a “blocking action” and to a metaphorical blocking – “forbidding 
20 Tabakowska points out that (13) b. contains an intransitive use, while (17) a. a transitive one, 
thus they may well illustrate two different senses. Subsequently, she invokes the example “zajechać 
komuś drogę” in a methodological context, i.e. that of identifying “distinct senses”, to show that the 
phrase does not yet have such a status, since it may designate not only “dangerous overtaking”, but 
also blocking passage from the front; to appear: 5. She does not comment in that place on the pos-
sible continuity of meaning between “blocking” as in (17) a. and “ostentatious arrival” as in (17) b. 
In another part of her article she does oppose “zajechać” to “podjechać” but in two different co-texts; 
as a result, a comparison of the “contribution” of both prefi xes is diffi cult, cf. to appear: 7. Apart from 
historical considerations (analogy to common constructions which designate “blocking passage”), 
my case rests on the following argument: since transitive zajechać (drogę) may take place from 
any direction, then the actual spatial confi guration is secondary to the fact that passage is blocked; 
since “blocking passage” is a/the central sense of za(-), it may well appear in both transitive and 
intransitive uses. If my interpretation is correct, example (13) b. does not represent “passability” but 
a “curtain” of sorts.
21 One can assume that pleonastic uses are “iconic”: “more form” of a given kind implies “more 
content” conventionally linked with it. Cf. e.g. Tabakowska, Ljungberg 2007; Pawelec 2007c.
I-lamanie POPRAWKI NANIESIONE IISek1:120   Sek1:120 2013-04-08   14:13:18
121
by some action”. In other words, the cognitive vision of conceptual development 
from the concrete (interpreted as “spatial relations”) to the abstract (interpreted as 
“relations in nonspatial domains”) is reinterpreted in view of the historical data 
presented here as going from concrete human activity (i.e. involving physical 
movement) to more “abstract” action (i.e. involving more complex social rela-
tions).
The meaning of passability, even if contestable in (13) b., is clearly present in 
(13) c.: “zaspać” (“to oversleep”). In Old Polish, however, it was much more lim-
ited than today and can be attributed (without certainty) to only a few examples 
(pp. 176–177), e.g.
(18) zabić  za  żywe
 za-hit  behind  live-ACC
 “to drive the nail till it reaches fl esh”
Thus, my interpretation above is apparently corroborated by statistical data: the 
“curtain” sense readings are much more likely in Old Polish material. In present-
day Polish the statistical distribution is clearly different, since the “passability” 
sense is no less central than the “curtain” sense (one source of the likelihood of 
hysteron proteron interpretations based on contemporary intuitions). 
The situation is different with the inchoative sense exemplifi ed in (13) a., 
since the prefi x za- “imparted the inchoative meaning [to the verb] throughout 
the history of the Polish language” (p. 177) and Old Polish material offers numer-
ous incontestable examples, e.g. “zajeść” (“za-eat”) – “to have only a bite”. The 
extended interpretation of “passability” proposed in such cases by Tabakowska 
sounds plausible but rather too abstract: “The notion of a passable borderline eas-
ily extends to stand for an abstract boundary separating non-being from being: the 
passage from the former to the latter is instantiated as a passage from non-action 
to action” (2003: 168). Janowska points out that in Old Polish the inchoative 
sense was expressed usually by za- and roz-, while most prefi xes could serve this 
function (2007a: 57). If so, then the sense of passing “from non-action to action” 
was common to all such cases, while the choice of a particular prefi x had to be 
motivated in some other fashion. One can assume that each prefi x expressed the 
inchoative sense in its own way and the abstract meaning is the result of bleach-
ing (thus, Tabakowska’s interpretation captures the outcome of a more complex 
process or provides its general schema).
The extended senses of “curtain” – “covering” as in (14) d. and “fi lling in” 
as in (14) e. – are richly represented in Old Polish material, e.g. “zakopać” (“za-
dig”), “zalać” (“za-pour”), “zasypać” (“za-strew”) (Janowska, Pastuchowa 2005: 
177). One may wonder, however, if the chain of extension from “blocking access” 
to “protection” and “securing for future use” (fi rst proposed by Dąbrowska), as 
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in (14) c, is the best conjecture.22 One of the examples provided by Tabakowska 
certainly had a different meaning: “zapamiętać” (“za-remember”) meant origi-
nally “to lose from memory, to forget”. In Old Polish, there were two verbs with 
the prefi x za- with the same meaning (and a similar derivation): “zapamiętać” 
and “zapominać” (“za-remember”). In both cases, the negative sense suggests 
the notion of passability (“going too far”, “crossing the limits of memory”). In a 
historical process, due to “a division of linguistic labour”, “zapamiętać” reversed 
its meaning, perhaps following the pattern of “zatrzymać” (“za-keep”) – “not al-
low to escape”.
To conclude, what one can see in the historical material is not an instantiation 
and extension of abstract schemas but rather a propagation of particular co-textual 
patterns, involving both meaning and form. This can be better shown in reference 
to the example (15), which Tabakowska explains in the following way: “By a fur-
ther extension, what cannot be seen any more, does not exist any longer; hence, it 
makes room for something else (a use reminiscent of (9) above, ‘where the thing 
metaphorically covered with something else makes room for it and ultimately 
becomes replaced with it’)” (2003: 171). 
It is likely that in Old Polish the verb zastępować (“za-step”) evolved from 
the verb (the stem) with PP: “stąpić za kogoś” (“to step za somebody-ACC”; “to 
replace, to represent somebody”). Such a pattern of development (as shown by 
Janowska) is clearly discernible in a group of verbs (carrying the meaning “at-
tack”) with PP in which the preposition “na” (“on”) occurs, e.g. “iść na coś” (“go 
na something-Acc”), “jechać na coś” (“ride na something-Acc”), “paść na coś” 
(“fall na something-Acc”). Such verbs appeared also with a variety of prefi xes, 
e.g. “nad-” (“over-”): “nadjechać” (“nad-ride”); “przy-” (“at-”): “przyjść” (“przy-
go”); “w-” (“in-”): “wpaść” (“w-fall”). Janowska argues that when the stems lost 
the semantic value of “attack” (due to specialization), the prefi x “na-” was the 
natural choice to take over that meaning, since “na” appeared in the PP in most 
cases. As a result, other prefi xes in such contexts fell into disuse, while “na-” in 
the meaning of “attack” began to appear in new derivations, e.g. “nalatywać” 
– “na-fl y”; “naskoczyć” – “na-jump”; “nalegać” – “na-lie”. With the passage of 
time, the new forms became lexicalized and “na-” in this sense is no longer pro-
ductive (Janowska 2007a: 108–109).
Janowska and Pastuchowa (2005: 178–179) believe that a group of Old Polish 
verbs with the prefi x “za-” and the meaning “to replace somebody in some ac-
tivity” had a similar origin, e.g. “zajść” (“za-go” – “to replace the defendant in 
court”), “zasadzić” (“za-place”, originally “sit” – “to place a successor in one’s 
post”). Thus, the use of the prefi x “za-” in “zastępować” would indeed be closely 
linked with the use of the preposition “za” (as Tabakowska assumes in her analy-
22 It could be hypothesized that this cluster of senses is motivated by associating aspectual za- 
with the sense of culturally salient verb-stems denoting “preservation for further use”, e.g. “zakisić” 
(“za-pickle”).
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sis), but because of a primarily syntactic rather than conceptual affi nity.23 If the 
chain of developments sketched above is correct, then this link can be placed in 
the following hypothetical sequence:
1. a number of verbs of motion followed the pattern “Verb + ‘za’ + ACC” to ex-
press what one could classify as a specifi c variant of the general meaning “to 
replace somebody in some activity”;
2. the verbs acquired various prefi xes (presumably, to mark the aspect or express 
a particular manner of “replacement” signifi ed by the stem), while still being 
followed by PP with “za”;
3. when the stems started to lose the semantic value “to replace (in some way)”, 
the prefi x “za-” (as analogous to “za” in PP) was attributed the meaning of 
“replacement” and other prefi xes fell into disuse;
4. the prefi x “za-” in this sense was possibly used in new derivations which be-
came lexicalized, while it is no longer productive in this function.
We can now try to point out some differences between the cognitive and the 
diachronic explanation of the prefi x “za-” in the sense of “replacement”. The 
former treats this semantic value as an extension of a basic dynamic sense of the 
preposition, relying on the following reasoning:
1. The sense of curtain: a TR covers LM1 with LM2;
2. Hence, LM1 disappears from view;
3. As a result, LM2 replaces (stands for) LM1.
Thus, a fairly abstract schema of a physical action is reinterpreted as a much 
more abstract schema of any kind of action. If this scenario is taken to describe 
actual developments, a thinking subject – when faced with a new situation – ap-
parently must make such mental leaps in order to express a more comprehensive 
view with the formal tools at hand. The latter analysis paints a different picture. 
At the point of departure we have several specifi c social activities, which require/
allow someone to take the position of someone else.24 In such contexts, articulated 
by “Verb + za + ACC”, the clause expresses the required meaning, while in other 
contexts, it may mean something else, cf. “idzie za niego” (“(she) go za he-ACC” 
– “she marries him”). Thus, the sense is extracted from the situation. Only when 
some formal pattern develops, a mental generalization co-occurs. If there are any 
23 To be sure, one cannot really disentangle “conceptual” and “syntactic” motivations. CL shows 
in great detail the conceptual aspect of syntax as an “end-state” (i.e. when some forms are intuitively 
stable in some conceptual roles). Here, I inspect the genetic aspect of syntax: when it actually takes 
on some conceptual roles.
24 Contrary to Tabakowska’s suggestion (personal communication), I think that such forms articu-
lated fi rst a replacement of humans, and only subsequently of objects. Pragmatically, the notion of 
replacement seems to presuppose a system of social roles, which one can take up. To be sure, objects 
may also “play” different roles but this usage seems to be based on an analogy with human roles.
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mental leaps in this scenario (which is doubtful), they follow verbal forms as used 
in some context.
The fi nal extension considered by Tabakowska covers the purely aspectual 
use of the prefi x.25 In this role, “za-” evokes the image of a TR “fi nding itself on 
the other side of (a LM)”, and thus expresses “a natural end of a process” (2003: 
171).
The historical material shows that the development of the aspectual (perfectiv-
izing) function of prefi xes is a complex and still unravelled story (Janowska, Pas-
tuchowa 2005: 235–239; Janowska 2007a: 64–68). For our purposes it is enough 
to point out that at fi rst the perfectivizing function of prefi xes was not obligatory: 
in some cases verbs with prefi xes had clearly imperfect meaning (one can also 
fi nd such cases in contemporary Polish). Usually, prefi xes did perfectivize but it 
is often impossible to say if in a given case they were purely aspectual or carried 
some meaning of their own.26 Still, the prefi x “z-”, which was and still is by far the 
most productive in this function, was predominantly used perfectively. There is 
no detectable general pattern why a particular prefi x took on this role with a par-
ticular stem. The only exception is a group of verbs in which prefi xes were added 
pleonastically: the prefi x carried a similar meaning to the stem (e.g. “zjednoczyć”, 
“ogrodzić”). Consequently, it is not surprising that in numerous cases a given 
stem was perfectivized by several different prefi xes. The abundance of (appar-
ently) synonymous verbal forms contributed to the reduction of verbal polysemy, 
claims Janowska (2007a: 67–68).
One can assume, then, that it was – to some extent – a matter of chance which 
one of several prefi xes retained the purely perfectivizing role (while the remain-
ing derivatives were used to express some specifi c meanings). In such cases, there 
was no need for the perfectivizing prefi x to be semantically motivated: it was the 
one which was not employed for other purposes.
In the last section of her article Tabakowska points out some advantages of 
cognitive modelling. She claims that “an understanding of [extension mecha-
nisms] enables us to analyse a good numer of old (or lexicalized) derivatives 
whose earlier transparency has now been obscured through the process of gram-
maticalization” (2003: 174). For instance, the imperfective bić (“beat”) and the 
perfective zabić (“za-beat: to kill”), which are now classifi ed as separate lexemes, 
are clearly related (the construction with “za-” being motivated either by the no-
tion of “complete covering” or “going beyond”).
The historical material, however, does not confi rm the assumption that the 
construction of zabić was “transparent”, i.e. motivated by one of the senses as-
cribed to “za-”.27 In Old Polish, the sense “to kill” was expressed by several dif-
25 “Purely aspectual” does not mean “semantically empty” but “highly schematic”.
26 “We cannot say with any certainty if in Old Polish, for instance, the spatial meaning of ‘na-’ 
(‘on’) in the derivate ‘napisać’ (na-write) was still felt or not” (Janowska, Pastuchowa 2005: 238).
27 Cf. Janowska, Pastuchowa (2005: 178); Janowska (2007a: 110–111); Janowska (2007b: 118–
–119).
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ferent verbs, e.g. bić (“beat”), gładzić (“stroke”), gubić (“lose”), tłuc (“whack”), 
siec (“cut”). In such cases the basic sense referred to a type of activity, which was 
(metonymically) extended to cover its result (such a combination of senses is still 
present in the case of bić: 1. “beat”; 2. “kill” pigs). These verbs took on various 
prefi xes which apparently played only the aspectual function, e.g. wybić, ubić, 
zbić, dobić, zabić; pogubić, zgubić, zagubić etc. In the process of semantic spe-
cialization (reduction of polysemy) two prefi xes acquired the anihilative sense: 
“za-” – e.g. zadusić (“za-strangle”), zadźgać (“za-poke”), zastrzelić (“za-shoot”) 
and “u-” – e.g. ubić (“u-beat”), udusić (“u-strangle”), usiec (“u-cut”) – of which 
the former is still active. The case of zabić is thus analogous to zastąpić: the pre-
fi x took over the meaning conveyed by the stems and became productive in this 
sense.
Finally, Tabakowska’s reconstruction is based on contemporary data. As a re-
sult, it leaves out those semantic values which have gone extinct. In this context, 
the ablative sense28 of “za-” is of particular importance, since it is opposed to 
the adlative sense taken to be prototypical by Tabakowska.29 Thus, for instance, 
zabiec (“za-run”) could mean both to “run away” and to “run towards someone”. 
The historical material contains several examples of this kind. What is more, some 
other prefi xes also expressed both ablative and adlative senses (“po-” and to some 
extent “od-” and “z-”).30
It is possible, then, that historically the adlative schema for “za-” was not pro-
totypical. One can speculate that since the presence of widely divergent (or even 
opposed) senses conveyed by the same form was felt to be awkward and the abla-
tive constructions fell into disuse (in a historically opaque process), the adlative 
sense gained the upper hand and developed in various directions; cf. Janowska, 
Pastuchowa (2005: 180). 
3.4. A discussion
As Tabakowska wryly notes, za as a preposition is representative of “a category 
which has been most frequently, and most excessively, discussed within the frame-
work of cognitive linguistics” (Tabakowska 2003: 156). The analysis of over by 
Brugman/Lakoff can be seen as the best known example and the paradigm of 
28 TR moving away from LM (as opposed to approaching it in the adlative sense).
29 In her rejoinder, Tabakowska questions the view expressed by Janowska and Pastuchowa 
(2005: 174) that ablative uses of za- are unknown today. She claims that when one takes into account 
the vantage point and perspective, the phrase zabrać (coś komuś) (“za-take something somebody-
DAT”) still displays that sense (to appear: 7–8). One may raise the question, however, whether that 
sense is contributed by the verb or the prefi x.
30 Janowska, Pastuchowa (2005: 174, note 84).
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a popular genre, which is only fragmentarily documented in the present study.31 
The popularity may be attributed to the belief that prepositions – because of their 
basically “spatial” or “localist” semantics – provide an excellent testing ground 
for the cognitive postulate that language should be explained in reference to per-
ception, and specifi cally to “our intuitive understanding of space” (Tabakowska 
2003: 158). What is more, “because of their enormous semantic potential and 
wide syntactic distribution, these items make an ideal lexical class for postulating 
and testing theories of lexical representation and processing” (Rice 1996: 136).
I have left out of this presentation psychological issues of language processing, 
as they are secondary to my topic (even though they provide important empirical 
evidence concerning claims about “cognitive reality” of network models).32 It is 
safe to say, however, that evidence of this kind (coming from psychological test-
ing and computer modelling of spatial lexical categories) is, at best, inconclusive. 
Thus – as was my assumption throughout – the adequacy of such models should 
be judged primarily on the basis of linguistic criteria.
One should mention, however, two practical applications of network analy-
ses which are quite widely discussed and may prove to be of signifi cance in an 
overall assessment of this venture, namely in lexicography and foreign language 
teaching.33 As for the former, network format is employed by an Internet graphi-
cal dictionary (visuwords.com) and seems to be a potentially attractive alternative 
to standard dictionary entries, since it helps to visualize at a glance the overall 
structure of a lexeme and subsequently to explore internal relations step by step.34 
The pedagogical potential is perhaps best represented by a “textbook for guided 
self-learning” of phrasal verbs (Rudzka-Ostyn 2003), which gives an “insight into 
the networks of metaphorical meanings of each particle” (back-cover).
The pedagogical aspects are closely connected with the cross-linguistic per-
spective. I have already noted that in a range of its usage za may be an equivalent 
of over. For instance:
(19) a.  Sam drove  over  the mountain.
 b.  Sam pojechał za górę.
   Sam po-drove za mountain-ACC.
(20) a.  The bird fl ew  over the mountain.
 b.  Ptak przeleciał  nad górą.
   Bird  prze-fl ew  nad  mountain-INSTR.
31 See e.g. Taylor (1988); Pasich-Piasecka (1993); Kochańska (1996); Kalisz, Kubiński (1998); 
Cuyckens (1999); Tabakowska (1999). 
32 See e.g. Sandra, Rice (1995); Zlatev (1998, 2003).
33 In lexicography, see e.g. Geeraerts (1990, 2007); in pedagogy, see e.g. Kurtyka (2001); Queller 
(2001); Tyler, Evans (2004c).
34 Geeraerts describes a dictionary format based on the notion of alternate structuration of entries 
inspired by prototype semantics (1990).
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(21) a.  Sam lives  over  the mountain.
 b.  Sam mieszka  za  górą.
   Sam lives za  mountain-INSTR.
(22) a.  Sam lives  behind   the wall.
 b.  Sam mieszka za  ścianą.
   Sam lives za  wall-INSTR.
Even a cursory analysis reveals that Lakoff’s image-schematic model of over 
could be profi tably cross-checked against Polish usage. The comparison is not 
quite straightforward, however (as we have already seen in Tabakowska’s analy-
sis), because of the Polish verbal aspect in Past Tense – (19) b., (20) b. – and the 
case system. Still, as is shown by the difference in translation between (19) b. 
and (20) b., the vertical LM in the latter sentence is preceded by nad (“above”) 
and not za (since the path is profi led, rather than its end-point). The difference 
between (21) a. and (22) a. is not refl ected in the translation: za does not require 
the possibility of traversal (the reason over is not used), but merely the blocking 
of vision.35
Consequently, what Lakoff announces as a universalistic hypothesis about 
conceptual processes is in fact an ethnocentric description in a network format of 
some constraints on the use of a lexeme. This (foregone) conclusion suggests a re-
versal of perspective: rather than view a set of uses of a lexeme as symptomatic of 
independent “imagistic” processes (an approach based on the possibility of a con-
tinuous “imagistic” extension36), one should treat linguistic material (in a given 
language) as consonant with some pragmatic (i.e., at some level, also perceptual) 
motivations. Only cross-linguistic comparisons, and further empirical work, may 
justify universalistic claims.
As concerns Tabakowska’s analysis, it differs markedly from the models of 
over presented above not only because it is offered in the Langackerian format, 
but primarily because it is not programmatic: it is an attempt to represent a con-
ceptual unity of the whole range of linguistic material, as attested by dictionar-
ies.37 Moreover, this attempt goes back to and confi rms the results of an older 
structuralist analysis by Weinsberg, who pointed out two central senses of za, 
glossed as “curtain” and “passability”.38 The cognitive innovation is to actually 
35 To be sure, most if not all such relations can be construed differently when other prepositions 
are chosen in translation (as they well may be, since the meaning of original sentences can be inter-
preted in alternate ways).
36 The limitations of which and, ultimately, futility have been best demonstrated by Dewell’s 
valiant attempt (2.1.).
37 The case of (all) over – involving corpus research or at least actual usage – is a natural empiri-
cal continuation of this approach. As its partial character strongly suggests, it involves the risk of an 
exponential growth of “nodes”.
38 This historical continuity suggests that Vandeloise’s defence of an ideally unitary approach 
– against Lakoff’s “full specifi cation” approach (when one disregards the actual context of that de-
bate) – receives further validation.
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link various uses of za to those central senses, as their instantiations, and to show 
that they also apply in other morphosyntactic categories, i.e. the verbal prefi x and 
adverbial modifi er.39 Thus, Tabakowska’s analysis incontestably offers greater in-
sight into the structure of ZA and better shows a conceptual unity of this category 
than a structuralist account based on features. Additionally, this approach allows to 
represent with unprecedented clarity differences in conventional construal of con-
trastive cases (when za(-) is opposed to other prepositions or verbal prefi xes). What 
is perhaps most impressive is the author’s persistence to reveal a relatedness be-
tween the central senses and prima facie unconnected specimens of za, e.g. “wziąć 
za rękę” (“to take by the hand”) or “kupić za milion” (“to buy for a million”).
As I have tried to suggest,40 following some glimpses into the diachronic ma-
terial concerning za-, Tabakowska’s interpretations are sometimes congruent – at 
a more schematic level – with historical developments, while in other cases they 
provide competing accounts. How is one to decide whether a “hypothetical re-
construction [...] based – intuitively – on the attested regularity in category de-
velopment” (Tabakowska, to appear: 8) is more or rather less convincing than a 
hypothetical reconstruction based on fragmentary, largely contextless41 historical 
material? As in all such (hermeneutical, interpretative) cases, there is only one 
(not terribly helpful) answer: we should follow what helps us make better sense of 
our material. As soon as one notices that one’s data are always implicated in one’s 
theoretical assumptions,42 the problem shifts onto the level of the strengths and 
limitations of one’s framework, when confronted with alternative approaches.
As already noted, the hermeneutical perspective does not offer any help at this 
“objective” level. It is not a method, thus (ideally) it does not take sides in debates 
between methodologies. The evidence presented in 3.3. does not serve to prove 
that a diachronic approach is more powerful than a cognitive one in general (if 
such a comparison could make sense), or as a way to illuminate synchronically 
intuited relatedness of senses (our topic). Both approaches reveal something,43 
while diachronic observations are useful in the task of establishing the proper 
limits of CL (my declared task).
Throughout this study, I have been trying to show that CL, despite invocations 
to conceptual processes and structures moulding language, is essentially agenetic: 
39 However, the centrality of both senses does not seem suffi ciently transparent in the diagrams 
of both semantic networks. 
40 “Suggest” is the word: my aim was to show that from the diachronic perspective one can 
offer alternative explanations. To generalize, all evidence is sketchy and intuitive at some point. In 
hermeneutical (interpretative) ventures one cannot really prove the validity of one’s approach; one 
can only try to develop the best case.
41 Often, also co-text is missing: many specimens are gleaned from judicial records in Latin, 
containing single Polish expressions.
42 As evidenced – at the simplest level – by the choice of one’s data. More importantly, such 
choices are always guided by what one fi nds relevant: by the criteria of analysis presupposed in one’s 
approach.
43 And both have their limitations. I will repeat here yet again that limitations should not be 
viewed as negative: one can see something only because one adopts a specifi c vantage point.
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it does not take into account the genesis, development and actual use of language. 
Thus, its approach is static.44 As a result, CL can encompass – on a single plane 
of analysis – conceptual “motivations” underlying linguistic units and their re-
latedness. This is prima facie paradoxical, since “motivations” belong to genetic 
(dynamic, processual, diachronic) accounts, while “relatedness” is captured post 
factum (from a static, synchronic perspective). The paradox dissolves once we see 
that the relatedness in question refl ects not actual motivations at work (historical, 
situated, contextual), but “cognitive” ones, based on presumed mental powers and 
conceptual structures of a “generic” human being.
This interpretation is not meant to belittle CL’s achievements. Quite the op-
posite: within this basically asocial and agenetic paradigm, researchers have been 
able to show at a much greater detail than any alternative approach that “grammar 
is meaning”, that there are no “empty” forms, that everything in language is inter-
related and motivated (i.e. not arbitrary). My point concerns the status of “motiva-
tions” invoked in CL as a posteriori: as hysteron proteron explanations, reversing 
(or by-passing) the natural historical order of development. From this point of view, 
Tabakowska’s insightful analysis captures the results of a contingent and perhaps 
largely impenetrable historical process, in which forces of different kinds are in-
volved (as suggested in the diachronic section). The strength of this kind of analysis 
is a transparent presentation of the whole range of attested material as a possible 
instantiation and extension of two central senses. This is a real achievement: as an 
interpretation,45 it captures in the fullest form available present-day intuitions con-
cerning the relatedness of attested senses. The limitation is linked to the strength: 
a transparent presentation is possible because the messy background is largely lost 
from view. Specifi cally, the “motivations” invoked in the analysis – the possibility 
to imagine plausible scenarios linking apparently unrelated senses – rely on con-
temporary intuitions (they are to make sense to today’s language users).
Can one go any further within these limits? One does not know beforehand, 
but a possible avenue is suggested by the case of (all) over (it also seems implied 
by Tabakowska’s remarks concerning the “contribution” of various elements in 
a sentence). Since words form “idiomatic” (i.e. compositionally unpredictable) 
phrases, one could try to represent in the network not only intuitions concern-
ing single lexemes (as disentangled from larger wholes), but also intuitions con-
cerning higher-level units, exemplifying “recursive” processes. In this way, the 
interplay between form and meaning could be (to some extent) captured in the 
model.46
44 An insightful formulation of this charge may be found in: McNeill 2005. I will briefl y present 
his approach in 5.1.4.
45 All semantic analyses are “interpretations”. Network models “interpret” linguistic data (dic-
tionary senses or corpus specimens) as related – at some level of granularity, on the basis of some 
criteria – to central senses (distinguished in one way or another). All such interpretations may be 
contested and replaced by a “more transparent” account. 
46 A step in this direction is made by Kardela (1993) in his attempt to represent collocations 
within the framework of Langacker’s grammar.
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CHAPTER 4. COGNITIVE “DIACHRONY WITHIN 
      SYNCHRONY”?1
4.0. Introductory remarks
In the Introduction, I posed a basic question concerning network models: what 
phenomena (at what level of reality) are they models of? Do they represent psy-
chological reality (putative semantic structure stored in the mind, which underlies 
an actualization in the context), historical reality (a diachronic social process of 
meaning extension), or logical reality (relatedness of ideas)? Or some combina-
tion of these? The fi rst two options presuppose a developmental account of the 
relatedness in question.2 This assumption was famously rejected by Saussure in 
his attempt to establish linguistics as a discipline on solid foundations. I have al-
ready hinted at his view, when “the unity of the sign” was mentioned (1.0.). It is 
time to see in greater detail what his position involves and to what extent it shapes 
contemporary approaches to language.
4.1. Saussure: synchrony vs. diachrony 
What are the grounds for a linguist to focus on language as a state? First, since 
a succession of historical developments “does not exist insofar as the speaker is 
concerned”,3 a linguist “can enter the mind of speakers only by completely sup-
pressing the past” (Saussure 1959: 81). Saussure clearly assumes that the “reality” 
of language is in the present state of the mind of its speakers and that it must be 
1 The phrase was used as the title of a collection of papers on cognitive historical linguistics: 
Kellermann, Morrissey (1992).
2 One may postulate that the structure is there all along. This Platonic “solution” (ridiculed by 
Plato in Parmenides) underlies e.g. Chomsky’s “nativism”. In that way Chomsky limited the devel-
opmental problem to the issue of “activation” of particular cognitive structures, but he did not even 
try to work out what that issue involved, as manifested by his lack of interest in Piaget’s arguments 
during the famous Royaumont debate, cf. Piatelli-Palmarini (1995); Rosner (1995, 1996). Piaget saw 
clearly the danger of divorcing structures from their developmental background (1972: 175). Alter-
natively, one can assume that the structure is purely formal (as in logic) or conventional and arbitrary 
(Saussure), thus backgrounding the issue of genesis.
3 This statement is reminiscent of Bréal’s view quoted in 0.4.
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captured without reference to past states. He also argues that the opposition be-
tween the synchronic and the diachronic view “is absolute and allows no compro-
mise”, since individual changes become operative only when integrated into the 
system (p. 83). Second, the system of language is based on the synchronic notion 
of “value”, as illustrated by a comparison with chess:
Take a knight, for instance. By itself is it an element in the game? Certainly not, for by its 
material make-up – outside [...] the game – it means nothing to the player; it becomes a 
real, concrete element only when endowed with value and wedded to it. Suppose that the 
piece happens to be destroyed or lost during a game. Can it be replaced by an equivalent 
piece? Certainly. Not only another knight but even a fi gure shorn of any resemblance to a 
knight can be declared identical provided the same value is attributed to it. We see then that 
in semiological systems like language, where elements hold each other in equilibrium in 
accordance with fi xed rules, the notion of identity blends with that of value and vice versa. 
(Saussure 1959: 110)
This analogy shows that a material entity (a knight in chess or a phonic se-
quence in language) gets a specifi c meaning only in a fi eld of relations with other 
elements: there are no atomic meanings. Once it acquires its identity, the material 
shape is secondary – it can be replaced by something else – as long as the system 
remains operative.4 Thus, value and identity of elements are inextricably linked.
In this way we get to the notion of “the unity of the sign”. Let me quote once 
again the passage concerning the delimitation of units, this time in a more exten-
sive version:
Without language, thought is a vague, unchartered nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas, 
and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language [...]. The characteristic role of 
language with respect to thought is not to create a material phonic means for expressing 
ideas but to serve as a link between thought and sound, under conditions that of necessity 
bring about the reciprocal delimitations of units. Thought, chaotic by nature, has to become 
ordered in the process of its decomposition. Neither are thoughts given material form nor 
are sounds transformed into mental entities; the somewhat mysterious fact is rather that 
“thought-sound” implies division, and that language works out its units while taking shape 
between two shapeless masses. (Saussure 1959: 112)
Thus, language is “the domain of articulations” – each unit is an “articulus”, 
a member, a subdivision in a larger sequence (pp. 112–113). From this point of 
view, Saussure argues that the nature of material used for symbolizing is second-
ary (whether phonic or gestural, as in sign languages), since “what is natural to 
mankind is not oral speech, but the faculty of constructing a language, i.e. a sys-
tem of distinct signs corresponding to distinct ideas” (p. 10).
4 Presumably (as minimal requirements in the chess context), the new material entity must differ 
in form from other elements and the changes cannot be too numerous. If we apply this perspective 
to language, we can see that formal oppositions – crucial in a genetic context – lose some of their 
importance in further history, once they are integrated in the system. Thus, few formal prompts may 
go a long way in communication (as is evident in various real-life situations).
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Let us take stock of the argument so far. The claim that historical vagaries of 
a language (abundantly exemplifi ed by the author) do not exist for the speakers 
may mean this: language is operative, because each unit has a place in the system; 
previous states are different systems; mixing them up would cause chaos. Saus-
sure’s idea makes sense in the context of his chess analogy. If we change a single 
rule, however slight, we may get a very different game. Consider “off-side” in 
soccer: abolishing this rule could entirely change the strategy and the dynamics 
of a football game. More importantly though (and this is the main point), one can 
play a game only if all players abide by the same rules.
However, Saussure’s analogy between language and a game breaks down at 
two points. The more obvious one concerns the nature of both types of activ-
ity: games are competitive, while language is based on cooperation. One cannot 
compete without clear rules, while one can cooperate with very little agreement, 
or even without any agreement, as long as a given kind of behaviour is perceived 
by both sides as advantageous (Harris 1988: 119–120).5 The more far-reaching 
objection concerns the nature of rules: they are always embedded in the wider 
unarticulated background of the activity in question (Wittgenstein 2000: 20, cf. 
C. Taylor 1995: 165–180). From this fundamentally diachronic perspective, the 
system of rules is secondary to practice, of which it is a partial articulation. In 
the (clearly extreme) case of competitive games, one may think that rules are 
completely arbitrary. But they must have evolved to satisfy the underlying need 
“to have a good game” of sorts and this very need – in particular circumstances 
– underlies all attempts at a reform of rules.6
Thus, the chess analogy ultimately leaks (as is true of all analogies). It conveys 
the general idea that language is a system, in which everything hangs together.7 
And that its users have a sense of what the system allows. This sense – speakers’ 
intuitions about correctness and incorrectness of particular “moves” – is the actual 
object8 of the discipline as defended by Saussure: “Synchronic linguistics will be 
concerned with the logical and psychological relations that bind together coexist-
ing terms and form a system in the collective mind of speakers”. And as opposed 
to: “Diachronic linguistics [which] will study relations that bind together suc-
5 The notion of “cooperation without rules” is developed in game theory (“the prisoner’s di-
lemma” etc., cf. e.g. Becker 1986) and it is the founding insight of the idea of a “spontaneous order” 
(e.g. Hayek 1978). For this approach in diachronic linguistics, see Keller (1994).
6 As e.g, in volleyball: if one can win points only after one’s serve, while virtually all attacks 
are successful, then a game is stalled: sets may last forever. In itself, this makes the game attractive 
for viewers but in an era of TV transmissions it causes problems (many games change their rules to 
become “good games for television”).
7 Which is clearly overstated, when one bears in mind the extent of “redundancy” in language 
(e.g. most words do not really die out – they survive in odd phrases or may be revived for some rea-
son). Thus, a biological “organismic” analogy, suggesting continuous presence in some form of no 
longer functional structures, may serve as an antidote to the limitations of the “chess” analogy.
8 As tirelessly pointed out by Itkonen. Intersubjective intuitions (concerning what is perceived as 
socially acceptable) must be distinguished from individual introspections (which concern one’s inner 
psychological states), see. e.g. Itkonen (1981); cf. Sandra, Rice (1995).
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cessive terms not perceived by the collective mind but substituted for each other 
without forming a system” (1959: 99–100; emphasis in the original).
Saussure’s argument serves well to make tangible some crucial points about 
language. First, it is a social normative activity: one must normally follow “the 
way things are done”. In other words, language is fundamentally about success-
ful social coordination (in relation to some challenges, tasks etc., which must be 
taken into account at some point). Second, the material side of language refl ects 
systematic (ideal, conceptual) divisions, because it originally took part in their 
constitution.9 Thus, conceptual or articulated thought is not prior to language. 
Before language, thought, or some mental state, is a situational whole (“nebula”). 
Only when “decomposed” thanks to systematic “delimitations”, it gets articu-
lated. It acquires a (relatively) independent identity. At this stage one may talk 
of “pairings” between material and conceptual chunks (as in “nomenclaturism”), 
while primarily language is a structured system of differences.
In this way we get to the most diffi cult point: “in language there are only dif-
ferences without positive terms” (p. 120; emphasis in the original). The “pairings” 
specify “signifi cations”, i.e. concepts which may refer to something in the world. 
However, this most obvious function of linguistic units (“descriptive”, cf. Büh-
ler 1965) is founded on their more basic differentiation. They may get to mean 
something only when integrated with existing units as opposed to them in some 
respects within a system of such oppositions: “In language, as in any semiological 
system, whatever distinguishes one sign from others constitutes it” (p. 121). Con-
sequently, Saussure defi ned the “linguistic point of view” as an attempt to capture 
the system of oppositions which underlies but is not directly infl uenced by all uses 
and vagaries of a language. As pointed out by a commentator: “[the whole array of 
Saussurean concepts] has a common aim: to separate the linguistic point of view 
from any direct relationship with the ‘real’ world” (Normand 2004: 104).
Is such a program viable? It clearly divorces language as a synchronic system 
of oppositions which can be accessed only through intuitions of its users from the 
life (and history) of the community, which engages in linguistic activity. Thus, it 
proposes to treat the system of differences as separate from the activity of differ-
entiation, which underlies it. In other words, Saussure treats articulation formally 
as “delimitation” of units, which have a material and conceptual side; a linguist is 
not to be interested how concepts are related to reality, but only how they are re-
lated among themselves. For Saussure, linguistic articulation is a formal structu-
ration10 within the linguistic system rather than an articulation of ideas, which, in 
turn, articulate reality. However, formal “value” of linguistic “units” may be cap-
tured only because we understand ideas expressed in some referential situations 
9 Nevertheless, detecting the actual “units” of language is a diffi cult task, since they are subject 
to temporal contingencies, may be invisible, appear at various levels of complexity etc.
10 To repeat, “formal” refers both to sounds and concepts. Saussurean vision of language is “for-
malist” because it divorces the linguistic system from the task of expressing reality (cf. 5.2.).
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(not in some abstract realm of ideas11), and we can understand ideas because we 
live in a reality that makes some sense to us. Thus, in order to delimit the proper 
“object” of linguistics, Saussure divorces language from the forces which under-
lie its generation and the real-life background without which linguistic “value” 
cannot be assessed.12
Whatever one may think of Saussure’s agenda, it is an openly linguistic one 
and it is realized to some extent by all protagonists in my account, also generativ-
ists and cognitivists. The former take up the idea of an abstract system of opposi-
tions: a differential system of features is used to defi ne particular lexical units.13 
The latter, since they aim at “psychological reality” of some kind, push formal 
oppositions (and clear-cut boundaries) into the background, but they clearly show 
the necessary interconnectedness of concepts. Pace Taylor, CL is not obviously 
more Saussurean than TG, while Langacker’s theory is Saussurean not because it 
is “symbolic”,14 but because he shows that the generativist view of abstract atomic 
features as underlying linguistic concepts is simplistic: a concept – as a profi le 
against a base – is part of a system, in which everything is connected.15 Before we 
try to assess what kind of reality is captured in network models, let us inspect an 
attempt to overcome Saussure’s strictures on diachrony within synchrony.
4.2. Logical diachrony: the case of “length, width, and 
potential passing”
The analysis in question was undertaken by Vandeloise (1988) to show that an at-
tribution of the complementary pair of terms length and width to particular entities 
cannot be reduced to an abstract “objective” formula concerning their shape, since 
it crucially involves pragmatic factors (“potential passing”). Thus, it is primarily a 
conceptual study – a search for an adequate description of the conditions of use of 
11 There is no denying that our ideas may get very abstract. But they are generated and under-
stood only because they refer to something, some referential domain (e.g. complex numbers or the 
hierarchy of angels).
12 For instance, the functional opposition between bus and coach expresses a differentiation in 
actual practice (service within/between towns). When the practice is reshaped, the linguistic value of 
that pair may become “intuitively” inadequate. 
13 This is also true for Chomsky: syntactic units form a comparable differential system.
14 For Saussure the “pairings” are secondary: a result of a systematic differentiation of two 
spheres; “symbolic” in CL is nomenclaturism pure and simple.
15 There in no sense in “mentalistic” CL – the sense motivating Saussure’s conception – that the 
“conceptual system” is genetically anchored in the “system of linguistic units”. Quite the reverse, 
it is assumed that concepts are available prior to linguistic expression. Cf. 5.l. for evidence to the 
contrary.
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both terms – rather than a lexical one (aiming to represent a distribution of words 
in use, in some range of their senses).
Vandeloise begins with the pragmatically simplest situation: entities con-
ceived as truly linear have no width ascribed to them, while their length is evalua-
ted along their actual shape (e.g. a piece of string). The latter is also true for 
paths (e.g. roads), which, however, “have a width, evaluated along a direction 
perpendicular to their length” (p. 406).16 Let us call this formulation “Rule 1” 
(R1). At the next level of complexity, mobile entities (e.g. moving cars) have 
their length evaluated parallel to their direction of movement, and their width 
– perpendicular to it (R2). At the third level, that of immobile multidimensional 
entities, especially relatively symmetrical ones (e.g. a house or a table), the as-
sessment may depend on the vantage point of an observer.17 Their length/width 
is evaluated along a parallel/perpendicular direction to the general orientation 
of an observer (R3).18 The fi nal rule is independent of the former ones. It is used 
in geometry because of its objective character: it is independent of movement 
of the object and of the speaker’s position. According to this “metric” defi nition 
(R4), the “length/width of an entity is its greatest/smallest non-vertical extent” 
(p. 408).19
Vandeloise mentions two problems (“constraints”) with an application of the 
rules (pp. 409–410). First, some types of objects cannot have length. For instance, 
vertical objects whose height is the greatest dimension, e.g. doors or narrow win-
dows. In such cases, what would be normally called length is more naturally la-
belled height. Second, as concerns width, it can be always assessed provided the 
entity in question has a signifi cant extension along this dimension (this constraint 
holds true for all dimensions).
Subsequently, Vandeloise points out an apparent paradox: why is it that 
speakers believe that “length” and “width” are “monosemic”, while one needs 
four rules to describe their application? In order to solve the paradox, he in-
vokes the notion of “pragmatic bridges”, i.e. some facts concerning human 
functioning in the world which go “beyond simple formal similarity or direct 
proximity” (pp. 410–411). For instance, even though the statement “X is behind 
Y” may be used in reference to two different situations (1. X cannot be seen 
because it is behind an obstacle; 2. X cannot be seen because it is behind the 
observer), both uses are linked by X’s inaccessibility to perception (pragmatic 
bridge). The transition from R1 to R2 is explained by the fact that roads allow 
movement: the length of a road and a car moving along it is assessed along the 
16 I will not quote the author’s precise defi nitions in full.
17 Normally, a house is attributed intrinsic dimensions: width relates to its front, while depth to 
its internal extent (p. 426, note 6).
18 General orientation is also a complex notion (p. 427, note 7). Vandeloise will invoke it in his 
discussion of a pragmatic transition from R2 to R3 (p. 417).
19 Since real life is more complex than geometry, several dimensions may compete for an evalua-
tion of actual situations according to R4. In such cases, a choice must be made whether to follow 
R2 or R3 (p. 409). 
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same direction. The transition from R2 to R4 is explained by aerodynamic (i.e. 
objective) properties of moving entities: a moving object (evaluated according 
to R2) offers less resistance, if its objectively longer dimension (R4) is parallel 
to movement.
The bridge between R2 and R3 (i.e. between an evaluation of mobile objects 
on the one hand and immobile objects from an observer’s vantage point on the 
other) is the most complex one (pp. 412–418). Vandeloise begins his account by 
an attempt to explain why R1 applies to linear entities and paths and not to mul-
tidimensional objects. He points out that the latter can be scanned along several 
directions, while the linear objects only along their actual shape. Similarly, a road 
is naturally assessed along the direction of movement it affords. Nevertheless, 
Vandeloise rejects as inadequate the most straightforward pragmatic bridge be-
tween roads and linear objects: “while roads are paths imposed on mules and don-
keys, linear objects impose paths on the line of vision” (pp. 413–414). He notices 
that in functional contexts, e.g. when sewing, the thread may be assigned different 
lengths, because for some tasks a simple thread is used, while for others – a dou-
ble one. Consequently, “there is not a univocal relation between a multipurpose 
object and its length but rather there is a univocal relation between its length and 
its different functions” (pp. 414–415). This rule holds not only for actual but also 
for potential functions, when one assesses an entity which is not actually in use 
(or whose function is unknown).
In Vandeloise’s account, “function” of one kind or another is conceived as 
some actual, regular or (more generally) potential movement (i.e. a trajectory 
of a given kind). Thus, the bridge between R1 and R2 (the analogy between 
scanning and actual movement) can be expressed in a more generally pragmatic 
way than before: in both cases potential movement (as functionally required) is 
involved.20 In other words, potential passing as a criterion of evaluation of length 
/width subsumes both the perceptual and concrete functional explanations. This 
account has prepared the ground for the bridge from R2 to R3. Moving objects 
like cars actually pass the observer. When we deal with immobile objects like 
houses, their length is assessed relative to the observer’s potential movement 
(beside them rather than through them, as with paths; that is why “general ori-
entation” is important). In this way R3 is shown to subsume R1 and R2 (all are 
covered by the criterion of potential passing). Vandeloise concludes: “Synchron-
ically, this complex network of relationships [i.e. rules and pragmatic bridges] 
is fairly representative of what speakers feel length/width have in common” (p. 
418, emphasis mine).
20 This explanation allows to conceive of “width” not merely as “perpendicular” to movement, 
but as “proportional to the easiness of the passing” (p. 415). To repeat, both “scanning” (R1) and 
“movement along a path” (R2) remain valid explanations but they are generalized – taken to repre-
sent pragmatically motivated potential movement.
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Vandeloise speculates that, from the diachronic perspective, there must have 
been the “fi rst access to the semantic pole of a word, [involving] a simple portion 
of this network”. That portion the author dubs “historical impulsion” of a lexical 
category. He points out that in the case of many words “impulsions lose their 
prominence”, being then “of little interest for a general theory of the lexicon”. 
However, in other cases some constraints on their present usage may be treated as 
“traces of their evolution”. Specifi cally, there is a node in the network (labelled 
“logical impulsion”) “such that synchronic evidence shows that a development 
from this node to the other nodes of the network is more likely than other devel-
opments”. On the methodological level, “developmental approach must explain, 
as far as possible, some seemingly arbitrary aspects of the distribution of spatial 
terms [the author’s fi eld of investigation] and most notably their selection restric-
tions” (p. 418).
I will not recount here Vandeloise’s speculative ideas concerning the logical 
order of development (or “logical diachrony”) of his “complex category” (pp. 
418–424). Of interest in the present context are his remarks concerning the dis-
crepancy between logical diachrony – which aims to describe “the systematic 
evolution of the distribution of words” (p. 425, emphasis in the original) – and 
actual diachrony (or history). He invokes the homonymous French adjective large 
(“wide”), which also means “generous” (lat. latus and largus, respectively), and 
points out that if one overlooks etymological information as well as some syn-
chronic clues formally differentiating both senses, one could relate them to the 
same (logical) impulsion “and... succeed!”.21 Thus, logical diachrony merely pre-
dicts that the extension from large as “wide” to large as “generous” is likely and 
could actually occur in other languages. To make things more complex, however 
(as Vandeloise adds), in French the perceived relation of both senses may have 
infl uenced a phonological fusion of forms.
Vandeloise’s paper is not only a tour de force in its own right but also a most 
illuminating contribution to the task at hand, i.e. to an assessment of the status 
of network models. Actually, Vandeloise also takes his exposition to be an argu-
ment for a specifi c interpretation of “complex networks”, but, I believe, for the 
wrong reasons.22 Crucially, his own analysis of “length/width” does not aim at 
a representation of a lexical category (as it happens, a monocentric one), i.e. of 
a particular distribution of lexical items in use. “Length/width” in his analysis 
are related not to a range of actual senses of both items23 but to the conditions of 
21 As he comically confabulates: “a wide table bears more food than a narrow one; generous 
men in paintings always have un large sourire and open their arms largement on a huge belly” (pp. 
424–425). As already noticed, “folk etymologies” testify to the fact that confabulation is an effective 
force in history.
22 Probably because he accepted at face value Langacker’s rhetoric about a possibility of a uni-
tary schema for a complex category and interpreted such a schema as a defi nition of a kind. As we 
shall see below, Vandeloise’s notion of “complex category” is different from Langacker’s.
23 This range is quite homogeneous (LENGTH/WIDTH are “monocentric” rather than “poly-
centric” categories). Still, one can fi nd phrases – e.g. “to speak at length”: (1) for a long time; (2) after 
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use of both concepts in various situations. He is concerned to fi nd out why peo-
ple conceptualize a set of different entities in some of their dimensions as either 
LONG or WIDE. His aim is to connect various referential applications of both 
concepts (and not just words; it does not matter whether LENGTH is expressed 
by length, long, lengthen, lengthwise24). To repeat his conclusion: “this complex 
network of relationships [of rules and pragmatic bridges between them] is fairly 
representative of what speakers feel length/width have in common” (p. 418). In 
short, Vandeloise asks25 what LENGTH/WIDTH really mean when invoked in 
discourse.
One cannot ask, however, what KEY (a complex lexical category) really 
means, as it comprises entities of different kind. The question to be asked is about 
the relatedness of those entities. In order to begin answering it, one must have 
some idea how to identify the entities in question (the “level of granularity” issue) 
and which entity/ies should have priority in the order of explanation (the issue of 
“central” or “prototypical” sense/s).
As for the latter issue, Vandeloise offers “logical impulsion”, i.e. “such [a node] 
that synchronic evidence shows that a development from this node to the other 
nodes of the network is more likely than other developments”. It is important to 
realize what kind of venture Vandeloise has in mind. Its point of departure is the 
presence of “some vestiges [...] of [a category’s] evolution”, i.e. things which 
seem problematic or arbitrary in present usage (“seemingly arbitrary aspects of 
the distribution of spatial terms and most notably their selection restrictions”). 
The “logical” approach seeks to explain synchronic arbitrariness by suggesting a 
putative developmental sequence, and the “logical impulsion” is proposed as its 
most likely starting point (p. 418).
As we have seen, “logical” is equivalent to “systematic” and offered as an 
alternative to “historical” explanations. Vandeloise suggests to proceeds from R1. 
This starting point is openly opposed to R4 which is normally offered as a general 
defi nition of the category, because R4 is divorced from reality. For instance, it 
does not take into account the fact that linear objects are normally not attributed 
“width”; or that the length26 of a solid object – a modern building’s facade – would 
be assessed as a straight line, even if the facade in question consisted of many 
a pause – in which other senses may appear. In short, Vandeloise aims to show pragmatic “unity” of 
a homogeneous conceptual category, while the point of network models is to represent conceptual 
“relatedness” of a widely heterogeneous (polycentric) lexical category.
24 I do not know whether the verb and the adverb could actually appear in all relevant contexts 
and whether they follow all rules mentioned. I aim to show that Vandeloise offers a conceptual analy-
sis of a unique kind. In linguistics, the aim is normally to relate some actual distribution to a given 
unit. In the more usual semasiological approach, one relates a lexical unit to a range of its senses; in 
the onomasiological approach, one relates a conceptual unit to a range of its lexical articulations.
25 An analogy to this venture is provided by Socrates asking about the “defi nition” of justice, or 
its “true meaning”. For Vandeloise (as different from Socrates), the “true meaning” of a concept is 
what pragmatically unites its different referential applications.
26 Or width, if its dimensions are taken to be intrinsic (e.g. a house).
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indented facets;27 or that a particularly wide vehicle could actually have a shorter 
length than width. From the vantage point of R4 such facts would be arbitrary.28
Thus, when we have a complex of referential uses (the distribution of LENGTH/
WIDTH ), one of them – the case of linear objects and paths – seems best suited 
for the role of “logical impulsion”, because a visual following of a linear curved 
object (scanning) or an actual following of a path seems the only sensible way to 
assess the length of such entities. To be sure, R4 also “imposes” itself in the case 
of unsymmetrical rectangles, but it cannot be applied to clearly related objects, 
e.g. triangles – where “width” is opposed to “height” – nor probably to most poly-
gons. R4 may be discounted as the candidate for “logical impulsion” because it is 
static and best suited to a narrow range of abstract shapes; it obviously cannot deal 
with actual usage (as we have seen in the previous paragraph). It is the dynamic 
character of R1 – manifested also in the case of static objects – which makes it 
perhaps the best candidate for that role.
What actually concerns us, however, is the applicability of “logical impulsion” 
to the problems underlying network modelling. Vandeloise introduces this notion 
to account developmentally (via pragmatic bridges) for what may seem arbitrary 
in various referential uses from the objective perspective. Language users do not 
see problems of that kind: they apply both words intuitively as “monosemic” (p. 
410). Vandeloise notices a paradox, however, since an application to different 
entities is based on four different rules. In order to solve it, he proposes a “com-
plex network” of pragmatic bridges as “fairly representative of what speakers feel 
length/width have in common” (p. 418).
This is a curious argument. In standard terms, length/width are monosemic. 
They are not like “a key in the lock vs. the key to the future”. Outside the domain 
of prototype semantics, problems with referential application (e.g. die, lie, bach-
elor, mother etc.) are not normally taken to infl uence the monosemic status of a 
word, as most forcefully stated by Wierzbicka (1990b) (cf. Antas 2000: 157ff.). 
One may not know whether the pope can be called a “bachelor” (and hedge this 
use with “technically”) but this does not make bachelor a polysemic word – mere-
ly a referentially vague one.29 Generally speaking, people do not need a defi ni-
27 This is a real problem when measuring the circumference of a bounded region. Depending on 
the scale of measurement (centimetres, metres, kilometres), “straight lines” underlying the measure-
ment of length look very different. As a result, the circumference in centimetres of e.g. Poland would 
be several times greater than when measured in kilometres (even if in “objective” calculations they 
are equivalent).
28 Generally speaking, since “objectivist” treatments often refl ect a rationalistic, “emancipatory” 
attitude, one could imagine that the common way of assessing length in the case of the wide vehicle 
would be branded as reactionary or that a reform of “unenlightened” usage in such cases would be 
proposed. One could easily cite real life examples from other domains. On the subject of “measures 
and life”, see Kula (2004).
29 This is true of all words, as demonstrated by Labov’s experiments with “cups” and “vases” 
(cf. 0.2.).
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tion30 to use a word. They feel a word has one meaning as long as they cannot 
meaningfully oppose it to another one, e.g. bachelor as “a young unmated male 
of some species”. That is why a “complex network” of pragmatic bridges does 
not solve any actual paradox. A monosemic word (i.e. a concept) like length is a 
pragmatic perspective on reality which provides a set of related answers, depend-
ing on the circumstances of application (cf. McLure 1990). In history, this concept 
does not change its identity (i.e. it is not transformed into another one) but rather 
develops in a set of oppositions to (most obviously) “width”, but also “height”, 
“breadth” and other notions, against which it helps to articulate unprecedented 
circumstances.
From this (hermeneutical) point of view, “logical impulsion” cannot be primary, 
as it does not involve a meaningful opposition (there is no opposition between 
“length” and “width” in the case of linear objects and in the case of paths the role of 
“width” is purely nominal31). Consequently, Vandeloise’s assumption that “logical 
impulsion” could be the same as “historical impulsion”,32 if it were not for historical 
contingencies, is wrong. The same goes for his claim that in language acquisition 
the child fi rst gets access to “a simple portion of this network” (p. 418).33 What is the 
role of “logical impulsion”, then? It is a brilliant methodological device: it serves as 
the most primitive pragmatic perspective on a concept’s application, which allows 
extension to pragmatically less clear-cut situations.34 As such, it helps to reveal the 
pragmatic unity of a concept’s range of application. This result is real and precious, 
as it shows that people probe reality applying and, in consequence, developing con-
cepts at their disposal (it does not show how it happens, though). 
When one turns from monosemic words (i.e. concepts, monocentric catego-
ries) to polysemic words (complex, polycentric categories) that pragmatic de-
scription of conceptual development is deeply suggestive and provides a crucial 
point of departure. A monosemic word is a set of pragmatically consistent “takes” 
on different states of affairs, revealing reality as something or such-and-such. Fol-
lowing Vandeloise’s insights, one may speculate that the opposition “long/wide” 
(assuming that nouns are derivative) relates primarily to features open to access or 
allowing access on the one hand, and limiting access or hidden on the other. One 
30 As shown by Vandeloise’s attempt, providing a defi nition covering all referential uses of a 
concept is obviously a vertiginous task. Since language users apply concepts on-line in unprece-
dented circumstances, it seems safe to assume they do not rely on rules and pragmatic bridges (a 
“psychologist’s” or a “linguist’s” fallacy).
31 It gets some pragmatic sense in Vandeloise’s reinterpretation as “proportional to the easiness 
of the passing” (p. 415).
32 “In a systematically evolving language, logical impulsions should parallel historical impul-
sions” (p. 418).
33 In the present case, the child should learn to use the concept LENGTH for linear objects. As I 
have tried to show after Vygotsky (1.2.2.), the child – to understand the concept in some vague sense 
– would fi rst have to reduce the initial overgeneralization in the syncretic stage.
34 R1 is clearly more pragmatically primitive than R4, as it relies only on scanning as opposed 
to physical measurements. I did not recount Vandeloise’s argument concerning R2 and R3 as too 
complex.
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can imagine walking in a tunnel with extended arms as an approximation of this 
stance: one fathoms “length” while moving forward, and “width” is what blocks 
or limits the passage (it is “proportional to easiness of the passage” in Vande-
loise’s formulation). When this stance towards reality is applied to linear objects 
– e.g. threads – the proper opposition to “length” (the dimension which allows to 
do the work at hand) is “thickness” (grubość in Polish), which offers resistance. 
When one observes a moving object, its “length” is normally its side, and “width” 
its front, refl ecting one’s point of access to such objects. With stationary objects, 
the access is by walking past them. The metric defi nition is a de-humanized or 
purely “objective” version of this stance: the accessive dimension is reduced to 
greater size. Since the observer is removed from the picture, we can see now why 
so much in actual usage seems arbitrary, when viewed in metric terms.
A polysemic word is a set of formally and genetically related “takes” on a va-
riety of situations, which are not felt to be pragmatically unifi ed. A given stance is 
(partially) applied to a pragmatically different domain to take hold of something 
felt to be related. When key (“in the lock”) is used to bring to mind “something 
providing access”, the referential situation importantly changes. One no longer 
invokes a tool adapted to a particular social role, but – fi rst – another tool used in a 
different role, which is felt to be functionally related (i.e. inviting a similar stance). 
A cluster of this kind invites a generalized use: “whatever helps one get there”; and 
as adjective: “the feature without which the job cannot be done”. Such general ide-
as may be “reached” from various directions, while words carrying such abstract 
senses retain their history of usage.35 To sum up, the use of a word to articulate a 
different situation is crucial in the process of transforming its identity: when mean-
ingfully placed in an unusual context, it contracts relationships with words which 
have articulated the new domain so far. At the same time, the impulse to generalize, 
abstract, express analogies and connections at a higher conceptual level is evident 
in all domains.36 The Saussurean system of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations 
develops pari passu with conceptual domestication of reality.
Does Vandeloise’s account escape Saussurean strictures against “diachrony 
within synchrony”? Is the ban on mixing synchrony and diachrony justifi ed? As for 
the latter question, I have mentioned two reasons for the ban. First, history does 
not exist for contemporary speakers, while the linguist’s task is to capture their 
intuitions. Second, the intuitions concern the system of linguistic units, in which 
everything hangs together (linguistic “value” of units). There is no question that 
one may have wrong intuitions about past uses.37 However, this is not primarily 
35 As investigated by the “onomasiological” approach: how a given concept (conceptual domain) 
is articulated lexically. It is worth pointing out that a particular historical path of development may 
always turn out to be relevant in use: at the general level, several words may mean “the same” thing 
(e.g. adj. key, crucial, critical, cardinal, decisive, pivotal), while in more specifi c applications their 
etymology may play a role. 
36 As noticed by Geeraerts in his appraisal of the defi nitional test of polysemy (0.4.).
37 This is clearly a crucial problem in diachronic linguistics. Not just because available mate-
rial is fragmentary and without signifi cant context, but primarily because a modern reader applies 
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because the present linguistic “system” is different. As we have seen, linguistic 
“value” is a methodological artefact. The meaning of words is not independent of 
reality, but rather intertwined with it in complex ways. Consequently, our intuitive 
access to the past (or possible future) is diffi cult mainly because present reality 
(co-founded by language) does not provide adequate clues to capture distant intui-
tions. Queen Victoria, perhaps, could hardly understand the present meaning of 
“cool!”, since an explanation would require a possibly impenetrable account of 
modern culture. The same goes for our attempts to understand e.g. the meaning 
of “nationality” in Middle Ages, or “freedom” in Ancient Greece. However, there 
is nothing in principle that we could not understand, if we were suffi ciently open 
and inquisitive. As long as the human condition is common to human beings (in 
the Gadamerian sense: as long as we participate in the historically constituted 
horizon of humanity), all of its manifestations (however intricate, abstruse or re-
volting) are – in principle – accessible.
Saussure’s ban is methodologically correct: if we want to describe the contem-
porary system of units, we must rely on present intuitions (there is no other access 
possible). However, as shown by Vandeloise, intuitions concerning the meaning 
of concepts (monosemic words) refl ect basic pragmatic stances – impulsions. 
They are consistent ways of “questioning” reality, which historically “reveal” it as 
such-and-such, thanks to a number of oppositions (one can know what LENGTH 
is only in relation to WIDTH, BREADTH, HEIGTH, THICKNESS etc.). Thus, 
one can show that some present state refl ects or encompasses a pragmatically 
complex set of diachronic answers. If my critique is right, Vandeloise does not 
offer a true historical account (nor even a chance for one), but he shows in a mas-
terly way that the conceptual present is a “summation” of pragmatic history.38
4.3. The status of network models
We can see now that my original set of questions concerning the status of net-
work models was not really adequate – it served as a fi rst approximation, without 
modern intuitions in interpretation. One obviously needs an extensive contact not just with the texts 
but also with the reality of a previous epoch to develop a feel for it (to fuse one’s “horizon” with a 
historical one, in Gadamerian terms). 
38 This view (at one level) seems to be consonant with Łozowski’s proposal to replace the oppo-
sition “synchrony” – “diachrony” (based on the idea that language is “a linear succession of discrete 
languages states”) with the notion of cognitive “panchrony”, conceived as “multi-directional pro-
gression of non-discrete categorization processes in language” (Łozowski 1999: 33–34). However, 
Łozowski’s focus on categorization processes in language is not further elaborated and “panchrony” 
is a misnomer, since the notion normally refers to “relations that are everywhere and forever verifi -
able” (Saussure 1959: 95).
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insight into the complexity of the situation.39 Initially, one could think that differ-
ent kinds of reality are linked to different temporal dimensions: a psychological 
present (synchrony), a social history (diachrony), the logical eternity (panchrony). 
I also suggested a need for a developmental account, since sense relationships 
must have been constituted in history. After Saussure’s demonstration that the 
synchronic and diachronic approach have different “objects” (systematic “intui-
tions” of language users as opposed to speculations concerning potential links 
between separate systems) and after Vandeloise’s analysis of a pragmatic consti-
tution of a logical category or a set of concepts, we can try to represent the situa-
tion in a more adequate way.
When one aims to model semantic structures (whether psychological, or social, 
or logical), one works on the basis of contemporary intuitions. Any such model 
will refl ect our present grasp of semantic relations: either in an active mind solving 
some problems, or in the intersubjective domain – the common world of a lin-
guistic community40 – or in an abstract conceptual system. Consequently, follow-
ing Saussure’s position, network models should represent contemporary intuitions 
concerning the relatedness of lexically available senses. To be sure, one could try 
to see how such a system “works” in individual minds (psychology) or whether it 
can be formalized (logic), but the point of network models is to show in a transpar-
ent way what is socially available – what the linguistic system offers its users.41 
From this perspective, it is imperative to distinguish “attested senses” from nonce 
uses or contextual construals (or social langue from individual parole).
The CL characterization of the difference between both levels in terms of 
“cognitive salience”, “entrenchment” or “sanction” is inadequate. The terms are 
not interchangeable, while the last one seems more relevant. Individual “cogni-
tive salience” or “entrenchment” do not count for much in intersubjective spaces: 
one must be able to rely on some senses as available to the other party. “Sanc-
tion” sounds closer to the mark; still, it is not enough that some meanings serve 
as schemas for elaborations or as points of departure for extensions (Langacker’s 
account). Attested senses actually give structure to our common world and to 
discourse.42 Langacker’s format seems designed for an abstract conceptual space, 
divorced from any role in structuring reality.
39 I simply enumerated the most obvious options: CL openly aims to capture “psychological 
reality”; commonsensical view of polysemy presupposes “diachronic” social developments; actual 
models of lexemes clearly represent the relatedness of concepts.
40 Or Saussure’s “social mind”. Cognitivists normally fi nd such holistic notions unacceptable as 
“metaphysical” (cf. Talmy 1995). Of course, “social mind” is a metaphor but it rightly suggests that 
a linguistic community relies on an intersubjectively available semantic system (which cognitivists 
try to reconstruct atomistically, on the level of individual minds).
41 Historical uses can be integrated into such models – e.g. kluka, kluczka in Tabakowska’s mod-
el of KLUCZ/KEY (1995: 51) – since one can try to “revitalize” any words (i.e. to connect them 
conceptually to “live” senses). To be “socially available”, however, they must be felt to structure 
reality.
42 These roles are described by Zlatev (2003) and McNeill (2005). I will present their views in 
“The hermeneutical coda” (5.).
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Following Saussure’s account, one must ask, however, whether language us-
ers have intuitions concerning the relatedness of senses. Since they use language, 
they know what words mean in a context; they will also say whether creative 
uses make sense to them. They cannot normally provide “defi nitions”, except for 
rudimentary statements concerning the “type” or “function” of an entity (“it is a 
kind of...”, “it is for...”). They will say that two uses are different when they bring 
to mind suffi ciently distant or distinct situations. To recall the example quoted in 
0.4., the verb tease has four sub-entries in a dictionary: “(1) To laugh at someone 
and make jokes in order to have fun by embarrassing them; (2) To deliberately an-
noy an animal; (3) To deliberately make someone sexually excited without intend-
ing to have sex with them; (4) (AmE) To comb your hair in the opposite direction 
to which it grows, so that it looks thicker”. The last sense is clearly distinct and 
highly specifi c. Sense (2) could seem – in general – not distinct from (1), if one 
did not know that “teasing” animals takes quite specifi c forms (e.g. with a stick), 
which normally have nothing to do with (1).43 Sense (3) seems least distinct to a 
Polish speaker, possibly because this “situation type” – even if equally common 
– is not elaborated on in the intersubjective sphere (while in English there are 
related expressions, e.g. striptease). It seems, then, that two uses are suffi ciently 
distinct when they are felt to structure differently some domains in a socially 
available way. The example of “calendar month” and “four week month” – ac-
cording to Croft and Cruse, possibly two closest ambiguous senses (0.4.) – seems 
to confi rm this formulation: they provide two different “recipes” (or structura-
tions) for social activity.
Consequently, the transfer of a sense to a different objective “domain” is not 
enough to get a distinct one, e.g. one can “play” with a child or with a dog; one 
can “tease” a child and a dog in sense (1). “Teasing” in sense (2) refers to a 
different kind of activity (which may be also applied to interpersonal relations) 
rather than to a different objective domain. Crucially, this type (tease2) is not just 
“conceived” as a possibility – it is actually “perceived” as a socially recognized 
situation. Once we accept this, we can easily discount putative cases of “polyse-
my”, like eating “with a spoon, fork, chopsticks etc.”, since they all refer to one 
kind of activity (performed with different tools). This case is better described as 
“generality” of words, when their senses do not bring to mind some referential 
distinctions, which can be signalled by other means. For instance, a house win-
dow may be contextually specifi ed to mean the “glass” or “frame” or “opening” 
in the wall. This is a single general sense (with different “active zones”), not a 
“natural category of senses”. Metaphorical uses – as long as they do not change 
the basic situational structure (e.g. for eat: an X “consumes” a Y) – do not change 
the sense (they are rather instantiations than extensions). But this structure – un-
derlying an application in a new domain – may in time give way to a more direct 
re-description. For instance, “Rust is eating away the garden gate” has the sense 
43 The difference is lexicalized in Polish: przekomarzać się (“tease1”) as opposed to drażnić 
(“tease2”), which suggests “courting danger”. 
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of “erosion” (marked lexically by the particle). Such “dead metaphors” (like adj. 
key, crucial, critical etc. mentioned before) are felt to have a distinct sense, while 
the etymological relationship may always be brought to attention.44 To conclude, 
a distinct sense brings to mind a different situation type because it has helped to 
structure it. Situation type is the third element or rather the basis on which the 
Saussurean articulation is founded.
When we return now to the relatedness of distinct senses, we can see, per-
haps, why the entries for tease are ordered in the way proposed: sense (4) – apart 
from the fact that it is a regional variety – is most strongly embedded in a highly 
specifi ed situation type; sense (3) – less so, and so on. One can imagine, perhaps, 
societies in which (2) would be more popular45 than (1) – in such a case, it could 
serve as the “default” use out of context. On this basis, one can speculate that the 
intuitive relatedness of senses is linked to the intuitive order of situation types, or 
their social salience. Can one postulate anything more specifi c? As we have seen, 
Vandeloise’s analysis reveals a pragmatic unity of various referential applications 
of a single sense. He was able to show the pragmatic logic of this referential 
system of uses. However, his account is clearly not diachronic – it is a pragmatic 
“summation” of historical vagaries.
When we turn from “monocentric” to “polycentric” categories, the “summa-
tion” in question must be of a different kind. The subject is no longer a set of 
related answers to a pragmatically unifi ed enquiry, a conceptual “probing” of 
reality (e.g. what is the dimension providing best access to various entities?). 
Polycentric categories are centrifugal, they are about a conceptual domestication 
of reality. One is no longer concerned with how to referentially apply an already 
tangible concept (tangible in a range of its applications), but rather how to “cap-
ture” – make manifest to others, communicate – entities not yet articulated in a 
language (or articulated in inadequate ways from one’s perspective). The issue in 
not about applying a concept but about manifesting one’s perspective on (some 
aspect of) reality to others.
The problems posed by polycentric categories are thus more fundamental, 
since language is primarily about communal sharing of perspectives on various 
aspects of reality, or the social structuration of reality (this is also what linguistic 
intuition is about). Clearly, establishing a perspective on reality is chronologically 
prior to its application. How can one fi x and communicate an individual point of 
view? How can one establish a communal one? These questions were not raised 
in Vandeloise’s account but, at this fundamental level, one can only gesture at 
answers.
44 Such “sleeping” metaphors can be “awakened”, in Müller’s formulation (2008).
45 It may seem that frequency of occurrence normally correlates with social salience. One can 
imagine, however, that tease3 is statistically the most popular activity of all four, while not being 
salient because of some social prohibitions. Tease4, even if generally performed on a daily basis, 
would be always less socially salient that (1)–(3) because of its relatively minor social status (as long 
as one’s hair-do is perceived as less important than one’s attitude to people or animals).
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In the present context one can say, in general, that this social, historical proc-
ess of establishing common perspectives involves extended uses of words, which 
tend to cluster around referentially salient specimens. Astronomical star and ce-
lebrity star – since both are currently salient – provide good reference points for 
related uses. The extension from the astronomical to celebrity sense is normally 
classifi ed as a metaphor and explained as an analogical use, e.g. “as a star catches 
one’s attention in the sky, so an actor catches the attention of the public”. This 
explanation is a hysteron proteron one: it is based on our present intuitions, partly 
shaped by the existence of the sense in question. When pressed, we could imagine 
a number of different scenarios underlying this extension. What is more, since a 
lexeme normally carries many senses, several of them can usually serve as a point 
of departure for a given extension. Additionally, idiosyncratic extensions (refl ect-
ing particular circumstances of use, rather than socially recognized functional and 
structural similarities) sometimes “make it” into general use. Historical vagaries 
cannot be really “explained”, as they often exemplify situational serendipity or 
groping in the dark or confabulation. Thus, diachronic evidence rarely (if at all46) 
provides a clear-cut or unique “motivation” in single cases. What it does offer 
is some sense of the complexity of the process – involving an interplay of form, 
content and background – as well as some “patterns” of development.
More specifi cally, when one views a perspicuous representation of a complex 
category – e.g. KLUCZ/KEY (Tabakowska 1995: 51; cf. 1.2.2.) – one notices 
that the contemporary central sense took over this role at some point in history. 
There are two earlier clusters: UNPREDICTABLE MOVEMENT, as exempli-
fi ed by kluczenie (“disguising one’s tracks”, “moving in circles”) and CURVED 
OBJECT, as exemplifi ed by kluka (“a curved rod”). Both are linked by the idea 
of “curvature”, which brings to mind unpredictability or devious behaviour, as 
exemplifi ed in an etymological dictionary (Brückner’s Dictionary). With the pas-
sage of time, a range of items expressing “deviousness” and “curvature” fell into 
abeyance, and the idea of “providing access” took central stage.47 We can see 
more clearly now that Langacker illegitimately fuses the diachronic and syn-
chronic perspectives when he suggests that the category prototype “is signifi cant 
because of its developmental priority and notable cognitive salience” (1987: 380; 
my emphasis). The latter criterion refl ects the present social status of KEY; this 
prototypical sense is not necessarily prior in social history and need not be prior 
in language acquisition; e.g. in a rural area, where houses are not locked, a child 
could learn fi rst the phrase klucz gęsi (“a wedge of geese”). 
Since the developmental history of a complex category is hidden from view 
of language users (and, as a rule, not completely transparent even to experts), the 
intuitive relatedness of senses apparently refl ects social salience of situation types 
46 To repeat, this is true generally. Any interpretation is situated and contingent.
47 It seems that other lexical items “took over” some senses expressed by this category, e.g. one 
of the senses of kluczka is expressed by contemporary mieć haka na kogoś (“to have a hook against 
sb”, cf. Brückner’s Dictionary). To be sure, “deviousness” is still present in some uses.
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co-structured by a given lexeme. As the example of tease suggests, however, it is 
much easier to point out local senses – structuring narrowly defi ned or marginal 
situations – than to offer a convincing argument for one central sense among a 
number of candidates, or for a hierarchy of extensions. From this vantage point 
it is easier to understand the futility of attempts to justify on some theoretical 
grounds the priority of one sense of over or to distinguish “in a principled way” a 
set of distinct senses. The senses are distinguished intuitively, on the basis of our 
everyday orientation in situation types.
If my account is correct, then prepositions – contrary to the view expressed by 
some cognitive linguists – do not offer the best testing ground for polysemy. Since 
they express relations rather then entities, their meaning is less tangible out of co-
text and context. One must place them in phrases or imagine situation types they 
help to structure before one can ascribe some meaning to them. Hypothetically, 
if one asked respondents for the central sense of za out of context, it is likely that 
“behind” would be mentioned fi rst, since it is opposed to przed (“in front of”). 
However, if one asked about the meaning of za in the phrase za pięć dwunasta 
(“za fi ve (to) twelve”), one could get the answer przed – since the point of time 
mentioned is in front of the full hour (as opposed to po – “past”) – or perhaps do 
(“up to”), when the passage of time is placed in focus. This instability of intuitions 
seems linked to the dependent status of prepositions.
Can one tutor intuitions? It seems to me that the models of prepositions which 
aim to capture the relatedness of attested senses are precisely such attempts to 
extend one’s intuitions by focusing one’s attention on links between senses. They 
are acts of imagination, retracing potential steps from “more central” to “less 
central” senses. Thus, by analogy, if we take a sequence of adjectival phrases (ad-
jectives are also relational words): “white wall”, “white wine”, “white marriage”, 
we would probably feel that the colour motivates the label for “transparent” wines 
(centrally opposed to “non-transparent” or red ones) and the label for sexually 
“pure” marriages. The actual motivations are, however, contingent on historical 
circumstances. As for the order of extensions, the “ecological” factors mentioned 
by Wierzbicka (0.2.) seem to be relevant: some experiences are so widespread 
and elementary in human life, that they are normally taken as primary (this fact 
does not remove contingency: the study of colour terms reveals that some striking 
motives – i.e. focal colours – are not taken up by all human tribes). To conclude, 
prepositional network models are interpretative (or hermeneutical) attempts to 
relate in a transparent manner socially available senses (i.e. intuitively present in 
a range of linguistic expressions). 
If we return, fi nally, to both foundational network models, they offer rather 
different accounts of meaning extension. Lakoff bases his model of over on an un-
specifi ed “imagistic” schema, which is subsequently specifi ed in several (largely 
arbitrary) dimensions and transformed according to hypothetical mental rules.48 
48 The resultant conceptual structure is then used in “conceptual metaphors”. I did not follow this 
story in the present account (see Pawelec 2005a, 2006a).
I-lamanie POPRAWKI NANIESIONE IISek1:148   Sek1:148 2013-04-08   14:13:20
149
Langacker offers a highly fl ex-ible format based on schematic similarity, under-
lying both specifi cations of a schema and extensions from a prototype. Neither 
of the models is presented as “diachronic”, while both authors invoke “psycho-
logical reality” (in a rather different meaning of the term) as their declared goal. 
Moreover, Langacker points to “descriptive adequacy” as his primary aim and is 
at places quite confusing about the synchronic status of the model.
My conclusion at this stage is perhaps entirely predictable. Since historical 
processes involve an interplay of formal structures, conceptual structures and the 
background, they cannot be properly represented by formats focused primarily on 
conceptual structure, even if these are offered as “dynamic”, as underlying real 
developments (if not in history, then certainly in mental life and in discourse). 
Consequently, if the formats are found useful by linguists (as seems evident and 
as has been partly documented), they should allow them to capture a “summation” 
of historical processes from a particular angle.
Generally speaking, Langacker’s format seems more promising in this respect, 
since it posits few formal requirements. As such – in skilful hands – it can be 
used to represent functional clusters and their intuitive conceptual unity from the 
present perspective. Also Lakoff’s model may be found inspiring, since it invokes 
pragmatic factors (mostly of a perceptual kind), which are obviously operative in 
history. This conclusion may come as a denouement, but the fact that a new type 
of format has been offered (as an alternative to the feature analysis) could be in 
the long run more signifi cant than the actual justifi cations offered for it.
To repeat, network models exemplify a search for linguistics with “a human 
face”. CL, within which they were developed, extended research horizons after 
Chomsky’s formalist approach, while being rooted in the mentalistic background 
(common to the fi rst and second generation cognitive science). Thus, network 
models represent the relatedness of lexical senses on the basis of general psycho-
logical constraints and intuitively evident conceptual relations. The amount of 
work performed within the cognitive paradigm testifi es to the intellectual poten-
tial of this approach.
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5. THE HERMENEUTICAL CODA
5.0. Introductory remarks
As shown by philosophical hermeneutics, “the world”, that is the world as we 
know it, has been revealed through constitutive activity which is normally con-
cealed, so that the world may appear. When one starts an investigation of some 
aspect of the world as it manifests itself from one’s vantage point (the “object” 
of that inquiry), one constantly runs the risk of mistaking what appears – from a 
certain stance, in a given theoretical paradigm, within some horizon, at a certain 
level of spiritual development, as established in the history of expression – for 
“raw reality” or “brute facts”. Hysteron proteron fallacy, or putting the cart before 
the horse, is thus a constant risk in the social sciences and human studies: one 
tries to explain the genesis of an entity, invoking entities available only as a result 
of that genesis. A cognitivist example will serve as the point of departure in sec-
tion 5.1., in which I would like to follow empirically a basic question concerning 
language genesis: should it be explained in mentalistic or in expressive terms? I 
will present some glimpses into the genetic relations between “language, thought, 
and reality” as a hermeneutical antidote to the mentalistic hysteron proteron ap-
proach. The antidote is to turn away from what has been constituted and focus on 
the process of constitution.1
Consequently, in our efforts to understand language, we must try to move back 
to the sources: to the points of genesis, which transform both the vision (i.e. one’s 
stance towards reality) and the world. In this way we may go beyond the products 
of language and reveal its power of generation. This is not a new approach in lan-
guage study. It can be perceived in the work of Humboldt, the greatest fi gure in 
modern linguistics before Saussure. The “genetic” approach is advocated by him 
in the famous “energetic” defi nition of language: “In itself [language] is no prod-
uct (Ergon), but an activity (Energeia). Its true defi nition can therefore only be 
a genetic one. For it is the ever-repeated mental labour of making the articulated 
sound capable of expressing thought” (Humboldt 1999: 49).2 More specifi cally in 
1 “Constitution” (Husserl’s term) does not mean that we “fabricate” reality, but that we reveal it 
“as something” – we discover the meaning it has for us. “Bracketing” of the world – of the constituted 
parts relevant for a given inquiry – is for Husserl the way to provide access to the phenomenon as it 
is (i.e., its necessary essence). After the hermeneutical correction, one tries to reveal the phenomenon 
by uncovering layers of constitution in history, also in a dialogue with naturalistic accounts, as in 
Ricoeur’s “detour” (cf. 0.1.).
2 I will discuss some limitations of Humboldt’s formulation pointed out by Gadamer as well as 
his place in the history of linguistics in the subsequent section 5.2. The fi nal section will contain my 
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our context: “the vocabulary is a continuous generation and regeneration of the 
word-making capacity, fi rst in the stock to which the language owes its form, then 
in the learning of speech by children, and lastly in daily usage” (p. 93). Since my 
task is to reveal the “transformative” power of language, it seems natural to focus 
on the three contexts pointed out by Humboldt (in a modernized formulation): the 
genesis of language, language acquisition and the use of language in discourse.3 
Of course, these domains of study – linguistic phylogenesis, ontogenesis and mi-
crogenesis – cannot be explored here. Instead, I will offer some “glimpses” into 
these areas of investigation to show how language, thought and reality are inter-
twined.4
5.1. Language, thought, and reality
The issue of linguistic “genesis” (in all domains mentioned above) is intensely 
studied by the cognitive (naturalistic, scientifi c) approaches. If one’s aim is to 
explain “functional wholes” – “mechanisms” in a loose sense – the description of 
actual causal chains (likely scenarios etc.) is of primary importance. When one 
can show, how an entity arises, one has a fi rm grasp on it. As opposed to the cogni-
tive “just so story”, discussed below, the accounts of linguistic genesis presented 
afterwards reveal genetic links between language, thought and reality (thus, from 
the hermeneutical perspective, they help to make the phenomenon of language 
manifest5).
Here is how a leading cognitive scientist, Steven Pinker, begins his popular 
account of language:
plea for “expressive” linguistics.
3 One could also inspect other areas in which the linguistic potential abruptly changes (either 
increasing, or decreasing one’s ability to communicate, live one’s life etc.), e.g. pidginization and creo-
lization on the one hand and various language defects and mental syndromes infl uencing linguistic 
capabilities on the other. The point is to fi nd a perspective which may allow one to notice that one’s 
linguistic potential and existential potential (access to reality) are intertwined. To be sure, from the 
scientifi c (naturalistic) perspective such cases are about a more extensive or more limited access to 
the reality independent of language. From the hermeneutical perspective, they offer glimpses how 
reality manifests itself more fully through language.
4 The phrase “language, thought, and reality” – the title of Whorf’s selection of papers (1956) 
– reappears in various versions in studies motivated by the ambition to show the inextricable links 
between the elements of such triads, e.g. Putnam (1975): “mind, language and reality”, Tyler (1978): 
“mind, meaning, and culture”.
5 From the naturalistic perspective, it would be said that I simply prefer one hypothesis to an-
other (while they all lack full confi rmation and so on). One cannot answer such claims: see Merleau-
Ponty’s comments in note 8 below.
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As you are reading these words, you are taking part in one of the wonders of the natural 
world. For you and I belong to a species with a remarkable ability: we can shape events in 
each other’s brains with exquisite precision. I am not referring to telepathy or mind control 
or the other obsessions of fringe science [...]. That ability is language. Simply by making 
noises with our mouths, we can reliably cause precise new combinations of ideas to arise in 
each other’s minds. The ability comes so naturally that we are apt to forget what a miracle 
it is. (Pinker 1994: 15)
The author hastens to add that this miracle has nothing to do with “the ineffa-
ble essence of human uniqueness”, but is “a biological adaptation to communicate 
information” (p. 19). Pinker points out the linguistic phenomenon of successful 
communication, while simultaneously providing two apparently equivalent ac-
counts of it, i.e. “we can shape events in each other’s brains with exquisite preci-
sion” and “we can reliably cause precise new combinations of ideas to arise in 
each other’s minds”. One can notice that the accounts are mixed up: it would be 
more adequate to say that we can “cause” events in brains (biological organs) and 
“shape” ideas in minds (spiritual entities, seats of self-consciousness etc.). By 
treating both accounts as interchangeable, Pinker surf-rides over the “mind-body 
problem” (how to get from “physical” to “semantic” explanations?).6 He seems 
to accept that noises cause patterns of neuronal activation in the brain (physical 
phenomena), which “cause” ideas in the mind (semantic phenomena).
Pinker’s account is full of confusion. First, words are not “noises”, they can-
not be treated as physical stimuli.7 In his account, Pinker blurs the distinction 
between the semantic and “objective” levels of analysis (or “emic” and “etic”, as 
in “phonemic” and “phonetic”). Words are made up of “phonemes” – the small-
est contrastive structural units in a system of language, which can be “realised” 
differently on the phonetic level (the actual noises). Thus, the “shape” of words 
(still below the semantic level) is not equivalent to physical signals. More gener-
ally, “noises” as such cannot be reliably linked to “perceptions” (and thus, one can 
expect, to “neuronal patterns”). As was shown by the Gestaltists, the same signal, 
depending on the overall pattern of the experiential fi eld, may be perceived differ-
ently, while different signals may be perceived as identical. Any empiricist theory 
6 Which is a variant of the philosophical problem of “the bridge” mentioned in 0.1. In psychol-
ogy, the problem appears in the form of the “homunculus”: a “little man” apparently necessary to 
control the machinery in the brain (a solution strange in itself, and resulting in infi nite regression, 
for we need another homunculus to control the brain of the fi rst one). In another book, Pinker quotes 
Dennett, who thinks that the problem of the homunculus is solved by the “computational theory of 
mind”: “Homunculi are bogeymen only if they duplicate entire the talents they are rung in to explain 
[...]. One discharges fancy homunculi from one’s scheme by organizing armies of idiots” (Pinker 
1997: 79). In other words, mind-body problem is solved, if A.I. specialists can reduce semantic in-
formation to algorithms used by machines. That “solution” replaces homunculi with A.I. specialists 
(and their brains etc.).
7 As in behaviourism. Chomsky, who in general opinion demolished behaviourism in his review 
of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (Chomsky 1977), apparently accepts the behaviourist perspective on 
linguistic “signals”, as is also evident in Pinker’s presentation. That perspective was shown to be 
inadequate (avant la lettre) in Saussure’s discussion of linguistic units (1959: 103ff.).
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linking physical stimuli to sensations requires a “constancy hypothesis”, which, 
as shown by the Gestaltists, “confl icts with the data of consciousness”.8
Second, as explored in the present case study, on the semantic level linguistic 
senses are not related in a one-to-one fashion to linguistic forms. One form nor-
mally has several conventional senses. What is more, this “underdetermination” 
of meaning by form is even more evident in actual use, when the meanings of a 
word form seem infi nitely fl exible. Thus, no “string of words” can be predictably 
(in a one-to-one fashion) linked to its “meaning” without taking into account the 
background of communication.9 But Pinker describes communication as a one-
way affair: an active sender shapes ideas in a passive receiver (or “sends a mes-
sage through a conduit”10).
Pinker subsequently reveals how the “miracle” works. People are equipped 
by biology with “mentalese”.11 And the solution runs as follows: “Knowing a 
language, then, is knowing how to translate mentalese into strings of words and 
vice versa” (1994: 82). The process of translation is supposed to be unconscious, 
“automatic”. However, that “hypothesis” does not solve any problems of com-
munication, since “mentalese” – whatever its proposed content, origin etc. – is 
assigned the role of “code”, which requires one-to-one correspondences between 
form and meaning.
What can one make of that story?12 It presents “language” as a biological or-
gan.13 The initial credibility of that account is probably rooted in two assumptions. 
8 Merleau-Ponty (2002: 8). Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s comments: “The law of constancy cannot avail 
itself, against the testimony of consciousness, of any crucial experiment in which it is not already 
implied, and wherever we believe that we are establishing it, it is already presupposed”. And sub-
sequently: “It is only fair to add that this is true of all theories, and that nowhere is there a crucial 
experiment. For the same reason the constancy hypothesis cannot be completely refuted on the basis 
of induction. It is discredited because it overlooks phenomena and does not permit any understanding 
of them. To discern them and to pass judgement on the hypothesis, one must ‘suspend’ it” (p. 9). And 
the fi nal statement: “For the philosopher, as for the psychologist, there is [...] always a problem of 
origins, and the only method possible is to follow, in its scientifi c development, the causal explana-
tion in order to make its meaning quite clear, and assign to it its proper place in the body of truth. 
That is why there will be found no refutation, but only an effort to understand the diffi culties peculiar 
to causal thinking” (pp. 7–8).
9 In the cognitive community the issue of the background of meaning and communication was 
fi rst raised by Dreyfus (1992 [1972]: 204ff.). See also Dreyfus, Dreyfus (1986) and Searle (1999: 
ch. 8).
10 See Reddy (1979) for a classic description of the “conduit model” of communication.
11 As explained in the glossary: “The hypothetical ‘language of thought’, or representation of 
concepts and propositions in the brain in which ideas, including the meanings of words and sen-
tences, are couched” (Pinker 1994: 478).
12 The Reader may feel that I chose a popular exposition of mentalism to criticise a caricature, 
rather than the real account. However, specialist accounts normally take their assumptions for grant-
ed (as hypotheses), while Pinker feels obligated to make them explicit for the public. What is more 
important, my primary aim is not to criticise mentalism as a scientifi c perspective (which – within 
limits one should try to specify – is valuable), but to present it as a particular style of approaching 
linguistic phenomena.
13 While the mind is supposed to be a “system of organs” (Pinker 1997: 27). The “modular” 
model of the mind has been the subject of a heated debate between the “fi rst” and the “second” gen-
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First, that language is produced in the mind and, consequently, in the brain, so 
that, in principle, a neuronal (or computational, or scientifi c) account of it should 
be possible. Second, that language works “automatically”, since we can talk and 
understand speech effortlessly. As for the former assumption, it is obviously true 
that verbal activity (as perhaps any activity) runs parallel to (partly conscious) 
mental activity and to neuronal activity.14 The question is whether these elements 
form a “functional unit”, which objectifying methods can model, or whether some 
crucial elements of such a unit are missing. We need an evolutionary account of 
the biological organ in question and some account of its actual functioning, if we 
are to make a decision of that kind. As for the latter assumption, language must be 
acquired or learned – it is a skill. It seems closer to driving or playing an instru-
ment than to biological organs, e.g. the senses.15 At this level of discussion, one 
can only point out that with complex phenomena, like language, many analogies 
may look, prima facie, convincing. It is crucial to check how far the analogies 
may be pressed.
We can see now, perhaps, why Pinker’s “positive” account of the phenomenon 
of communication, even though it obviously fails to deal with traditional prob-
lems, may seem initially appealing. Pinker attempts to increase that appeal by his 
presentation of alternatives. He suggests that if language is not a biological organ 
adapted for communication, then we are left with telepathy and fringe science or 
“the ineffable essence of human uniqueness”. In other words, it is either science 
or obscurantism.
But if Pinker’s account does not even begin to tackle the problems of commu-
nicating ideas via the physical medium of sounds (or marks on paper etc.), then 
we may ask in what respects it is better than telepathy. That question has a more 
general signifi cance, as demonstrated by Roy Harris’ charge against the model of 
communication (or the “language myth”) adopted by linguistics of the time (the 
early 1980’s). He says that it is based on two fallacies: “telementation” – that the 
function of speech is to convey thoughts from one mind to another (a version of 
the “conduit” metaphor); and “fi xed-code fallacy” – that a language community 
is a group of individuals who are taught to associate words with the same mean-
eration of cognitive scientists (see e.g. J. Taylor 1989: 16–20). From the hermeneutical perspective, 
the issue is of secondary importance, since both positions assume that language is a natural (“biologi-
cal”) phenomenon.
14 Still, the unconscious semantic level (“mentalese”) requires special pleading, for it is hard to 
imagine “thinking” without an agent (even a dumb homunculus, an idiot from Dennett’s army, must 
“get it right”).
15 I mention the senses, since this analogy is invoked by some cognitivists: “It is as though the 
ability to comprehend experience through metaphor were a sense, like seeing or touching or hearing, 
with metaphors providing the only ways to perceive and experience much of the world. Metaphor 
is as much a part of our functioning as our sense of touch, and as precious” (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 
239). The fi nal statement in that seminal book has a hermeneutical ring to it, but the analogy between 
language and the senses is interpreted in a radically different way in both cases. Lakoff and Johnson 
postulate mechanisms (semantic transfers) extending what they take to be the perceptual basic level 
(image schemas) to the cultural world. Hermeneutical philosophers show how language is a reprise 
du sens (Ricoeur’s phrase) of perceptual sense, cf. e.g. McLure (1990: 503, 513); Dillon (1988).
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ings.16 Specifi cally, Harris attacks the belief of generative linguists that “a lan-
guage is a fi nite set of rules generating an infi nite set of pairs, of which one mem-
ber is a sound-sequence or a sequence of written characters, and the other is its 
meaning”, and opposes to it his own understanding of language as “continuously 
created by the interaction of individuals” (1981: 11, 167). One may conclude, fol-
lowing Harris, that not only TG or CL, but linguistics as such has a fundamental 
problem with modelling verbal communication.
The phenomenon described in his particular manner by Pinker is obvi-
ously real. In a less theory-laden formulation, it is an ability to “share”, to “make 
common” (lat. communico) some “content”. At the same time, it is an ability 
to “reveal” to someone else what one knows, to make it “manifest”.17 From the 
hermeneutical perspective, one may ask if there is some affi nity between the un-
covering of phenomena by the senses and uncovering of “contents” by language. 
As was mentioned before (0.1.), perception is an activity which allows us to reach 
phenomena because it “hides itself”. One may assume that language allows us 
to “share some content” also because the background of sharing is hidden from 
view. We do not know (all the way down) how such a sharing is possible. But we 
can locate the source of the problem with Pinker’s position: he explains “words” 
in reference to ideas (“mentalese”), while ideas are not prior to words.
I will present below three accounts – glimpses into areas of massive research. 
The fi rst two will concern “phylogenesis”, i.e. the evolution of a type of animal: 
the linguistic animal or “the symbolic species”, in our case.18 The question – de-
spite the infamous prohibition imposed on such inquiries as inherently speculative 
by The Paris Linguistic Society in 186619 – has generated enormous literature.20 
My aim here is limited to the issue at hand: should the origin of language be ex-
plained primarily in mental or in expressive terms? In other words, is the linguis-
tic ability the result of some mental developments or of expressive activities?
In this context, it is important to remember that any inquiry of the former type 
faces a more acute problem of evidence. In fact, this is a more general problem 
of all “mentalistic” accounts: scientists have access to behaviour, not to mental 
states and mental “architecture”. One should not go as far as the behaviourists, 
who refused to speculate about the mental “black box”, but it seems reasonable to 
assume that we must point to specifi c behavioural changes, if we want to invoke 
mental evolution of one kind or another.21
16 Harris (1981: ix). With the publication of Relevance by Sperber and Wilson (1986) the “code 
model” of communication was supplemented with the “inferential model”, but the problems pointed 
out by Harris remain.
17 Lat. revelo – “to unveil, uncover”; manifestus – “bound or grasped by the hand” (Smith’s 
Dictionary). These original meanings are obviously suggestive within an account of meaning based 
on active involvement with reality.
18 The title of Deacon’s book (1997).
19 As often mentioned in books on language evolution, e.g. Deacon (1997: 14).
20 See Hurford (2007) for a recent review.
21 I discussed some relations between the behaviourist and cognitivist view on language in 
Pawelec (2008).
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Consequently, there is no prima facie warrant for mentalistic accounts of lan-
guage origin which postulate some developments in brain structure or mental 
architecture merely on the basis that such developments are required by a corre-
sponding theory of language (“psychologist’s fallacy”). For instance, Fauconnier 
and Turner criticise Chomsky’s idea that “language” (i.e. brain structure underly-
ing Universal Grammar) must have evolved as a result of a genetic mutation.22 
What they propose instead, however, is of the same type. They praise Deacon, 
who is “the one theorist on our list who leaves ample room for relating the origin 
of language to the origin of other cultural behaviors”. But rather than analyse some 
functional links between specifi c behaviour on the one hand and mental architec-
ture they assume necessary for its appearance on the other, they merely state: 
“There is every reason to think that once the capacity [for double-scope blending] 
was achieved and the cultural products started to emerge, they reinforced each 
other. Language assisted social interaction, social interaction assisted the cultural 
development of language, and language assisted the elaboration of tool use, as the 
tree of culture put forward these exceptional new products” (Fauconnier, Turner 
2003: 185–186). Fauconnier and Turner simply assume that once a new cogni-
tive ability was in place (they never say how it got there), language development 
started for good. Deacon’s account of experiments with chimpanzees presented 
below (5.1.1.) shows clearly that the genetic order assumed by Fauconnier and 
Turner should be reversed.
The next two accounts will provide very short glimpses into “ontogenesis” 
– language acquisition (the classic case of “Little Hans” described by Freud) – 
and “microgenesis”, i.e. the use of language in discourse. They are much shorter 
because my aim is to illustrate the point hopefully established in reference to 
evolutionary research: that the expressive view of language is more convinc-
ing than the mentalistic alternative. The last section focuses on the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis.
5.1.1. Teaching chimps symbols
In Deacon (1997) we fi nd a behaviourally motivated hierarchy of cognitive abili-
ties underlying symbol use. Deacon weaves many elements into his explanation 
of language origin. I will focus here on just one: his interpretation of experiments 
to teach symbols to chimpanzees.23
Before we see what “symbols” require in terms of cognitive abilities, we need 
to have some grasp of operations at two lower mental levels: the “iconic” and “in-
22 Chomsky pulls “a speculative, catastrophic, indeterminate, but all-powerful biological event 
out of a hat” (Fauconnier, Turner 2003: 184). For a more specifi c criticism of Chomsky in this con-
text, see Deacon (1997: 35, 103ff).
23 Two not exceptionally bright chimps called Sherman and Austin trained in the 1970’s to use 
simple symbols by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and Duane Rumbaugh. Subsequent work with the pygmy 
chimp (or bonobo) Kanzi showed a much greater potential of the apes for acquiring symbols.
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dexical”. Deacon invokes Peirce’s terms24 to describe various types of interpretative 
processes in the animal world. The iconic level should be viewed as the “default” 
option of interpretation, i.e. in negative terms as the lack of need or ability to make a 
distinction. For instance, a bird which does not recognise a moth sitting on the bark 
of a tree (a case of successful mimicry), does not fi nd enough clues which would 
indicate the behaviourally important difference. Hence, the iconic level is limited 
to what an animal can already recognise, and requires the least interpretative effort. 
As for its origin, it is based on an inferential process based on the recognition of 
“similarity” (regular association), says Deacon (pp. 71–76). 25
Indices are well exemplifi ed by Pavlov’s dog salivating at the sound of a buzz-
er. We talk here about associating one type of experiential context (or “icon”) 
with another (rather than two “entities”, defi ned by their physical features). In 
a standard behaviourist account, this type of situation is represented in terms of 
“stimulus” and “response”: some distinct element (“buzz”) close in space and 
time to an icon (“food served”) “triggers” an animal’s corresponding reaction 
on its own, when the sequence has occurred often enough (conditioned response 
learning). Behaviourists assume that, with suffi cient exposition, the association is 
“automatic” (one “thing” replaces another as the “cause” of some action). Deacon 
shows how much mental work is necessary in this case and what kind of change 
in mental architecture is involved.
We need not go into details. It is enough to realise that what looks, from the 
behaviourist perspective, like a replacement of “triggers”, requires an interpreta-
tive blending of two icons (“buzz”, “food served”). Only the third icon – compris-
ing both on a higher level of mental organisation26 – may be used for indexical 
purposes. In experiential terms, indexical interpretation allows to shape (adapt to 
the “standard” conditions) the “vortices” of experience.27 Naturally, that interpre-
tative process is constrained by the mental potential of a species.28
24 Deacon uses Peirce’s terms in a rather idiosyncratic fashion. For the original meaning of “in-
dex”, “icon” and “symbol”, see e.g. Nöth (1995). It is important to underline here that “symbol use” 
in the experiments analysed by Deacon has little to do with human “language use”.
25 It is crucial to realize that “similarity” invoked in the explanation of the iconic level is not 
based on some prior, physical resemblance (as we would see it in our terms). “Similarity” here is a 
break-off point in the process of interpretation: the animal does not fi nd clues (whether of boredom, 
or lack of attention or the limitations of its mental system) for making an experiential distinction (i.e. 
for a differential response). Thus, “anything” can be iconic of “anything” else (Deacon 1997: 76).
26 More complex mental representation of reality (from icons to indices) is explained here in 
terms of “internal communication” between levels of mental architecture (Deacon 1997: 78). This 
idea was developed in neurological terms by Edelman (1992).
27 Deacon’s explanation shows in some detail what Cassirer meant (in his interpretation of per-
ception pathologies) when he described normal perception (quoted in 0.2.) in the following way: 
“What was previously an unremitting fl ow of events now coalesces, as it were, about [‘favored 
points’ which interrupt the stream of experience in various ways]: in the very midst of the stream 
there form separate vortices, whose parts seem to be linked in a common movement” (Cassirer 1957: 
221).
28 Deacon says that the same “physical” signal – “laughter” – will be interpreted differently, 
depending on the mental potential of a creature. A fi sh would recognise it merely as “vibration” (an 
“icon” meaning “danger” or “nothing of importance”). A dog would take it as evidence that humans 
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We can now move to the experiments with chimps, which may be treated as a 
case of “enculturation” – an attempt to fi nd out how much of the human symbolic 
culture can be appropriated by animals. Two chimps, Austin and Sherman, were 
trained to use sequences of “lexigrams” (simple abstract shapes without any icon-
ic resemblance to their referents) on large illuminated keys on a keyboard. There 
were two “verb” and four “noun” lexigrams to choose from (“give”/“pour” going 
with solid or liquid food, e.g. a “banana” or “orange juice”). The animals were 
fi rst taught successfully the “right” pairs, one by one (4 in all). However, when 
required to choose from all available options, they failed to do so (they repeated 
the last sequence taught or tried at random). This shows that they learnt to link the 
lexigrams with their referents indexically, with no grasp of the meaning relation.
The problem they faced is easier to appreciate when we notice that 6 lexi-
grams may be arranged in 720 ordered sequences and 64 ordered pairs. The four 
“correct” pairs taught during initial training were not enough for them to guess 
the “logic” of the system (i.e. “classes” of allowed combinations). To make this 
task easier, the researchers decided to train the animals which sequences are not 
allowed (i.e. what not to do – a very complex training task). After thousands of 
trials, the chimps produced correct pairs every time.
To check, if the animals had learnt the liquid / solid distinction (and that a 
new lexigram is for a new item), the experimenters introduced some new food 
items with corresponding lexigrams. This time, Austin and Sherman made almost 
no mistakes – they got the “logic” right. The animals learnt that the meaning of 
a lexigram (its reference to something experientially signifi cant) depends on its 
relations to other lexigrams. “This is the essence of a symbolic relationship”, con-
cludes Deacon (pp. 84–86).
Let us have another look at the training process to see how the transformation 
took place. The animals learnt the initial four pairs separately (let us say: A1, A2, 
B3, B4) as indices. But when faced with the whole repertoire, in which only 4 out 
of 64 pairs “worked”, they were helpless – their errors immediately obscured the 
right choices. Only after the “wrong” pairs were indexically excluded, Austin and 
Sherman could be successful again. Deacon assumes that the symbolic reconfi gu-
ration happened at this stage, to reduce the memory load:
Try to imagine yourself in their situation for a moment. You have just come to the point 
where you are not making errors. What is your strategy? Probably, you are struggling to 
remember what specifi c things worked and did not work, still at the level of one-by-one 
associations. The problem is, it is hard to remember all the details. What you need are aids 
to help organize what you know, because there are a lot of possibilities. But in the internal 
search for supports you discover that there is another source of redundancy and regularity 
that begins to appear, besides just the individual stimulus-response-reward regularities: the 
relationships between lexigrams! And these redundant patterns are far fewer than the messy 
are around (an “index”). For chimps (which can produce it), laughter is indicative of a “relaxed 
atmosphere”. For us, it is symbolic (an experiential response to a situation, e.g. a recognition of the 
point of a joke) (Deacon 1997: 73).
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set of dozens of individual associations that you are trying to keep track of [...] Forced to 
repeat errorless trials over and over, Sherman and Austin didn’t just learn the details well, 
they also became aware of something they couldn’t have noticed otherwise, that there was 
a system behind it all [...]. They could now afford to forget about individual correlations 
so long as they could keep track of them via the lexigram-lexigram rules”. (Deacon 1997: 
88–89)
Thus, according to Deacon, the transformation may be described as a change 
in “mnemonic strategy”. The indexical relation: “index tokens – referents” was 
replaced by an indexical relation of a higher order between index tokens “to of-
fl oad redundant details”. Deacon’s interpretation makes it clear that the symbolic 
relation is built on top of numerous indexical relations, whose “structure” (inter-
relatedness from some perspective) may become tangible thanks to at least three 
factors: numerous repetitions of indexical activity, in a relative separation from 
other actions, and (crucially in the experiment) a set of stable “structural hints” 
(lexigrams). Deacon notes that “nature seldom offers such nice neat logical sys-
tems that can help organize our associations. There are not many chances to use 
such strategies, so not much selection for this sort of process” (p. 89). Deacon’s 
comment makes it very clear that while his interpretation reveals some important 
structural features of “symbolic interpretation”, it cannot tell us much about the 
evolutionary context – the origin of language. The structural hints or lexigrams 
provided by the experimenters, and procedurally “deciphered” by Austin and 
Sherman, are not to be found in nature; symbols had to be invented by homo sa-
piens as repeatable, clearly differentiated behavioural units. We will have a closer 
look at the evolutionary context in the next section.
Nevertheless, Deacon’s account of “symbolic interpretation” is much more il-
luminating than the mentalist stories of language origin proposed by Chomsky or 
Fauconnier and Turner. He shows, fi rst, that a new mental stance is rooted in ex-
ploratory action. On the indexical level, animals search for clues or develop new 
behavioural patterns when they are frustrated by lack of success. When they fail 
at a task, they do not know the way to proceed (there is no mental plan, conscious 
or unconscious) – they must try again. Only subsequently, as a result of consis-
tent behaviour (successful “tries” are repeated29), is a mental reconfi guration of 
experience possible.
Second, the symbolic “recoding” requires that a creature unlearns (or sus-
pends) the search for “immediate satisfaction”. This general change of “stance” 
must be rooted in behaviour which is not a direct response to environmental pres-
sure. The most obvious candidate is “play” – adaptive behaviour allowing the 
young to learn adult behavioural patterns by imitation.
29 The driving force of a successful try was demonstrated in a cruel experiment recorded in a 
Polish documentary “The Rat-catcher” (Andrzej Czarnecki, Szczurołap, 1986): a rat could swim for 
about 10 minutes in a large aquarium, before it drowned; another one, after less than 10 minutes in 
another tank, was given a chance to rest on a prop for a few seconds; subsequently, it had swum for 
almost 15 hours, mostly around the spot where it expected to be rescued, before it drowned.
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Third, indices may stand on their own, while symbols can appear and function 
only in a system. A “symbol – referent” pair is an abstraction, viewed outside of a 
network of symbolic relations.30
Fourth, the discovery of symbolic meaning is an insight into an experiential 
whole: what one already “knows” implicitly, in a situation, is revealed as a struc-
ture; abstract links are forged, which allow an overall vision (Ricoeur’s reprise du 
sens). In this context, Deacon invokes the opposition between “insight learning” 
and “learning by rote”. An insight is possible only after one already “knows” how 
to handle a given task (with some obstacles and lack of transparency). One cannot 
be expected to understand structural hints without a prior practical acquaintance 
with a domain.31
Fifth, structural clarity in a domain is gained because the relations between to-
kens (allowed combinations) are consistently built on experiential relations. The 
social use of tokens imposes a cognitive map on the reality, previously available 
to an animal only in a behavioural way. As we have noticed, reality can be repre-
sented, because it has already been differentially structured in action. The sym-
bolic restructuring is also differential: what we call “orange juice” – and interpret 
as a physical entity with some properties – would be revealed in the experiment 
as [not solid] [not apple liquid]. As long as further symbolic distinctions are not 
introduced into the system, an animal will call any new drink either “orange juice” 
or “apple juice”. This habit – a series of attempts to make consistent choices 
– would probably reveal some criterion of differentiation (e.g. [sweet] vs. [sour]). 
We can see now that the initial characterization of the referents was made from 
the human perspective.
Sixth, once a system of symbols is installed, it allows to restructure all ex-
perience. Primarily, experience no longer takes the form of indexical relations, 
triggering reactions, but is shaped by abstract categories, revealed in linguistic 
expression. A symbolic species is no longer on the leash of its environment.32
To be sure, this effect was not achieved in the experiment reported (nor in any 
other). Austin and Sherman did not learn symbols, as we normally understand 
them: conventional signs used for “conveying ideas”. They learnt to use lexi-
grams, they acquired “procedural” knowledge of symbols as “structural hints”. 
30 This is the standard way of describing symbols: “token-meaning” pairs linked by conven-
tion (as opposed to the original Saussurean system of differences). We can see, by now, that such a 
description is a result of focusing on end-states, without proper attention to the process of “constitu-
tion”.
31 In everyday life, this is perhaps best seen when one deals with “instructions” of various kind 
(e.g. how to get to some location, cook a dish, operate a device etc.). As long as one is not in touch 
with the reality in question, an instruction may seem to be clear but means little; when used in a situ-
ation, it proves to be ambiguous at various crucial junctures, until one acquires an overall grasp of the 
whole semantic fi eld to which it applies.
32 As a result, the symbolic species can learn not only by exploration and imitation but also 
through linguistic “hearsay”, which increases its chances exponentially (learning by “hearsay” is 
invoked by Harnad 2005: 16).
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But that achievement did not constitute a step on the path to symbolic communi-
cative behaviour.
5.1.2. The mimetic origins of language
Deacon’s interpretation of experiments with chimps shows with greater clarity 
several problems of mentalistic accounts of language origin. In general, they dis-
regard the basic rule of cognitive development (and, as a result, they reverse the 
order of explanation): mental reconfi guration of experience is rooted in active en-
gagements with environment. One must “know” something procedurally (“know-
ing how”), before one may develop a conceptual (abstract, structural) grasp of it 
(“knowing that”). More specifi cally, the development of a “structural grasp” can-
not be automatic, as is vividly shown by the acquisition of lexigrams. It requires 
“structural hints”, which may be used to form (in a long and painstaking process) 
abstract categories. The appearance of such symbolic “tokens” in nature is an 
important gap in Deacon’s interpretation.33
This gap is narrowed in Donald’s account of “mimesis” (1991, 1993, 1999, 
2000, 2001) – the crucial “exaptation” for language.34 Donald frames the problem 
of language origin in terms of “voluntary access” of animals to their “memory 
banks”. Animals rely on their environment to provide “hints” for recalling proper 
behavioural patterns. Humans, however, have the ability for “autocueing”: they 
can retrieve their memories voluntarily (Donald 1993: 146). How did this ability 
evolve?
Donald postulates a “mimetic skill” – imitation with one’s body. Mimesis re-
quires a memory system that can “rehearse and refi ne movement voluntarily and 
systematically, in terms of a coherent perceptual model of the body” (p. 150). In 
other words, one can produce a sequence of movements matching some previous 
sequence, because one develops a perception of one’s body (proprioception), re-
sulting in a conscious “body image”. When one has a model of one’s body (or vol-
untary “control”, in everyday terms35), one can stop, replay and edit any action of 
the body. This is a “supramodal” skill – it can be exercised with any means: eyes, 
hands, feet, posture, locomotion, facial expression, voice (p. 151). Thus, a rhythm 
33 Assuming that the author believes that his interpretation helps explain the origin of language (as 
seems probable, considering the title and the suggestion that nature rarely offers structural hints).
34 The term “exaptation” is used for a function which changed its role in the evolutionary proc-
ess – which was co-opted for some other task. This notion is a naturalistic way out of the hysteron 
proteron trap (i.e. an attempt not to invoke present functionality in genetic explanations).
35 To give an example of missing “voluntary” control: a patient suffering from a rare syndrome 
can slap a mosquito on his cheek but cannot point to the cheek, when asked by the doctor. For more 
examples of that kind see Cassirer (1957), Merleau-Ponty (2002). This point illustrates the more 
general difference between what is available behaviourally, in a situation, and what is available se-
mantically, out of context. The difference between relative and absolute discrimination described by 
Harnad (0.2.) is of the same kind.
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initiated by foot tapping can be taken over by fi nger tapping, tongue clicks, hand 
or head movements, jumping, singing etc.
Mimesis is clearly adaptive. It may have evolved from animal play or ritual 
displays, when similar sequences of movements are repeated by a pair or a group 
of individuals (without voluntary control, by “contagion”). Whatever its source, it 
is obviously advantageous, once acquired: the intentional reproduction of move-
ments can be used e.g. for tool making, practising hunting skills or communicat-
ing by mime.
For Donald, mimesis is the fi rst step in the human co-evolution of mind and 
culture. Donald postulates three stages of development: mimetic culture, mythic 
culture (based on language and story telling), theoretic culture (based on external 
memory systems: writing and other cultural artefacts, like abacus or computer). 
Donald’s grand vision need not be inspected in detail here. It is important, how-
ever, to notice two elements missing in Deacon’s account: the development of 
mental abilities is intensely social (anchored in interactions of a collective, rather 
than in interactions with environment); and it requires the control of one’s body, 
which turns into “an organ of mimicry” (cf. Merleau-Ponty 2002: 479).
Donald’s proposal has been developed by Zlatev. He offers a defi nition of bod-
ily mimesis which shows clearly how it differs from simpler acts of imitation on 
the one hand, and from symbolic representation on the other:
Def: A particular bodily act of cognition or communication is an act of bodily mimesis if and 
only if:
a) it involves a cross-modal36 mapping between exteroception (i.e. perception of the envi-
ronment, normally dominated by vision) and proprioception (perception of one’s own 
body, normally through kinesthetic sense);
b) it is under conscious control and corresponds to – either iconically or indexically – to 
some action, object or event, while at the same time being differentiated from it by the 
subject;
c) the subject intends the act to stand for some action, object or event for an addressee 
(and for the addressee to recognize this intention);
d) without the act being conventional-normative, and
e) without the act dividing (semi)compositionally into meaningful sub-acts that system-
atically relate to each other and other similar acts. (Zlatev 2007c: 9; emphasis in the 
original)
Condition (a) states that all acts of imitation involve mapping between exter-
nal and internal perception. In other words, one becomes aware of one’s body 
(develops “body image”) through acts of imitation. Zlatev mentions “contagion” 
as an example of the simplest, “proto-mimetic” level of imitation. Contagion – as 
with “contagious” laughter or yawning – does not involve voluntary control and 
is not representational for the subject. Representation on the level (b) is “dyadic”, 
36 The term “cross-modal” is applied to perception, as coming through any (number of) sensory 
channels. It seems related to “supramodal” as used by Donald (i.e. activity through any channels of 
expression).
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i.e. it involves a differentiation between “signifi er” (a bodily act) and “signifi ed” 
from the subject’s point of view. An example of iconic mimesis, described by Pi-
aget, is “an infant opening and closing her mouth to model the opening and clos-
ing of a matchbox”. Children pointing at objects to help guide their attention is a 
case of indexical mimesis. Only when condition (c) is fulfi lled, mimesis becomes 
“triadic” – it is used for communication and involves an addressee (thus, gestures 
turn into mimetic signs). Miming an action to communicate something about it 
would be an iconic mimetic sign, while “declarative pointing” is a paradigmatic 
indexical mimetic sign. Only when signs become “conventional” – that is “nor-
mative” – and they are systematically linked, we cross the border of “symbolic” 
acts, i.e. language (conditions d-e).
On the basis of bodily mimesis, Zlatev proposes the notion of “mimetic sche-
mas”, i.e. pre-linguistic concepts, which categorise activities (EATING, CRY-
ING, RUNNIG) and actions (goal-directed acts: GRASP-X, PUSH-X). He men-
tions fi ve properties of “mimetic schemas”37: they are “(a) representational, (b) 
accessible to consciousness, (c) relatively concrete, (d) proprioceptively based 
and (e) pre-refl ectively shared” (p. 11).
We may stop here to recapitulate. Donald and Zlatev’s account paints a picture 
of language genesis which is directly opposed to mentalistic explanations. The 
latter are based on the A.I. assumption that mental capacities require a “program” 
to be functional.38 That assumption takes radically different forms, e.g. that “lan-
guage” requires an algorithmic “syntactic module” (Chomsky’s “Platonic” nativ-
ism), possibly operated by “an army of idiots” (Dennett), or that it is based on 
“image schemas” developed in direct interactions with environment (Lakoff and 
Johnson’s empiricism). But these differences merely point to an essential arbi-
trariness of mentalism, which cannot propose functional explanations, except for 
“freak” mutations or automatic semantic processes and transfers in the “cognitive 
unconscious”. Mentalism is “agenetic”, as clearly demonstrated by the evolution-
ary accounts presented in this section.
The mimetic account of complex mental abilities may seem at fi rst counter-
intuitive. It proposes, for instance, that acts of imagination – when we voluntarily 
picture things “in the mind” – are dependent on prior symbolic imitation (i.e. 
social gesturing). Thus, it opposes the commonsensical view that the objective 
world is “external”, while our “internal” mental world is somehow based on it (a 
view shared by mentalistic accounts of language). However, our mental world is 
primarily “external”: it is born and develops in contact with things and co-specif-
ics; it is dependent on control of one’s body and on acts of expressive communi-
cation (consequently, the “individual” mind is genetically “social”). The “objec-
37 On all fi ve counts “mimetic schemas” are opposed to “image schemas” proposed by Johnson 
and Lakoff.
38 As stated by a Polish psychologist and a critic of cognitivism, this is an “old assumption” that 
“all complex behaviour must be based on a prior plan of action” (Bobryk 1996: 107). We can see now 
that it is a result of focusing on end-states, or hysteron proteron fallacy.
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tive” world, on the other hand, could be viewed in some sense as “internal”: its 
appearance is shaped by our stance, by the ways we approach it, by our frames of 
reference and horizons (to repeat: there is no intention here to deny independent 
reality and non-arbitrariness in our vision of things). It is perhaps best to say that 
the opposition “external”/“internal” is not originary.
5.1.3. First words of a child
Freud in Jenseits des Lustprinzips recounts playful behaviour of a 1,5 year old 
boy (1988: 13–18).39 The child was not precocious, spoke only a few words un-
derstood by his family, never cried when left alone, and was generally not a nui-
sance – with one exception. He used to throw away all small objects he could 
grab, producing at the same time a long “oooo” sound, interpreted by his carers 
as fort (“away”). In time, Freud realised that the boy played only this one game 
with his toys: “away with it” game. One day, the boy was playing with a spool. 
Rather than throw it away, he made it disappear behind the edge of the bed and 
then recovered it, pulling the thread attached. This game was accompanied by 
loud “ooo” in the fi rst stage and da (“here”, “back”) in the second one. The child 
never tired of this game and was visibly enjoying himself, more so when the spool 
appeared again.
We need not go into specifi c interpretations of this behaviour provided by 
Freud and Lacan (cf. Lang 1973) to see its probable psychological meaning and 
its relevance in our context. The boy was deprived of his mother’s presence. His 
reaction was not crying (the standard expression of rage and helplessness at this 
stage) but an attempt at a symbolic control of the situation. The act of imitation 
gave him some power to channel his emotions: “I can throw you away” or “I do 
not need you” (if mind-reading could yield any specifi c results at this psychologi-
cally “undifferentiated” stage). The discovery that there is a happy ending to his 
plight – that disappearance and return are linked – allowed him to “represent” his 
situation, gave him some insight.
The case of Little Hans exemplifi es the actual mental work in “symbol acqui-
sition”: the boy repeats with the means available to him the act (“disappearance”) 
that disturbs him the most – taking symbolic “revenge” – and discovers in the 
process that this act is linked with another one, which brings more satisfaction 
(“return”). This work cannot be properly described as “unconscious”, or even 
“cognitive”. The boy seeks relief in his existential plight. He does not burst into 
tears as most of his peers would, but takes an active role. By re-enacting the situa-
tion, he hits upon scenarios which bring relief – the second one more effectively 
than the fi rst one. The schema provided by the more successful scenario (“away” 
– “back”) allows satisfactory orientation in the situation at hand. Its verbal rep-
resentation (fort, da) may be easily invoked when the child fi nds himself in (for 
39 I used this example in Pawelec (2007a: 213–215).
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him) analogous situations. Thus, symbolic representations expressing emotional 
attitudes towards existentially important phenomena lead to cognitive representa-
tions as a by-product.
5.1.4. Words as “stopping orders” 
So far, I have focused on the genetic relations between “language, thought, and 
reality” (in phylogenesis and ontogenesis). I have tried to demonstrate, following 
evolutionary and developmental research, that the genetic order assumed in men-
talistic accounts should be reversed: exploratory, expressive and at some stage lin-
guistic behaviour necessarily precedes (pre)conceptual structures. This must be so 
if mental structures re-code or provide insight into experiential structures devel-
oped via rote-learning. Equally necessary is the eclipse of the constitutive process 
by its outcome: the revelatory procedures must fade into the background, if we are 
to be able to “see” the world the way it has been “revealed”. This does not mean, 
however, that the constituted world may be replaced by its mental representation 
– that language may be identifi ed with conceptual structures. As stated by Mer-
leau-Ponty: “The link between the word and its living meaning is not an external 
link of association, the meaning inhabits the word [...]. Language certainly has an 
inner content, but this is not self-subsistent and self-conscious thought. What then 
does language express, if it does not express thoughts? It presents or rather it is the 
subject’s taking up of a position in the world of his meanings” (2002: 224–225; 
emphasis in the original).
David McNeill provides an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s idea that “mean-
ing inhabits the word” (McNeill 2005: 91–92). His interpretation is part of a de-
tailed theory explaining the role of gestures which accompany speech. McNeill 
captures Merleau-Ponty’s idea in terms of a dialectic (or an opposition leading to 
a resolution through change) between gestures and words in an utterance: “im-
agery-language dialectic”. The opposition results from a combination of different 
modes of expression: gestural imagery is holistic, it signals the position taken 
up by the speaker against some common background, while verbal articulation 
is linear – it successively “unpacks” the holistic stance, translates it into catego-
rial content. From a complementary point of view, it is an opposition between 
an individual stance and the social means of expression. The change in question 
is a mutual propulsion and clarifi cation through an interplay of these channels 
of expression: gestures differentiate signifi cant contrasts in a way which is not 
transparent to the listener and which requires unpacking in words, while words 
make sense in the fi eld of oppositions signalled by gestures. What is of special 
interest in our context, verbal articulations serve as “stopping points”, signalling a 
temporary resolution of the dialectic. Our linguistic intuition tells us that a given 
formulation is “good enough” as an articulation of our actual stance in a discourse 
situation. In other words, an individual vision is judged to be suffi ciently available 
thanks to the social means of expression, which do not code or trigger conceptual 
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structures, but serve to satisfy our intuition that we have made ourselves under-
stood (McNeill 2005: 92–95). This approach allows us to understand why people 
effectively use words even if they are often unable to provide their defi nitions (to 
say nothing about rules of grammar). Meanings “inhabit” words, because words 
allow us to take stances towards situation types. When we talk about something, 
we do not express ready-made thoughts with verbal labels attached to them but we 
enact our stance to a situation.
5.1.5. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
In CL, the relations between “language, thought, and reality” are discussed in ref-
erence to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.40 It is usually presented in two versions: the 
stronger interpretation called “linguistic determinism”, and the weaker one called 
“linguistic relativity”. The former states (in Pinker’s formulation) that “people’s 
thoughts are determined by the categories made available by their language”, 
while according to the latter “differences among languages cause differences in 
the thoughts of their speakers” (1994: 57). The strong position is clearly unten-
able (e.g. in view of bilingualism). The weak position – linguistic relativity41 – is 
quite unspecifi c. It merely states that the language we speak “infl uences” the way 
we think. Its most tangible interpretation, known as “thinking for speaking”, was 
developed by Slobin. He makes the assumption that in the process of speaking 
(or any other process of verbal coding, decoding or re-coding), “experiences are 
fi ltered through language into verbalized events” (Slobin 2000: 107; emphasis in 
the original). In other words, in order to be expressed in a particular language, 
experience must be accessed from a particular point of view (a conventional one, 
if imposed by grammar). Thus, linguistic structures make available conventional 
ways of viewing reality, while language in use is a “window” on online concep-
tual activity.
Slobin has carried out several experiments to confi rm the infl uence of “avail-
able” coding structures on the way experience is expressed.42 As an example, he 
40 E.g. Lakoff (1987: ch. 18); Bickel (1998); Hopper (1998); Lee (1998); Slobin (1998, 2000, 
2003); Niemeier, Dirven (2000). For other points of view, see e.g. Black (1962: 244–257); Tyler 
(1978: 68–70).
41 Whorf expressly calls his position “a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers 
are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic 
backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated” (1956: 214). However, his position, rather 
confusingly (see Leavitt 2006: 66–68), does not amount to “linguistic relativism”. It is only the deter-
ministic interpretation which states that we are imprisoned in our “linguistic-cultural” vision of the 
world – that all our “truth-claims” are relative to that system of reference. Since Whorf does not reject 
the view that linguistic backgrounds “can in some way be calibrated”, he is not a relativist. However, 
a deterministic (i.e. relativist) interpretation of Whorf’s position was prevalent in the early reception 
of his work. No wonder that Berlin and Kay, in their classic work on the semantic universals in colour 
terminology, explicitly reject “the Whorfi an tradition” (1969: 2, 160) (cf. 0.2).
42 This is not a new type of research. One can see affi nities with e.g. Chafe’s study of narrative 
structuring of events in different cultures (Chafe 1980). The view that language in use is a window 
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hypothesised that there should be systematic differences in the way experience 
is coded when one compares two types of languages called (after Talmy) “verb-
framed” and “satellite-framed”. The latter (e.g. English or Polish) indicate “path” 
by a satellite to the verb:
(1) a. He ran   into  the house.
 b. Wbiegł   do  domu.43
  He in-run  to  the house
The former (e.g. French, Spanish) indicate “path” by the main verb:
(2) a. Il est entré dans   la maison  en courant.
 b. He is entered in   the house  by running44
As a result, verb-framed languages tend to code the manner of movement in 
an optional adjunct phrase (en courant), while satellite-framed languages tend to 
code “manner” in the main verb.
In the experiment, Slobin’s team asked respondents45 to describe events from 
a picture storybook Frog, where are you? – a fairy-tale in 24 pictures without 
words. In one episode, a little boy climbs a tree to look into a hole, and an owl 
fl ies out and knocks him down. While in satellite-framed languages the owl’s 
movement was described (in various proportions) both by manner verbs and 
path verbs, in verb-framed languages only path verbs were used (with a sin-
gle exception – one description of a Hebrew speaker). Slobin concludes that 
“speakers of the two language types differ in their habitual attention to manner 
of motion – as evidenced [...] in relative differences in frequency of mention”. 
Specifi cally, speakers of verb-framed languages tend to focus on “path” (rather 
than “manner” of action) and tend not to choose manner verbs. On the struc-
tural level, Slobin notices that verb-framed languages have far fewer expressive 
manner verbs. He explains this fact by a smaller “cost” of fi lling one combined 
“slot” for “motion” and “manner” in satellite-framed languages (which has 
encouraged language users to be inventive) than of fi lling the additional op-
tional slot for “manner” in verb-framed languages (2000: 113; emphasis in the 
original).
Slobin provides more evidence, but his overall conclusion is cautious and still 
rather vague: “it seems that users of [verb-framed] languages build mental images 
on on-line conceptual activity is best exemplifi ed by the research conducted by Chafe (1976, 1990, 
1994, 1998) and McNeill (1992, 2005), also Drey, McNeill (1990).
43 The division into both types is somewhat fuzzy: in Polish, “path” is coded both by the preposi-
tion (do - “to”) and the verbal prefi x (w-) - (“into”); the English translation of example (2a) shows 
that there are English verbs (“entered”) which code “path” more completely than French verbs (est 
entré dans). Cf. Slobin (2000: 133–134, note 3).
44 Slobin (2000: 108). Except for the Polish sentence, the examples are Slobin’s.
45 Both children (aged 3–11), and adults. The languages tested: English, German, Dutch, Russian 
(satellite-framed); French, Spanish, Turkish, Hebrew (verb-framed).
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of physical scenes with minimal focus on manner of movement, and with rather 
different conceptualizations of manner when it is in focus. [...] These differences 
are exceptionally diffi cult to pin down, but the considerable range of evidence 
examined here is at least suggestive of rather divergent mental worlds of speakers 
of the two language types” (2000: 133; emphasis in the original).
Slobin’s interpretation of “linguistic relativity” is so “weak” that the fi nal 
suggestion concerning “rather divergent mental worlds of speakers of the two 
language types” comes as a surprise. After all, he talks only about “habitual atten-
tion” to certain features of the physical environment linked to the use of linguistic 
categories. To put it in more general terms, if one uses a tool, then some features 
of the environment “stand out” as relevant for the task at hand. For instance, 
since one uses articles in English, the feature of referents “presumably known/
unknown to the addressee” is constantly monitored in speech and writing.46 In 
Polish, that feature is not coded in grammar, but it can be expressed by other 
means, when relevant. The existence of a tool – e.g. a grammatical construction 
or a lexical item – may perhaps say something important about the social world, 
in which it developed and is still found useful, but – in itself – it is not enough 
to reveal the “mental world” of its users. Some crucial elements must be missing 
from Slobin’s argument.
Slobin’s attempt to fi nd “Whorfi an effects” in the use of grammatical catego-
ries shares an important feature with Berlin and Kay’s famous attempt to disprove 
such effects in “colour naming” (mentioned in section 0.2). Both approaches treat 
the principle of linguistic relativity as a testable “hypothesis” and, accordingly, 
try to confront linguistic data with the perception of physical evidence (colours, 
actions). Since we have access to everyday perceptual things independently of lin-
guistic expression,47 it seems natural for scientists to look for effects of linguistic 
categories on that level.
But the effect of language on the perception of “middle-size dry goods” seems 
to be primarily general. Language lets “things” appear. It reduces the pressure of 
environment and allows its users to see a stable “world”. Consequently, they may 
freely focus on any part of it. If some elements of their world play a signifi cant 
part in daily commerce, they will be lexicalized. Thus, there is nothing essentially 
“relative” (incommensurable) in the fact that Eskimos have many words for dif-
ferent kinds of snow (if they do), to mention just one example from a large collec-
tion of “odd cases” presented in the literature. Eskimos must focus on snow col-
lectively – with the help of linguistic distinctions – to survive. But, in principle, 
anyone can “see” snow the way they do. If not always directly, then certainly in 
the context of relevant activities (e.g. “a snow” good for making an igloo). This 
46 I presented this example in Pawelec (2006c).
47 An access which can be standardised by the use of “pictures”, presenting “entities” in question 
(drawings, fi lms, colour samples etc.). As mentioned in 0.2., Lucy comments on the problem of using 
only linguistic data for investigating Whorfi an effects (2000: xi–xii).
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is true for any kind of “expert” knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of distinctions rele-
vant for some activity (e.g. wine-tasting, driving a car or chicken-sexing).48
Taylor points out that the situation is different as concerns entities constituted 
in a language: “The reason why this is bound to be so is evident. Human beings 
in different societies constitute different ways of life. They recognize different 
emotions, different virtues, build different institutions, practices, and footings. 
[...] A given emotion, a given virtue, a certain prized act, a certain kind of footing, 
may only make sense within the institutions and practices of that society, and in 
relation to its favoured ends” (Taylor 2006: 36–37). Apparently the same point 
is made by Lucy: “There are many domains of experience that are primarily or 
exclusively verbal and we might expect linguistic relativity to have its most dra-
matic effects in such domains” (2000: xii).49 
We are now in a better position to assess the principle of linguistic relativity. 
A language – as Taylor shows – expresses and partly constitutes a “way of life”: a 
collective way of dealing with reality. A social group develops various practices as 
an answer to life’s exigencies and in an attempt to make its existence worthwhile. 
In the process, distinctions relevant for practices are verbalized. If we return now 
to Berlin and Kay’s study on colours (0.2.),50 we may repeat what we know from 
work on “language genesis”: linguistic categories express existentially important 
distinctions. If they happen to be universal (as in the case in question), this is not 
a direct result of physiology, but of some commonalities of human experience. 
Light and dark, the sun, fi re, vegetation, the sky, the soil – these features of en-
vironment (as pointed out by Wierzbicka) are common enough and suffi ciently 
important to prompt expression of the system of colour categories found in hu-
man communication. One may wonder, of course, why some communities did not 
feel the need to develop a richer system of distinctions and were satisfi ed with a 
48 It is true in principle that one can learn to see relevant distinctions; in practice, there are natural 
limitations of taste, skill, persistence etc. In this context, it is perhaps important to add that in many, 
if not most cases expertise does not in itself require (or even allow) verbalizing of the fi nest distinc-
tions: one can perceive or perform something profi ciently without naming; nevertheless, naming 
helps steer attention and seems indispensable when passing one’s expertise to novices. On the issues 
involved in developing expertise, see Dreyfus, Dreyfus (1986); on chicken-sexers and supervised 
learning, see Harnad (2005).
49 Lucy’s remark is, of course, cogent in the context of attempts to test the principle of linguistic 
relativity. It does not help, however, to understand it. It would be more adequate to say that many 
domains of experience are primarily or exclusively constituted by expressive social practices and 
that, consequently, an access to experience of that kind is mostly linguistic.
50 This is their conclusion: “Our essentially linguistic investigations have led, seemingly ines-
capably, to the conclusion that the eleven basic color categories are pan-human perceptual universals. 
But we can offer no physical or physiological explanation for the apparently greater perceptual sali-
ence of these particular eleven color stimuli, nor can we explain in any satisfying way the relative 
ordering among them. Existing theories of color perception, both classical and recent, offer several 
plausible suggestions for parts of the observed pattern, but none will serve as the basis of an adequate 
explanation” (Berlin, Kay 1969: 109).
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single opposition.51 Still, we see in this case that the experiential spectrum is to 
some extent shaped prior to language, that particular languages “divide” it in an 
experientially motivated fashion, and that – in principle – there is no limit to mak-
ing and verbalizing ever fi ner distinctions (our “dialogue” with colour reality can 
go on for ever, if we perceive further differentiations signifi cant in some spheres 
of activity).
What about Whorfi an effects? Once we accept that linguistic categories ex-
press experientially relevant distinctions, we will not be surprised that language 
infl uences “habitual” responses to reality. If nothing special is expected, it is natu-
ral that people will use standard “slots” prompted by linguistic categories. Since 
“verb-framed” constructions, mentioned above, require only a specifi cation of 
“path” (and not necessarily of “manner”), there is little point in providing “extra” 
detail, unless one is asked to. Since Polish has not grammaticalised the feature 
“presumably known/unknown to the addressee”, it is verbalized only when the 
speaker fi nds it relevant (as opposed to English). Whorfi an effects of that kind 
are not signifi cant (they say nothing about the “mental world” of language users), 
because we normally have or may have experiential access to relevant physical 
distinctions and, in most cases, some verbal means to draw them.52
However, if the required experience is rooted in a social reality – if it is devel-
oped in the context of specifi c collective practices and institutions – then language 
marks distinctions which may not be accessible to members of other communities 
(like “cool!” to Queen Victoria). To give an example from Poland under the com-
munist rule, the English word “customer” could be easily translated into Polish at 
that time, since shops existed, but the underlying idea of the relevant social prac-
tice (as expressed by the phrase “Thank you for your custom!”) made little sense. 
In Poland, one “hunted” for better commodities – usually sold “under the counter” 
– and “customers” were treated by shop “assistants” as pests. This example is 
relatively superfi cial, as “doing shopping” is perhaps not a deeply “formative” 
experience.53 Still, it shows well enough that the source of strongest Whorfi an 
effects lies not simply in the linguistic character of a domain, but in social prac-
tices, which shape the experience in a given sphere of activity. Accordingly (to 
return to Slobin’s statement), when one wants to investigate “mental worlds”, 
one should focus primarily on social practices underlying linguistic distinctions. 
However, since this task necessitates highly interpretative, culture- and language-
51 The opposition which is diffi cult to verbalize (and imagine) when one operates on the basis 
of a more complex system of distinctions: perhaps “light vs. dark” or “cold vs. warm colours”? Cf. 
Wierzbicka’s comments (1990a: 128 ff.) and 0.2.
52 In the classic work on the “descriptive function” of language, Bühler notices that in each 
language family there are at least rudiments of structures fully developed in other families (1965: 
152). At this point, a philosopher may raise a more general issue: what structures are necessary for a 
language to allow a description of the world, cf. Patočka (1987: 123ff).
53 For a linguistic analysis of a formative social practice – “the cult of Mary, Mother of God” in 
Poland – see Tabakowska (2000).
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bound explorations, cognitive scientists tend to focus on perceptual domains and 
cross-linguistic structural patterns.
5.2. The formalism of linguistics: a Gadamerian view
I have already quoted Humboldt’s “energetic” defi nition of language (5.0). Let me 
quote now another passage, made famous by Chomsky, which presents in some 
detail the relationship between thought and language: “For language is quite pe-
culiarly confronted by an unending and truly boundless domain, the essence of all 
that can be thought. It must therefore make infi nite employment of fi nite means, 
and is able to do so through the power which produces identity of language and 
thought. But this also necessarily implies that language should exert its effect in 
two directions at once, in that it fi rst proceeds outwards to the utterance, but then 
also back again to the powers that engender it” (1999: 91).
The energetic defi nition emphasizes the processual nature of language as 
mental labour necessary for the expression of thought.54 The second passage, as 
pointed out by Gadamer, captures its essence as “a faculty that is aware of itself”, 
i.e. which is “able to make infi nite use of fi nite means” (Gadamer 1993: 441). This 
involves a two-way traffi c, which underlies the fundamental identity of thought 
and language: thinking arises in linguistic expression, which is subsequently ap-
propriated through refl ection and thus increases the ability to express thought (or 
one’s awareness), which in turn calls for subtler means of linguistic expression. 
As Humboldt puts it: “if the mental powers be lively enough, there issues from 
this constant striving and counter-striving of the soul an ever-greater refi nement 
of language, a growing enrichment thereof in spiritual content, which enhances 
the demands made of language in precisely the same measure as they are better 
satisfi ed” (1999: 92; emphasis in the original).
In his appreciation of Humboldt’s position, Gadamer notes that Humboldt 
limits “the universality of the connection between language and thought to the 
formalism of a faculty” (1993: 440). As we have seen, Humboldt captures the 
development of mental powers (or ideality) in terms of a positive reinforcement 
between linguistic and conceptual articulation. In his account, however, there is 
no source of propulsion, giving impetus to the process of expression, apart from 
arbitrarily distributed “will” (“if the mental powers be lively enough”). To be 
sure, the originary “will to speak” remains the central problem for all theories of 
the genesis of language. Even if we can sketch plausible scenarios of this kind (as 
we have seen in 5.1.1.–2.), it is still an unfathomable mystery why an ape species 
54 The material in this section and partly in the next one has been presented in Pawelec (to ap-
pear: b).
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discovered language (a mystery of the same order, perhaps, as other enigmas of 
reality: why is there life?; why is there consciousness?; why is there something 
rather than nothing?).55 One thing is clear by now. Contrary to Humboldt’s intui-
tion, what speech serves to articulate is primarily not thought, but a common situa-
tion. The will to speak is the will to connect with some aspects of reality56 and to 
make others see something in the world. This point is clearly made by Gadamer: 
“there is no refl ection when the word is formed, for the word is not expressing 
the mind but the thing intended” (1993: 426). The word is an attempt to articulate 
something about the world. Refl ection may come later as an effort to see whether 
(or how well) a given take fi ts in with one’s general grasp of the situation.
Let us ask now about the fate of the Humboldtian heritage in modern linguis-
tics. As we have seen (4.1.), Saussure is fully aware of the inextricable connection 
between thought and language. To quote again: “Without language, thought is a 
vague, unchartered nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct 
before the appearance of language [...] Neither are thoughts given material form 
nor are sounds transformed into mental entities; the somewhat mysterious fact is 
rather that ‘thought-sound’ implies division, and that language works out its units 
while taking shape between two shapeless masses” (1959: 112). Saussure’s notion 
of “linguistic value” appears to be close to Humboldt’s insight: language is “the 
domain of articulations”, or “reciprocal delimitations” of sounds and concepts 
(p. 112). However, Saussure argues at length (1959: 79–100) for a systematic 
approach to linguistic phenomena, which he fi nds possible only in synchronic 
linguistics. As a result, Humboldt’s focus on dynamic energeia – the linguistic 
energy which leads to an enrichment of mental powers and a parallel refi nement 
of linguistic structures – is replaced by the focus on static value: “the pairing of 
a certain number of acoustical signs with as many cuts made from the mass of 
thought engenders a system of values” (1959: 120). For Humboldt, a linguistic 
change may be a sign of spiritual development (assuming the change embodies 
mental labour). For Saussure, it results from the infl uence of external social forc-
es, which rather limit freedom and rationality. Since the linguistic sign is arbitrary, 
in principle the linguistic system could be organized at will in a perfectly rational 
manner. However, due to the infl uence of time, which produces deformations and 
even “teratological cases”, it cannot be improved by individual actions (1959: 32, 
78). In general, the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign makes the idea of spiritual 
development in language incomprehensible.
When we move on to Chomsky’s interpretation of Humboldt – which, ironi-
cally perhaps, led to the present-day revival of his thought – we lose sight of 
the genetic link between language and thought ever more completely. Although 
Chomsky presents Humboldt’s views under the rubric “creative aspects of lan-
55 To be sure, such questions are raised by philosophers, rather than scientists. Cf. a statement 
by a psychologist: “Brains that pulse with certain patterns of electrical activity are conscious. Why? 
They just are” (Donald 2001: 178).
56 In performative uses and most explicitly in verbal magic, cf. e.g. Leeuw (1997).
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guage use”, he does not relate the “patterned organization” of linguistic elements 
to mental labour necessary for articulation, but to “the fi nite system of generative 
principles” (Chomsky 1966: 22). In other words, Chomsky replaces “creativity” in 
language use as commonly understood (as acts generating new means of expres-
sion) with his own reinterpretation of it as the capacity to produce infi nitely many 
new sentences thanks to the application of recursive rules (cf. McLure 1990: 500). 
As noted by a critic: “The idea that we create and understand novel sentences 
because we know a set of rules is a travesty of the meaning of creativity, for it 
construes creativity as the mechanical action of rules in reproducing and com-
prehending what is already known” (Tyler 1978: 140). In Chomsky’s formalist 
account of language there is no place for spiritual development. Additionally, since 
generative principles are supposed to operate in individual minds, the social nature 
of language is lost from view.
CL apparently overcomes the formalist limitations of TG, as it places mean-
ing at the centre of linguistic analysis and even promises to explain “what people 
fi nd meaningful in their lives” (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: ix). However, in the main-
stream it takes for granted the mentalistic perspective on language developed by 
Chomsky: conceptual processes are prior to and independent of linguistic “surface 
structures”; language should be explained on the conceptual (“deep”) level. Since 
Chomsky’s focus is limited to the “combinatorial potential” of syntactic forms, 
his hypothetical “mentalese” may be purely formal: algorithmic and unmotivated. 
Cognitive linguists, on the other hand, are interested in the semantic potential of 
verbal units at all levels of generality and complexity. Consequently, the “men-
talese” they postulate must be much richer and motivated psychologically: by ap-
parently universal rules of perception and by more specifi c rules imposed by one’s 
cultural environment. However, in both cases the process of conceptualization 
is divorced from the mental labour inherent in verbal articulation, as described 
by Humboldt. At the same time, there is no recognition of the essentially social 
nature of the linguistic sign, as dependent on its place in the system of differences 
(linguistic value). Thus, language is reduced “to a simple naming-process” (Saus-
sure 1959: 65, 114).
In spite of important differences, all modern accounts of language mentioned 
above treat it merely as a “tool”. This perspective was most clearly articulated by 
Bühler with the Aristotelian notion of organon (1965: 24–28) and subsequently 
developed by Jakobson (1960). Bühler pointed out three basic functions of lan-
guage: representational, expressive57 and appellative, while Jakobson mentioned 
several additional ones, which may play a more or less important role in various 
acts of communication, e.g. poetic, magical, phatic. It should be clear at this point 
that a functionalist description of language, valid in its own limits and important 
57 Bühler’s “expressive” function is limited to acts of communication involving one’s inner 
states (emotions etc.). It should not be confused with hermeneutical “expression”, which involves a 
linguistic articulation of opaque reality.
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as an antidote to formalist tendencies, takes for granted common horizons opened 
up by linguistic expression.
When we look at language from the hermeneutical perspective – as a new way 
of collective being which opens up horizons in which reality may progressively 
appear for us – theories put forward by linguists are bound to seem limited. Gada-
mer accuses Humboldt of “formalism”, because language conceived as energeia 
allows to differentiate thought and refi ne the means of its expression, rather than 
provides an altogether more transparent access to reality.58 Subsequent conceptions 
may seem even more constrained: Saussure views language as a socially consti-
tuted system of values, Chomsky – as a generative system biologically implanted 
in individual heads, cognitive linguists – as networks of conceptualizations func-
tioning according to psychological rules, while all of them view language as a tool 
of communication rather than a transforming way of being.
But we may also treat these theories in the standard way: as steps along the 
path of scientifi c progress. Even if linguistics divorces language from the origi-
nary context of “opening up” for us a range of mute experience, this is properly 
so. Linguistics as a science must “objectify”, i.e. focus on language as separate 
from the world it helps to reveal. It is a set of “methods” – constrained ways of 
dealing with phenomena. As such, the theories mentioned above are necessarily 
“perspectival”, throwing light only on a particular aspect of language. And it may 
be argued that each of them is an improvement on its predecessor (even if gains 
are bought at a price). Consequently, the hermeneutical approach to language need 
not imply a criticism of linguistics (certainly, that was not Gadamer’s intention). 
Nevertheless, it may serve as a reminder to linguists of the scale and, ultimately, 
mysteriousness of the phenomenon they subject to analysis.59 
Finally, we may see better now that the interpretation of CL as “a return of 
[prestructuralist] hermeneutics to lexical semantics” put forward by Geeraerts 
and Tabakowska is only partly right. It is true that a wealth of interpretative ob-
servations concerning “psychological” motivations of linguistic forms made by 
linguists in the 19th and early 20th century has been integrated into a mentalistic 
paradigm. One may ask, however, whether in the process the very hermeneutical 
character of those observations has not been obscured. Any statements concern-
ing the history of linguistic ideas would obviously require a separate study. If one 
assumes, however, that the prestructuralist linguistics was (at least partly) Hum-
boldtian in spirit – i.e. exploring a situated and social mental labour of linguistic 
articulation within particular communities – then CL’s reprise of that heritage in 
mostly individualistic and universalist terms (a generic human being coping with 
its environment) brings with it both gains and losses which I have tried to capture. 
58 This “accessive” role of language is described by C. Taylor (2006). Cf. Pawelec (2009a, b).
59 I do not suggest that linguists require such reminders. As already mentioned, Saussure (1959: 
112) and Croft, Cruse (2004: 115) – for instance – freely admit the mysteriousness of linguistic phe-
nomena they aim to capture. My point is to underline the tension between the hermeneutical vision 
of language as transformative of reality and human life on the one hand and the vision of language as 
a tool of communication analysed in various ways by linguists on the other hand.
I-lamanie POPRAWKI NANIESIONE IISek1:175   Sek1:175 2013-04-08   14:13:21
176
In short, while CL can represent in a transparent way the results of processes of 
linguistic expression, it misrepresents their nature due to its cognitivist assump-
tions.
5.3. A plea for “expressive” linguistics
As I have already pointed out, a phenomenal success of CL is indicative of a 
disillusionment with (what is felt to be by many) arid formalisms of TG and of 
a widespread longing for linguistics “with a human face”. Despite its limitations 
– which I have tried to delineate in this book – CL has generated a vast body of 
work which reveals the “human factor” in language. Can one go further in the 
direction laid down by CL, while at the same time modifying its fundamental as-
sumptions? Let us inspect one such proposal.
Zlatev offers the notion of “a minimal, differentiated language game” (MDLG) 
as a correction of the idea of “embodiment” which was developed in cognitive se-
mantics (e.g. Johnson 1987). Basically, he wants to replace the view that linguistic 
meaning is “grounded” in physical interactions with environment (preconceptual 
“image schemas”) with the Wittgensteinian “view of language as constituting 
‘forms of life’, embedded or situated within sociocultural practices”. As he says, 
if cognitive semantics does not complement “physical” with “social” embodi-
ment, it “is bound to remain individualistic, trapped in solipsism or neural reduc-
tionism” (Zlatev 2003: 454; emphasis in the original).
We already know the force of this objection. The notion of “image schemas” 
refers back to Kantian “transcendental schemas” and, more generally, to the prob-
lem of knowledge: how can we know anything, assuming that reality is in constant 
fl ux? Plato famously proposed the realm of immutable ideas but subsequently 
demolished his own theory in Parmenides. The problems with all such a priori 
systems of categories are similar: any framework devised for the organization of 
experience is bound to seem arbitrary, while the application of a fi xed form to 
changing content involves endless regression (one needs a more general schema 
to apply a given schema, and so on). If one rejects idealism, and chooses to derive 
categories a posteriori from experience, the problems are even greater: experience 
is in fl ux, anything can be compared with anything else along an infi nite number 
of dimensions, and – crucially – comparison requires a standard (thus one returns 
to idealism). Johnson does not show a way out of such problems; he merely postu-
lates a limited set of categories (e.g. CONTAINER, PATH, BALANCE, CENTRE/
PERIPHERY) which supposedly emerge in universal physical experience and 
“ground” linguistic meanings. Despite empirical rhetoric (including the neuronal 
level), this is an idealistic solution, which is open to all typical objections. Specifi -
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cally, it does not face the problem of other minds, or (in its more relevant version 
for us) the problem of communication: how can one know what someone else has 
in mind? An “ostensive defi nition” is never enough: it can be interpreted in an 
infi nite number of ways. Hence Zlatev’s charge of solipsism.
The solution proposed by hermeneutics, and followed by Zlatev, is to reject 
that “meanings are in the head” (brain, mind). Meanings arise as ways to struc-
ture situations. Biological meanings arise in a habitat (or the fi eld of activity of a 
species) as a set of differentiations (of the type: “food/non-food”, “home/foreign 
territory”, “friend/foe” etc.) imposed by a generic search to satisfy the needs of 
a given type of creature. Such meanings are not conceptual (or ideal): they are 
available only as responses to a situation. Linguistic or conceptual meanings arise 
in the communal fi eld of expression and “sediment” – become freely available, 
can be used to actively structure any situation (real or imagined). As a result, a 
linguistic creature is at a distance from its environment (rather than at its beck and 
call) and can freely zoom in on things, not just in pressing circumstances, when it 
is on the look out for food or a predator. This means that even our “mute” experi-
ence – when we do not feel the need to use words or when we are confused and 
grope for words – is qualitatively different from the wordless world of animals. 
Such experience appears against the already structured background of cultural 
meanings – infi nitely richer than the biological meanings of an animal.
This account shows that when we talk about something in the world, we do not 
refer to an objective, language-independent state of affairs (with the concomitant 
problem of ostensive defi nition), or to a conceptualization, a node in an internal-
ised network of defi nitions (with the concomitant problem of other minds), but to 
“a humanly signifi cant, in part linguistically construed aspect of reality”. Conse-
quently, Zlatev proposes that the “semantic pole” of linguistic symbols should be 
conceived not as a “conceptualization”, but as a “situation (type)” (2003: 455; cf. 
Zielińska 2007a, b for a related proposal). His notion of MDLG emphasizes our 
social (i.e. partly linguistically constituted) situatedness. He talks of a “language 
game” to underline the fact that symbols are a matter of social convention; thus, 
it is social norms – rather than “truth conditions” or “conceptualizations” in indi-
vidual minds – which constitute criteria of their appropriate use. The “minimal” 
unit of language is an utterance – the smallest move in discourse. Crucially, the 
minimal unit is one which still possesses essential attributes of the entity in ques-
tion (as opposed to “atomistic” accounts). It is “differentiated”, since it consists of 
smaller entities: words or phrases, but it retains its holistic character (words have 
meanings only in situated use; one cannot properly base a linguistic theory on a 
lower level of structure than the minimal unit).
Zlatev’s notion of MDLG captures the social nature of linguistic meaning. 
It points to the fact that we inhabit a socially structured reality, which our lan-
guage has helped to articulate (thus, in a sense, we inhabit language). Let us notice 
that this idea is different from the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (in its strong version), 
which presents language almost as a set of animal habits one cannot but follow. It 
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is more adequate to say, after Gadamer, that language opens up a horizon within 
which things appear for the fi rst time and may be articulated ad infi nitum (as 
opposed to the animal realm, in which things have no independent status – they 
appear only fl eetingly in a situation as correlates of drives). Consequently, we 
are not forced to follow current articulations, while they are necessary as step-
ping-stones for all attempts at reformulating reality (and, of course, may be used 
unrefl ectively).
We can perhaps appreciate better now the signifi cance of the sequence in-
voked in the Introduction: “the issue of the representation of lexical senses (avail-
able out of context) presupposes the issue of distinct meanings of words in use, 
which in turn presupposes the question of the transformative power of words”. To 
be sure, the last question is bound to remain hardly transparent, since it concerns 
the contours of our life-world: the background of our understanding, underlying 
both unrefl ective, habitual practices and attempts at extending the boundaries of 
“domesticated” reality, which may transform its shape. This is necessarily so, 
if the hermeneutical diagnosis is right: something may appear only against an 
opaque background as a result of active engagements. In semantic terms, there 
are no single, “atomic” meanings. A meaning may appear only in a semantic fi eld, 
as a result of differentiations. In the animal world, meanings are available in a ge-
neric behavioural fi eld (or a habitat), constituted by basic polarizations refl ecting 
“biological” needs. In the human world, meanings refl ect existentially signifi cant 
entities and features (perhaps best exemplifi ed by such fundamental oppositions 
as “male/female”, “human/animal”, “night/day” or “earth/sky”) and they “sedi-
ment” in communicative fi elds, or become articulated and freely available. This 
communal, intersubjective process forms the necessary, intuitively accessible 
background of all acts of communication, thus providing a way out of the prob-
lems with ostensive defi nitions and other minds.
When we accept this semantic, linguistically articulated and intuitively acces-
sible background of communication, we may try to see more clearly the problem 
of “distinct” senses. Apparently, they are distinct when relevant referential situa-
tions are not only intersubjectively differentiated, but also felt to be opposed. The 
four senses of tease, mentioned in 0.4. and 4.3., are felt to be distinct because they 
refer to situations which are taken to be mutually exclusive (full “antagonism” 
pointed out by Croft and Cruse, cf. 0.4). This intuitive background of communi-
cation is far from transparent. Referentially distinct activities, e.g. “to paint” pic-
tures vs. walls, need not be opposed, or felt to be distinct senses (cf. Tuggy 1993). 
Why can one say: “John paints, and so does Jane” (when John paints walls in a 
gallery, and Jane paints pictures hanging in the gallery)? Such a statement may 
cause mild amusement, while “John teases Rex, and so does Jane” (when John 
teases the dog with a stick, while Jane – with a sausage) is openly aberrant (or 
zeugmatic). This intuitive difference calls for some explanation. One can specu-
late, for instance, that the former sentence is acceptable because painting as an art 
is felt to be a specialist variant of a more general activity (a “microsense” of sorts, 
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to use the terminology provided by Croft and Cruse). Apparently, microsenses are 
felt to become “distinct” senses when the situations they co-articulate drift apart 
in social perception (one can imagine that “teasing” a dog with a stick or a sausage 
would be perceived as a single sense in some “macho” cultures). To conclude, 
whatever explanations one puts forward, they should clarify our intuitions about 
what senses are felt to be socially antagonistic.
When we turn to the issue of the representation of distinct “senses”, we can 
see now that some of the accounts presented above “change the subject” (cf. 0.1.). 
Most blatantly, both Lakoff and Dewell – who invoke “imagistic” explanations 
– abstract from the intuitive background of communication in the name of some 
theoretical constructs (the “linguist’s fallacy”). When one begins with attested 
senses – as done by Queller and Taylor in a small segment of a lexeme’s applica-
tion, and more extensively by Tabakowska – the problem of the relatedness of 
senses looms large. It is perhaps intuitively tangible when one focuses on “recur-
sive” extensions of a single sense in phrases – their sequence seems transparent, 
since they are all covered by contemporary intuitions. When one tries, however, 
to relate the whole range of dictionary senses, one is at a loss because such senses 
were established in a history of expression, which is not intuitively accessible (as 
demonstrated by Saussure). The cognitivist solution is to represent the results of 
that history around the central senses, as revealed by contemporary intuitions. 
Can one do better? Can one actually uncover the layers of constitution? Is “ex-
pressive” linguistics possible?
We have seen one such attempt by Vandeloise (4.2.). Even though it does not 
represent the actual development of a single sense (a monosemic category), it 
clearly shows the pragmatic character of that process and the crucial role of op-
positions in it (LENGTH as opposed to WIDTH, BREADTH, HEIGHT, THICK-
NESS etc.). Another example known to me concerns a grammatical category – the 
French verbal adjective (McLure, Reed 1990). In both cases, it is the unity of a 
linguistic category which is at stake. Such examples suggest that one can imagina-
tively recreate the logical or notional (as opposed to the actual, diachronic) unity 
of a lexical category, when one focuses on “some vestiges […] of [a category’s] 
evolution”, i.e. “seemingly arbitrary aspects of the distribution of [a given term or 
category] and most notably their selection restrictions” (Vandeloise 1990: 418). 
Such attempts are openly interpretative and merely suggestive of the processes of 
meaning extension that must have taken place (while particulars and contingen-
cies are obviously hidden from view).
Consequently, my plea for “expressive linguistics” is tentative and limited. I do 
not propose a new “paradigm”, which could rival CL or other linguistic schools. 
Expressive linguistics would be necessarily based on individual insight, helping 
one to transcend contemporary intuitions. One thing is clear, though: such at-
tempts would have to take as their point of departure exceptions and irregularities, 
which are “regularized” or swept aside by mainstream linguistics.
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